The interview above was after the anthrax was mailed but before the first death was diagnosed as due to anthrax. Dr. Alibek then was interviewed on ABC’s Nightline on October 17, 2001. He addresses the question of the access to know-how of former Russian scientists.
KOPPEL: If anyone should know about the potentially sinister uses of anthrax and other biological and chemical agents it’s Ken Alibek. He defected to the United States after two decades overseeing the Soviet Union’s biological weapons program. Thirty thousand people reported to him. And he told Congress that some 7,000 to 9,000 of those have the knowledge to create and disseminate biological agents. Dr. Alibek is with us here in Washington.
And when you talk about those 7,000 to 9,000 people, where are they? What are they doing? Does anybody know?
Mr. KENNETH ALIBEK (President, Hadron Advanced Biosystems): It is very difficult to answer this question. I’m assuming the great majority of them are still in Russia and in some—in some other form of Soviet Union countries. Some of them are in Europe. Some of them in the United States, and then some of them are in some Asian and Middle Eastern countries.
KOPPEL: Do you think some of them have been hired, in effect, as—as contract agents by people who might even be engaging in the kinds of things we’re seeing here in the United States right now?
Mr. ALIBEK: In—in my opinion, it’s—it’s probable.
***
Mr. ALIBEK: In my opinion, there is a solution. Keeping in mind that there are many biological weapons, threat agents, we need to start thinking broadly. And I—in saying this, I mean theoretically, it is possible to develop a broad spectrum defense against biological weapons.
***
KOPPEL: That interview conducted earlier this evening. Dr. Alibek also told us that scientists in the former Soviet Union were working on a defense against biological weapons, and he believes the Russians today would be willing to work jointly with America on such a project. It should also be noted that Alibek’s Virginia company is currently developing the so-called human immune system boosters. Back in a moment.
Dr. Alibek testified before the House Armed Services Committee Oversight Panel on Terrorism on May 23, 2000 about the issue of proliferation of biological weapons.
“Biological weapons are relatively inexpensive and easy to produce. Although the most sophisticated and effective versions require considerable equipment and scientific expertise, primitive versions can be produced in a small area with minimal equipment by someone with limited training.
***
By far, the most effective mode for applying biological weapons is an aerosol cloud. Such a cloud is made up of microscopic particles and is therefore invisible. It can be produced in several ways, most of which involve either an explosion (some type of bomb) or spraying (usually involving a special nozzle on a spray tank). The effectiveness of the cloud is determined by numerous factors, such as the amount of agent that survives the explosion or spraying, and the wind and weather conditions outdoors or air flow and ventilation indoors.”
“The interest of terrorist groups in biological weapons is no surprise. Biological weapons have a number of very attractive features for terrorist uses. Their killing power can approach that of nuclear weapons. They are relatively inexpensive to make. A small-scale biological weapons attack using a common disease organism, such as tularemia or plague, can be masked as a natural outbreak. The effects of a biological weapons attack are not apparent for several days, allowing the perpetrator tune to vanish. The raw material—disease- producing strains of microorganisms—fairly easy to obtain. And the techniques and equipment that are used in ordinary biotechnology research and production can be used for biological weapons.”
Comment:
Ayman in a memo to Atef said the group had become interested in biological weapons only because US officials kept telling the world how easy they were to make.
“Terrorists interested in biological weapons are on the level of state- sponsored terrorist organizations such as that of Osama bin Laden; on the level of large, independent organizations such as Aura Shrinikyo; or on the level of individuals acting alone or in concert with small radical organizations.”
Comment:
Given that Ken has told me he knew Ali was a hardliner — more recently he described Ali as a fanatic — it would seem that GMU should have been aware of the threat of such “individuals acting alone or in conert with small radical organizations” (if not Al Qaeda itself).
Dr. A continued:
“Although these groups will produce biological weapons with varying levels of sophistication, they all can potentially cause great damage. *** Furthermore, there is no doubt that we will see future uses of biological weapons by terrorist groups, as there have been several attempts already.”
***
For terrorist groups, the most likely source of such knowledge would be state-sponsored biological weapons programs, which have the financial and scientific wherewithal to perfect production and deployment techniques. Since the Soviet Union and Russia had the most sophisticated and powerful biological weapons program on earth, the former Soviet states present a particular proliferation threat. The tremendous knowledge amassed by former Soviet scientists would be extremely useful to both military and terrorist organizations.”
Comment:
Given he knows the threat is grave, and his program would be a prime target for infiltration, what steps were taken to ensure that someone not allied with the Salafi-Jihadis and preaching on the signs of the coming day of judgment was not sharing his fax, mail drop and water fountain?
Having worked for Andrew Card once (for two months in 1996 when Mr. Card was Secretary of Transportation), did Ali use Mr. Card as a reference?
Dr. Alibek continued:
“When most people think of proliferation, they imagine weapons export. In the case of biological weapons, they picture international smuggling either of ready-made weapons material, or at least of cultures of pathogenic microorganisms. However, this area of proliferation is of the least concern. Even without such assistance, a determined organization could obtain virulent strains of microorganisms from their natural reservoirs (such as soil or animals), from culture libraries that provide such organisms for research purposes, or by stealing cultures from legitimate laboratories.”
Comment:
American Type Culture Collection co-sponsored Ali’s bioinformatics program. I am told by a former ATCC scientist — the scientist says she/he was terminated for an expressed concern for security — that Ali would have had access to the ATCC patent repository (as distinguished from its less interesting online catalog).
Dr. Alibek continued:
“Given the current economic situation in the states of the former Soviet Union, the incentive to sell equipment and knowledge suitable for biological weapons production without regard to their eventual use is great both for the government and for individual scientists and businessmen. The Russian government has long been short of funds, and its biotechnology arena has also been adversely affected. Many of its scientists are unemployed; those that are employed are paid poorly or not at all Some of them have been forced to turn to other lines of work, such as street vending. It is important for the international community to ensure that these scientists have legitimate, decent- paying work to do in their fields.
The proliferation issue is particularly complex for biological weapons. In many cases, the same equipment and knowledge that can be used to produce biological weapons can also be used to produce legitimate biotechnological products ***”
Dr. Alibek concluded:
“To protect ourselves from the threat of biological weapons, we must increase our awareness and understanding of the threat, strengthen current international agreements and increase transparency ***”
Comment:
ATCC refuses to say whether they had virulent Ames in its patent repository. Dr. Bailey refuses to confirm Ali was not more than 15 feet from both Dr. A and Dr. B.