Invasion’s ideologues: Ultra-nationalists join the Russian mainstream

A decade ago, many of the most influential thinkers in today’s Russia were in the intellectual wilderness. While some sat in pamphlet-littered basements churning out copies of underground ultra-rightwing newspapers with names such as Lightning and Russian Order, others were in jail following failed coups in 1991 and 1993 against the pro-western “occupation regimes” of Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin.

Russia’s intellectual journey since then has been dizzying, as the radical has become mainstream and the hardline position increasingly moderate-sounding, with what were the margins emerging as the political centre.

Now, against the backdrop of conflict in Georgia and deteriorating relations with the west, Russia’s ultra-nationalist thinkers are starting to exert unprecedented influence. The wide acceptance of a group of ideas once dismissed as laughable signals a new era in Russia’s foreign relations, as Moscow seeks to protect what President Dmitry Medvedev calls a “region of privileged interest” in parts of the former Soviet Union.

Rising nationalist opinion could also mean bigger defence budgets and a race to modernise Russia’s military as well a presaging a yet more nationalist approach to economic policy. The government is coming under increasing pressure to invest the country’s oil wealth at home rather than abroad and could even respond to international criticism of the war in Georgia by pre-emptively imposing trade restrictions on the US.

The war not only boosted the prestige of the military, which enjoyed its first successful campaign in a generation. It has also enhanced the reputations of a narrow group of ultra-nationalist thinkers who prophesied the coming clash with the west. Today’s Russia, willing to press its national objectives with military force, unconcerned with the erosion of democracy and dismissive of world opinion, was foretold a decade ago in inky manifestos and in lecture halls full of bearded radicals straight out of Dostoevsky.

“I am convinced that now, following the war, there will be a huge shift in the balance of power within the Russian elite,” says Aleksander Dugin, leader of the Eurasian Movement, a prominent far-right group.

Mr Dugin has seen a remarkable improvement in his fortunes since the days in the early 1990s when he worked out of a basement flat in a gritty central Moscow district penning works on the metaphysics of Christianity. He went on to become a television talk show host and a professor at Moscow State University. Now he has a radio show on the Kremlin-supported 107 FM.

“The people that formed the centre under [former president, now prime minister Vladimir] Putin will now become marginal. And another pole will appear that did not exist under Putin at all. That is the army, the military and patriotic movements. That is us. Under Putin we were the extremists: respectable, yes, but radicals. Now we are moving right into the centre,” he says.

Not everyone shares Mr Dugin’s view, but the newly ascendant nationalism is likely to bring new ideas into Russia’s mainstream. These form no less than the basis of a looming ideological clash between Russia and the west. “Political momentum has been shifting in [the ultra-nationalists’] direction for quite some time. One could argue that the incursion into Georgia was something new, but it was building on a momentum that we have been seeing,” says John Dunlop from Stanford University’s Hoover Institution.

Viktor Erofeev, a well-known author and one of a small and shrinking minority of Russians who question the reasons for the war against Georgia, attributes the wave of patriotism to a widespread “cult of power”. In a recent radio debate, Mr Erofeev described it as “the joy of victory, in sport, in politics, but also in war. It is an archaic form of self-consciousness ... [that] has remained with us, where it has disappeared in more civilised countries.”

Amid the bombast about reimposition of Tsarist rule, the reconstitution of the Soviet Union or Russian empire and banishing Washington’s influence from the region, the new right does have a philosophical bone to pick with the west, which proclaims the “universality” of democracy and human rights and makes the US ready to defend and promote these goals throughout the world – by military force if necessary.

Russia’s opposition to “unipolar domination” by Washington is tied to the view pushed by the thinkers of the new right that such universal truths are an illusion, that their nation and civilisation form a unique “whole” that has a right to existence. That this ideological approach has penetrated to the Kremlin can be seen in a now famous speech in Munich in February 2007 by Mr Putin, in which the then president said he considered the unipolar model “not only unacceptable but also impossible in today’s world”. The model was flawed, he argued, because “at its basis there is and can be no moral foundation for modern civilisation”. It was a speech that was labelled by some commentators as the start of a new “cold war” with the west.

