The NIE is a State Department brain fart, and as such must be taken with a grain of salt.
The National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) titled Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities should receive acclamation for political marketing and condemnation for intelligence value. An intention is a future determination to act in a particular manner. A capability represents possession of sufficient mental and/or physical power to perform an act. Intelligence agencies should contribute information about intentions and capabilities for the policy decision-making tasks of others.
The current NIE becomes a policy determinant by using a data point, belonging to text, and contorting it into the primary judgment. The estimate Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003, and had not restarted, states past circumstances representing neither intentions nor capabilities. The NIE does not assume Iranian intention to acquire nuclear weapons, but assertions follow of intentions and capabilities to produce weapons grade uranium, solve associated technical problems, and make subsequent political decisions to proceed with program execution. Potential Iranian policy momentums, and present technical capability estimates continually reflected upon the defining Scope statement. Therefore, political exposition, advocating an accommodative policy toward Iran and its aims, retained primary rhetorical stature. The NIE also baselessly asserted traditional Western diplomatic efforts caused Iran to halt its program. The document avoided accountable assessments of Iran’s intentions.
The report’s political exposition required studied ignorance towards available intelligence data. General Abireza Asgari who defected March 2007 had extensive access to Iran’s nuclear and intelligence secrets. Nowhere does the document qualify statements to recognize traditional security procedures. After his 2005 employment change procedures should limit access to Iran’s nuclear program and intelligence agencies. Defection then required posting bodyguards of deception around continuing operations. An assessment with moderate to high confidence should always require at least two independent sources. Judgments overturning previous assessments should subject data to special scrutiny and skepticism. Obtaining even one trusted source from behind a new security wall within a closed society becomes very unlikely.
Contrary to report assertions, military action offered a key incentive during that period by removing the immediately adjacent Taliban and Hussein regimes. The fact Libya eliminated WMD programs, and the supposition Iran halted their nuclear weapons initiatives should acknowledge intentional or unwitting application of war residing on a continuum of diplomacy. Talks, conferences and economic measures serve as war without bloodshed; war serves as diplomacy with bloodshed. Intelligence and espionage provide a medium invigorating all options.
This latest NIE presents another milepost along the way to complete corrosion of U.S. intelligence. Determined destruction began as the Church and Pike Committees eviscerated the CIA, which can only provide value when operating powerfully within a cunning and ruthless world. Congress under pretense of “reasserting” authority plundered authority given to all presidents since George Washington to conduct clandestine operations. Congressional blindness seeks interminable briefing requests and micro-manages operations. Presidents suffer petulant demands to confirm ever more intelligence officials. Hearings provide the shallow political theater needed for re-election. Without profound catastrophes, there seems little interest to reinvigorate our “short of war” capabilities.
It cannot be done under any Republican president. A rework of the NIE process will certainly be spun as an attempt to cook the books.
Save your breath, John.