Polish Commentary Analyzes Russia's Relations With West

[Commentary by Marek Ostrowski: "What about Russia?" - the article incorporates a box with commentary by "W.S": "Shield Still Uncertain"]

The interests of global powers - Russia, the United States and the EU - are bound up with the issue of Georgia, a small yet strategically located country. This conflict has yet again intensified Poland's fear of Russia, a feeling that runs in our blood. Do we have reason to fear?

History likes to repeat itself: August 2008 in Georgia comes a mere 40 years after August 1968 in Czechoslovakia. Back then, Moscow ousted the disobedient government from Prague in line with [deceased Soviet leader] Brezhnev's doctrine and replaced it with a friendly government, brought in Russian tanks. Even though no new government has been brought to Tbilisi this time, the military defeat of the Georgians' incursion into Ossetia may remove the pro-American President Saakashvili from power. And it serves as a warning to other countries, the former Soviet satellite states: do not mess with us, because we are close and America is far away. Does this mean that Moscow has adopted a softer version of Brezhnev's doctrine, namely [Russian Prime Minister] Putin's doctrine?

First of all, who is to blame for the war, victims and suffering? Today, it appears that both sides - Saakashvili and Moscow - wanted a confrontation, but Moscow waited for the naive and hotheaded Saakashvili to make a serious mistake and pull the trigger. And this is what happened. Saakashvili made a bad mistake by promising to "restore the constitutional order" during the election campaign. Fulfilling this promise (sending troops to take control over Ossetia) was an even worse mistake. This is because the Russian- Georgian agreement of 1992 did not give him the right to do so. Ossetia is part of Georgia but enjoys autonomy and the supervision of "international" (in this case Russian) troops.

Saakashvili's faults paled when the international community saw the brutality of Russia's response. Russia decided not only to fight back but also to impose an exemplary punishment on its neighbour. Russia's disproportionate use of force, also in Georgian territory, means a unanimous verdict of guilty.

For a brief moment, Russia's intervention in Georgia brought back the forgotten imperial categories of "the near abroad" [the now independent former Soviet republics] (a Russian political term that indicates that the countries that are close to Russia, even the independent ones, should have a special status of not fully sovereign states), "the zone of influence", and "the game of superpowers".

Russia sent out an evident signal that the former Soviet republics should not seek closer relations with America in the Caucasus, which is allegedly part of the "near abroad" or "gray area".

When the satellite states from Central Asia were given a free hand following the USSR dissolution, the Americans did not let the opportunity slip and joined the race for natural gas and oil in the former Soviet backyard. This race was not a pleasant experience for Russia, especially because Washington showed no consideration for Russia's pride. In the US Department of State, the person in charge of Caucasian affairs is Matthew Bryza, an energetic diplomat and deputy assistant secretary of state who frequently visits Tbilisi. Incidentally, he is fluent in both Polish and Russian. "The United States wants to break Moscow's iron grip by mobilizing businesses and countries to build new pipelines that will bypass Russia and Iran," Bryza said in public. And such pipelines, bypassing Russia in the Southern Corridor, have been built over the past 10 years.

In this war over pipelines, Georgia has special importance. If resources in Azerbaijan are a rich bottle, Georgia is the cork of this bottle. What is located further towards the Caspian Sea and behind it must be transported via Georgia. Moreover, if the West loses Georgia and Azerbaijan, it will also lose the only route to Central Asia that is independent of Russia, which means the route leading to natural gas in Turkmenistan and oil in Kazakhstan. These resources may be transported to the West either through Russia or through the Caucasus, which means Georgia.

In the area of rivalry between Russia and the West, not everyone is faring so badly as Georgia. There is another model of relations: a clever game on both sides. This is Azerbaijan. It became independent when [former] President Heydar Aliyev sold the right to extract oil to Western oil concerns in 1994. Russia worried even more about the launch of the BTC [Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan] pipeline, which deprived it of the monopoly on the transportation of Caspian oil to the West. Despite the Kremlin's dissatisfaction, [Azerbaijani President] Ilham Aliyev has very closely cooperated with Mikheil Saakashvili over recent years: when Russia cut off gas supplies to Georgia in 2006, it was Aliyev who helped Georgia by offering a contract. Moreover, Azerbaijan and Georgia are building a Transcaucasian railroad to Turkey.