Russia’s insistence on the right to “sovereign democracy”, a phrase of Vladislav Surkov, the Kremlin’s top ideologist, can also be traced to this philosophical opposition to moral absolutes. Mr Surkov argues that each nation has the right to practise democracy in its own “sovereign” way, which rationalises in theoretical terms the fact that Russian democracy is not very democratic at all.

Many ultra-nationalists already walk the corridors of power: Dmitry Rogozin, former head of the Rodina (Motherland) party, is Russia’s ambassador to Nato. The Duma, or parliament, has also been a hive of activity of radical nationalists since the mid-1990s, regularly featuring the rantings of arch-nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky.

While their liberal western-oriented counterparts spent the decade following the collapse of communism learning the economic theories of Milton Friedman or reading up on the Council of Europe, the venerable organisation dedicated to promoting human rights, Russia’s nationalists were studying the Orthodox church, mugging up on French postmodernism or simply “drinking beer, playing chess and lifting dumbbells”, as Valery Korovin, leader of the Eurasian Youth Movement, puts it.

Russia’s military and “special services” such as the former KGB, now FSB, have long had a mysterious connection to these ultra-rightwing groups. The rising stature of the siloviki, as the former uniformed men are known, has accompanied a rise in the prestige of rightwing philosophy. While serving officers tend to keep their political leanings to themselves, several retired officers took on a high profile in the media during the Georgian war and their prestige is only likely to increase with the success of the military campaign.

Aleksander Prokhanov, editor of the radical rightwing Tomorrow newspaper and known as the “nightingale of the general staff” for his close links to Russia’s top brass, predicts a political crisis between pro-western and nationalist political factions. After the military victory in the Caucasus, the nationalists will need to guard against political setbacks at home, he says. That requires “very fast changes – social, political, economic and ideological” in Russia, in which the main opponent will be the new pro-western elite “who are loath to give up their assets in the west”.

The event that gave the new right much of its popularity was Russia’s agonising decade of economic collapse following the end of communism: that destroyed the credibility of liberal democratic reformers. In addition, the US campaign against Russia’s ally Serbia in 1999 sparked a sea- change in public opinion.

Following the collapse of the USSR in 1991, opinion polls showed nationalism was a phenomenon associated primarily with lower-income groups, while the upper echelons of society saw imitation of the west in all things, from democracy to liberal economics, as desirable. But already in 2001, a study by the Center for Political Technologies in Moscow noticed a new “ideology” among the middle and upper class – previously the “agents of modernisation”. A majority had come to see Nato as a hostile force and the break-up of the Soviet Union as a mistake. Most viewed Russia as belonging to a unique civilisation separate from the west.

Under Mr Putin’s eight-year presidency, the popularity of rightwing ideas grew as he deployed belligerent rhetoric and used Kremlin resources to sponsor groups such as Nashi, the youth movement organised by Mr Surkov. Mr Putin, and Mr Medvedev after him, adorned the presidency with the trappings of empire – regularly featuring the orthodox cross of Tsarist Russia and the red star of Soviet might.

Today, Russia’s ideological transformation is complete, if contradictory. Just like in the 19th century, when Russia’s armies fought against Napoleon while its aristocracy spoke French, today’s Russian elite embraces a confusing agenda: Nato is considered a hostile force and they support the war in Georgia, but they still prefer holidaying in the west, owning property there and sending their children to British private schools.

However, analysts caution that public support for Kremlin policies is not unconditional. More than on patriotism and national pride, public approval for Mr Putin is based on his – and now Mr Medvedev’s – presidency delivering higher living standards. Dmitri Simes of the Washington based Nixon Center says there are limits to the sacrifices people will make: “They don’t want to be cut off from the west, they don’t want to be isolated or ostracised.” Russians do not want to increase military spending in a way that would compete with or threaten other national priorities, he says.

