With something like a Patriot battery, all 3 components are co-located. But consider a distributed air-defense network. Or even one in which the local command/control node reports to a central command node. (Now who do we know that prefers centralized control? Hint, think Soviet era...) The reporting almost certainly is not hard-wired, land-line stuff. Particularly if you're designing a mobile system, or one that is supposed to survive battle damage to infrastructure, etc.
So there are a lot of comms going on via radio - computer to computer. This may include tracking messages from the radar computer back to the command site's computer - saying (in a formatted binary message) "Hey, I have a target at ..." It may also include requests to engage, authority to engage, etc. The command node may be able to direct the sensor to alter sensitivity, sweep different search sectors, go into a mode incompatible with picking up low flying aircraft, etc.
If you could electronically get on that same comm net's frequency, and you understand the message formats in use... And I assume they'd be encrypted some how... But suppose you could break into this... Then you'd own the radar, the command node, etc. You could push the radar around like you owned it. You could inject false targets, or cancel the reports of the ones the radar is sending.
Heck, you probably don't even have to be able to decrypt the traffic. Suppose you just "step on" the traffic enough, at the right times, to get the command node to reject all tracking messages from the radar? The radar is dutifully reporting seeing new targets, but the command node never gets an un-garbled message... Hence they never see it, never command the radar to go from search to fire-control/engagement mode... You sail through with the radar watching you with little interest, but the *system* ignoring you...
This is all just theory. If, if that is what happened, they'll figure it out after debriefing the radar crews: "How come you didn't order us to engage the targets?" - "What targets? How come you didn't report any?"
So yeah, it was a risk revealing such a thing is possible (if in fact it is). But the real bite in the shorts is that there may be no good remediation for it. Or maybe they didn't sweat revealing this capability 'cause they have something else up their sleeve too? Or maybe the remediation for this is worse than the effect, or can be taken advantage of in some other way. It is a game of cat 'n mouse, and the advantage is generally with the attacker, since they control the pace and the engagement and the defense is well, on the defense, reacting to the attacker.
So basically, maybe they didn't hide their aircraft from the sensors, or jam the radars. Maybe they hid their aircraft from the system, and in-effect jammed the system...???
Blinding the Syrian AD system is entirely feasible. Doesn’t have to be high tech to do it, either. Could be as simple as Mossad agents having the right phone numbers, right names, and right accents to get away with telling dispersed Syrian radar units to shut down for 5 minutes for a “maintenance check.”
The Syrians *did* track the F-15I’s from the attack point onward. That’s worth considering. That’s how the Syrians were able to recover the Israel F-15I drop tanks so quickly from such remote, rugged terrain in Turkey.
But the Syrians didn’t hit any of the Israeli aircraft, which means they failed to defend their airspace.