But Azerbaijan does not want to mess with Russia and even cannot afford to do so. In order to maintain good relations, it leased a radar station in Qabala to Russia and is still eager to sell oil to this country.

However, Georgia with its European and NATO-oriented aspirations is not Azerbaijan. Georgia poses a serious problem and further relations between countries in the world will be largely determined by how the West solves this problem.

It is now clearly visible that the EU made a mistake when it pushed for Kosovo's independence, completely ignoring Russia's opinion. After all, the rule of Serbia's territorial integrity could have been maintained. There are sufficient legal formulas to ensure this. But Russia was offered an argument: no one can be forced to stay under a given country's flag. Now Moscow is issuing a challenge not only on the issue of the Georgian regions of Ossetia and Abkhazia. Transnistria (ruled by Russian placemen) is severing contacts with Moldova, even though in theory it constitutionally belongs to this country. (Romania not only failed to recognize Kosovo but warned against its recognition in public specifically because of negative consequences for the "Russian" Transnistria in the future.)

Was President Kaczynski right when he shouted at the rally in Tbilisi that Moscow would now reach for Ukraine, for the Baltic republics and, in the long term, perhaps also for Poland? Russia's cold war with the Baltic republics has been waged for nearly 20 years. Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia proclaimed independence in Spring 1990 and were able to negotiate the withdrawal of Russian troops in the early 1990s: the last echelons left Estonia in August 1994. [Deceased Russian President] Boris Yeltsin's weak Russia could not stop the Baltic states' dreams about membership in NATO and the EU, even though it protested extremely vociferously and set "impassable lines."

In this local cold war, Moscow is accusing Latvia and Estonia of oppressing the Russian minority and glorifying the Baltic SS divisions that fought against the Red Army, while Lithuania comes under criticism for impeding transportation links with the Kaliningrad Region.

The Baltic states are paying back by accusing Russia of aggressive and imperialist intentions, at the same time claiming compensation for the years of Soviet occupation. Until recently, Latvia and Estonia did not even have border treaties with Russia! Latvia solved this problem as recently ago as in 2007. Wherever it can, Russia tries to make relations with small neighbours more complicated. Hence the espionage scandals that break out every now and then, the tussle over the Bronze Soldier of Tallinn and the fact of cutting off oil supplies to the refinery in Mazeikiai, which had been purchased by Orlen [Polish oil concern].

For years, the Kremlin has been trying to create the impression in the West that Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia are not yet prepared to join NATO or the EU. But when their membership became a fact, the Kremlin began to treat the Baltic states not as independent partners but as Brussels' provinces. According to the Kremlin, Brussels should now discipline these provinces. Of course, the best thing to do would be to discipline them in accordance with Russian suggestions and warnings. According to the Russians, the EU is therefore now responsible for the situation of the Russian minority in Latvia and Estonia.

But many things have changed! Poland and the Baltic republics are members of both the EU and NATO and there is absolutely no indication that things could be different.

However, what happened in Georgia exposed the painful lack of a well thought-out Western policy towards Russia under Putin (which is stronger and wealthier than under Yeltsin) more clearly than ever before. At the beginning of his term, Bush was enchanted by Putin. He said that he "looked into his eyes and saw a good soul". He had tangible reasons to see Russian goodwill. Shortly after that, following the 9/11 attacks, Putin did not hesitate to help America, especially by making Russian bases in Uzbekistan (an ostensibly independent country that was, after all, right under Russia's nose) available to the United States. Western gratitude towards Russia proved tangible, too. Russia was given rewards that need not have been given: a formal mechanism of cooperation with NATO, which means the NATO-Russia Council, and international prestige in the form of a place in the Group of Seven (annual consultations between the leaders of the world's most industrialized countries, even though Russia's level did not make it a suitable member). But the West failed to agree on any common policy on Russia.

