Posted on 08/17/2007 9:15:19 AM PDT by knighthawk
In a few weeks, the war in Afghanistan by one count will be six years old. By another, it has been going on for more than three decades. This war has made Afghanistan (especially its southeastern region, along with western Pakistan) the epicenter of global Islamist-jihadist terrorism.
The war during the 1980s, directed, funded and waged for geopolitical reasons through irregular fighters often proudly praised as "mujahideen," led to three significant influences: the propagation of irregular sub-conventional war through terrorism in the name of religion; a phenomenal spread and diffusion of military-specification sophisticated weapons to the jihadist groups; and important perceptions of the outcome of that war.
All these are dominant templates in the current war in Afghanistan, though in an enormously expanded scale that undermines security and stability in the Middle East and beyond. Perhaps the most difficult issue to deal with, having ramifications in terms of its impact on the ongoing war in Afghanistan (and Iraq), are the perceptions of victory and defeat. The Soviet Union pulled out after a decade in a fairly organized manner, leaving behind a well-entrenched Afghan regime with a capable military force that successfully defended its outposts for years. But across the world, especially among Muslim populations, the perception rapidly grew that the jihad waged by Afghan mujahideen had "defeated" a superpower and its surrogate regime in Afghanistan.
Radical jihadist terrorism erupted from the Balkans through Kashmir to the Philippines. An even more radical Taliban was created to unseat the mujahideen regime in Kabul. The 1993 terrorist bombing of the World Trade Center in New York and other acts of Islamist terrorism were but some of the tragic consequences. Religious terrorism itself became an instrument of policy for many, promoted and propagated by an increasingly fundamentalist army in Pakistan that invoked holy scripture to legitimize terrorism after including "jihad" in its motto.
Unfortunately, despite its enormous military acumen and capability NATO has not, even after six years, succeeded in ensuring peace and security in Afghanistan. If anything, the Taliban show deeply disturbing signs of resurgence; Waziristan in West Pakistan appears to be slipping out of Islamabad's control (which was tenuous at the best of times). The political goals and military objectives of the global war on terrorism, whether achievable or not, appear to be increasingly irrelevant. The failure of NATO to achieve a recognizable "victory" over radical terrorist forces will have far reaching consequences for the region from the Mediterranean to the South China Sea, especially when this happens to coincide with the inability of the sole superpower, even after four years, to win the peace in Iraq.
There are already signs of a replay of the post-Soviet development of Islamic militancy and jihad now that it is clear that NATO and the United States are unlikely to win the war on terrorism. Hizbullah's semi-conventional war last year raining thousands of short-range rockets on the Israeli population is a recent example - in spite of the skillful performance of the Israel air force.
Meanwhile, America's withdrawal of the bulk of its military forces from an Iraq on fire can only add to the two-decade-old belief that Islamic militancy and jihad can defeat even a superpower. Pakistan, which has been playing a major role in the war in Afghanistan, contributing to its radicalization and militancy, is itself facing a defining point in its turbulent history. A weakened army regime, the forthcoming elections, and a patchwork democracy that leaves the army (and its intelligence agencies) free to wield influence, though not accountable for the further growth of terrorism will provide more space for expansion of Taliban and jihadist influence in Pakistan in the coming years.
We need a stable and non-radical Afghanistan if growth of global terrorism is to be reversed. This requires careful crafting and sustained policies to encourage moderate, albeit tribal cultures. The time may have come for a fundamental shift in strategy in Afghanistan from trying to defeat Al-Qaeda to containing the Taliban and insulating the badlands from the rest of the country.
However, even this cannot be done without the full participation of Islamabad on one side and the cooperation of Iran on the other. Current trends read against the backdrop of past lessons indicate that both will be more difficult as time goes by. The US-Iran confrontation on nuclear issues has helped the hard-liners in Tehran to move toward assertive chauvinism. As for Pakistan, a civilian government with little actual power would find it more difficult to curb religious extremism, as indeed was the case through the 1990s.
That's why we may be on the threshold of the further spread of religious extremism and terrorism emanating from Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Jasjit Singh is director of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in New Delhi. This commentary first appeared at bitterlemons-international.org, an online newsletter.
Ping
Well, they are dying in greater and greater numbers... and their leadership life expectancy is around 6 weeks.
LLS
On second thought... let’s just put the author on our terrorist watch list.
LLS
This misconception was fostered by our neglect of all things Afghanistan after the Russians pulled out. Prior to our support the muj were getting their asses kicked and wouldn’t have lasted another year. Once we filled the pipeline with the proper arms the end of the Russians was just a matter of time.
The error by the muj is that they did this with only Allah’s help.
ping
I do think that early on in Afghanistan, the US should have created some massive, though not particularly expensive, works projects to put literally hundreds of thousands of Afghans to work for their equivalent of minimum wage and food. Since their wage is tiny, a few billion dollars could have funded it all for years.
The greatest difficulty would have been in setting up a system by which either their families would get their wages, or they would be put into a bank for them.
This would mean that a few years on, along with other reconstruction, the typical Afghan on the street would either be providing for his family or would have cash to spend—a big boost to their national economy, and not just from the top down.
And while their work would be unskilled, they could do much infrastructure improvement of all kinds, hopefully that would lay the groundwork for other economic development.
By now, it would also have been a good way for the millions of returning Afghan refugees to re-integrate into the economy. Entire villages could be torn down and rebuilt from scratch as larger and far more efficient towns with many more amenities for their old and new citizens, including an expanded marketplace, civic buildings, etc.
Canals dug, rivers re-channeled, farmland cleared, earthen anti-flood dams built, even forests planted.
The more peaceful areas of Afghanistan would benefit the most from redevelopment, and would have most to gain from keeping the peace.
“Black flags of Khorasan” bump
While road building is good, and helps the central government to reconnect the country, it is more “results oriented” than “employment oriented.” What I was talking about was really a “zero unemployment” program whose primary goal is a big (relatively speaking) jump in standard of living for the typical Afghan.
Of course it isn’t make-work, but what it does is less important than that it employs the unemployed, keeping them out of mischief. Hundreds of thousands of fighting aged men who have food and a small job are not joining the Taliban just to eat.
It has tons of beneficial side effects. It gives the government a census of sorts. They know who is employed and who is unemployed, and those who claim no employment but are still out and about are probably up to no good. Officially the money and the food is coming from the central government, which shows it is working (even if the real government never gets the chance to steal it). The workers get ID cards and are put in the system.
The workers are also a captive audience, so that they get their news and information from the government, not rumor or the enemy. Literate government couriers bring messages from and to their work camps and villages, so workers have second hand confirmation that their money is making it home (delivered by US or NATO personnel, not the Afghan courier.)
Workers are also given a pitch to join the military, they can be given practical teaching and training to improve their lives when they go home, and they can even get lessons in patriotism and nationalism.
When a very large work detail comes to a town with an offer to rebuild and improve it, their new hires from that town do it as their first job, so they see the money going to their families. This is when other aid projects like setting up micro banks comes into play, so that the new town has new businesses.
Having your town rebuilt, with lots of new money and work come to it means quick better times for all, so they are also quick to be very friendly to the government as a town. Word also travels to adjacent towns of all the good stuff, and they want to get in on the deal, too.
The hordes of refugees are put to work first in the countryside, which gives the government time to relocate them so they don’t overwhelm the system. And all the while they are getting food and pay, so when they get to their new homes they won’t be destitute.
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