Roughly speaking, one can see three approaches. The United States approach involves pulling Russia into the Atlantic area of influence, competing fiercely with this country in politics and business and forcefully taking over zones of influence wherever it can. The approach adopted by Germany and France involves doing business with Russia, hoping that security will be ensured by links established through mutual arm-twisting. When it comes to Poland and the former Soviet satellites - well, whoever can should try and describe these relations. One option involves adopting a cautious approach to business, stressing how much we suffered from Soviet crimes and warning the naive West against Russia's expansion.

Georgia caused an upheaval among Western countries or at least a wave of opinions that the West needs to adopt a tougher or more sober policy on Moscow under Putin and [Russian President] Medvedev. [French] President Sarkozy helped negotiate an understanding that should prompt the Russians to pull out. [German] Chancellor Angela Merkel flatly stated that Georgia would be a NATO member if it wanted it. Likewise, prospects for Ukraine's membership in NATO may be now better. George Bush mentioned the possibility of withdrawing the US support for efforts to introduce Russia into the political and economic structures of the 21st century. Condoleezza Rice also threatened with the international isolation of Russia. Commentators named all possible ways of sending out signals to Moscow that its policy will not be helplessly tolerated in the West. Theoretically, this includes refusing to accept Moscow as member of the OECD or WTO (which is a more serious issue, as this organization defines the rules of global trade) as well as pulling back from pushing for a new agreement about partnership and cooperation with the EU (but does Moscow want this agreement?), discontinuing its membership in the Group of Eight, suspending the NATO-Russia Council and depriving Russia of the right to stage the 2014 Sochi Olympic Games. But is such isolation possible?

The Kremlin's current policy enjoys support among the Russian public and it is difficult to find anyone in Moscow who would feel indignant at the use of force against Georgia. However, Russia appears to be losing on a very important field of European propaganda, especially in big countries - in Germany and France, where it enjoyed considerable support until recently. If this decision were vested solely with the leaders of Germany and France, they would probably ignore Georgia, especially because this is a far- away country and the fighting is now over. However, the public may now require more of its politicians: cooperation with Russia - yes, of course, but Russia must observe the international rules of the game.

A prominent Polish expert on security issues says that Russia would have achieved much more if it had demonstrated only the possibility of a military response following Saakashvili's attack and immediately referred to international organizations and arbitration. Most probably, Russia would have made the EU and NATO force Saakashvili to pull out of South Ossetia and Abkhazia by invoking the agreements of 1992, which gave these two Georgian provinces great autonomy. But Russia decided to do something else.

Our problem involves the fact that Poland's domestic and international policies have become so closely entwined that no refined diplomacy can be conducted because the aim is not to achieve tangible results (also in the area of security!) but above all to win applause in a patriotic costume show. Much has been written about President Kaczynski's presence at the rally in Tbilisi and his inauspicious comment of "we have come here to fight" as well as about the division into those who were present (the brave ones) and those who were absent (by implication, cowards). Well, politics is after all more difficult than propaganda.

Unfortunately, the Russian issue has important internal (as well as historical and emotional) connotations in Poland and whenever it is necessary to pursue policy together with Russia or towards Russia, politicians (who are scared stiff of pragmatism and realpolitik) make attempts to outdo each other. It has been wrongly and childishly assumed that patriotism manifests itself in "courageous and uncompromising" declarations against Russia, not in how much Poland and the Poles actually obtain in foreign policy.

Under the circumstances, there is no reason to be glad about the US missile defence shield (see box on page 13). This project is distant and still uncertain. Likewise, it is a bad thing that the shield will be built in Poland not as a NATO initiative but in response to the Georgian crisis. Tomasz Zalewski, our correspondent in Washington, is hinting that given the current context, the shield has been apparently treated there as part of sanctions against Russia.

Right now, the Bush administration has nothing to lose, because the policy of pulling Russia into partnership-based cooperation, pursued for 16 years (since the USSR collapse), has been abandoned. The situation is no longer idyllic and Moscow has to be made clearly aware of this fact. But how? "If a military response is out of the question, Patriots play the role of a surrogate signal," explains Charles Kupchan, a leading expert on European affairs and former high-ranking official in President Clinton's administration.

Well then, but who will draw the short straw in this project? America? The Russians will do no harm to the Americans. Europe? Certainly not. Poland? Of course! When Brzezinski, who is after all no friend of Putin's, asked if America would cover the costs of Russia's potential boycott of Poland, why did no one give an answer in that discussion? Of course, an alliance with America is very important for Poland's national interests, but we cannot be an ally that keeps drawing the short straw. Our fears of Russia are justified, not only historically. Many of Russia's current activities raise concerns. Responding to these activities, we cannot by guided by historical experience alone, by fear or by political calculation at home.

On the face of it, Warsaw should be glad about the fact that Russia's public image has been spoilt and that we can hear Western pledges to adopt a tougher line on Moscow or even to isolate it. In essence, however, this is a major challenge for Polish policy. Will we gain more by standing out among those who are criticizing Russia and making our rhetoric even more pointed or by showing self- restraint and becoming open to dialogue? Warsaw should appreciate the Russian saying "the quieter you are, the further you go," especially because the slogan of isolating Moscow is good in Portugal or across the Atlantic but not in a country that borders Russia.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov is supposed to visit Warsaw in September and we have many important bilateral issues to resolve with him. Despite bad experience with Georgia, the West is still faced with the same choice in Eastern policy: isolation or engagement and inclusion? The answer to this question cannot be too hasty or intuitive.

Today, Poland is part of the West and should influence Eastern policy in the EU and NATO, also because of its historical experience. Russia's imperialist inclinations can be more effectively fought in Berlin, Paris, Brussels or Washington than in Tbilisi. But this is more difficult than achievements in wars fought with faces and words, which make people feel better.

In exchange for our agreement to deploy 10 US anti-missiles near Slupsk, Washington agreed to delegate one battery with 96 Patriot missiles to Poland and sign an agreement with Warsaw about closer military cooperation, which includes covering Poland with the Patriot air-defence system as well as setting up a joint commission to examine threats from third-party states. The agreement includes no provisions about the target number of batteries or the amount of the US outlays for the modernization of the Polish Armed Forces. Nonetheless, this is not what the government wanted. Rejecting the previous offer in July, [Prime Minister] Donald Tusk clearly said that he made efforts to obtain not money for the Armed Forces but security guarantees for Poland. According to the government, the current missile defence agreement's wording has in fact the value of a bilateral military alliance. We will see whether this is in fact the case when the agreement is published. Either way, this enthusiasm should be slightly dampened already today. First of all, the US guarantees hinge on the deployment of the shield and this may be prevented not only by the future US president but also by the conditions that the US Congress may impose on the project, making further funding conditional on the ratification of [missile defence] agreement in Polish and Czech parliaments and on whether the Pentagon presents evidence that the shield is effective. In the Czech Republic, the ratification will not take place until 2009 and may be unsuccessful. Realistically, there is no such thing as successful missile tests.

Secondly, the initialled agreement is not binding upon the next US government. George Bush himself failed to honour a range of significantly more formal agreements concluded by his predecessor. The future of the shield and related US guarantees for Poland is therefore uncertain. And it will remain so for a long time, even after the agreement is officially signed.

The future of the shield and related US guarantees for Poland is therefore uncertain.

Poland stood up to Russia when standing up to Russia was crazy - and they won. With that bravery, Eastern Europe followed. The US needs to stand with Poland now - shoulder to shoulder - they're worthy.

The future of the shield and related US guarantees for Poland is therefore uncertain.

>>Putin’s soul>>

A glaring contradiction in terms.

Just sit tight, Poland. It’s far from over.

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