“Mr Putin was so hugely popular not just because of his national security credentials but because, under him, Russians began to live much better. But a new cold war, a new arms race, would threaten all that.”

Russia’s invasion of Georgia and its attempt to partition the country by recognising the enclaves of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent have prompted concern across the European Union about what else might be in the Kremlin’s sights. Anxiety is mounting that it could ultimately be Ukraine.

With 46m people, of whom 18 per cent are ethnic Russians, and a territory almost the size of France, Ukraine is shaping up as the crucial geopolitical battleground between Moscow and the west. “Ukraine is Georgia multiplied by 10,” says Michael Emerson of the Centre for European Policy Studies, a Brussels think-tank.

There is particular concern about Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula, where Russia’s Black Sea fleet is based, with a lease that expires in 2017. Ethnic Russians form a majority of Crimea’s population and pro-Russian politicians nostalgic for the Soviet era are a powerful force. Thousands of Crimeans hold Russian passports, offering an excuse for Moscow to intervene in the peninsula as it did in South Ossetia last month.

“All that provides Moscow with a leverage of influence over the peninsula and a pretext for taking an interest in Ukraine,” says Vsevolod Samokhvalov, a former visiting fellow at the EU’s Institute for Security Studies.

The need to put EU-Ukrainian relations on a firmer basis will dominate discussions this Tuesday in Paris between Viktor Yushchenko (right), Ukraine’s president, and EU leaders including Nicolas Sarkozy, France’s president, and José Manuel Barroso, the European Commission chief, both fresh from Moscow. “If the summit fails, it will send a negative message to Georgia, Belarus and Moldova. Everyone in our region is watching closely what will happen,” says Kostyantyn Yeliseyev, the Ukrainian deputy foreign minister responsible for EU relations.

But in the light of Russia’s disregard for Georgia’s territorial integrity, is the EU ready not just to express solidarity with Kiev but to offer a clear path to EU membership – something it has shrunk from in the 17 years since Ukraine won independence from the Soviet Union? In Paris, to bitter Ukrainian disappointment, no such offer will be made. The EU is divided, with Poland and Sweden among the most fervent supporters of Kiev’s aspirations but older EU members, notably Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany, more hesitant.

“We have lots to do to reinforce ties with Ukraine, without possible accession,” Mr Sarkozy said after an EU summit last week.

Central and eastern European countries that joined the EU between 2004 and 2007 fear that the longer Ukraine is kept in limbo, the more Russia will be tempted to wrench it closer into the Kremlin’s sphere of influence – an outcome that would have grave implications for their own region.

“Neither we in the EU nor the Ukrainians are ready for membership tomorrow, but we should offer them a membership perspective,” says one government minister of a former Soviet bloc country.

Since 2004, the EU has dealt with Ukraine through its European Neighbourhood Policy, of which officials in Kiev take a dim view: it groups Ukraine with non-European places such as Algeria, Libya and Syria. “The events in Georgia proved that the ENP has completely failed. We have been saying for years that the ENP is nothing,” Mr Yeliseyev says.

Last June, EU leaders endorsed a Polish-Swedish proposal for an “Eastern Partnership” project, under which relations with Ukraine – as well as Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and, subject to domestic reforms, Belarus – were to be given special attention. The partnership plan is likely to be accorded higher priority after Russia’s assault on Georgia. This will mean faster action on a free trade accord and on easier travel for Ukrainians to the EU. The route to a trade deal was opened in May when Ukraine joined the World Trade Organisation – a status Russia still lacks.

Yet in commercial terms, Russia is a far more important partner than Ukraine for the EU – and Europe’s dependence on Russian oil and gas supplies makes it improbable that this will change. The EU accounts for 70 per cent of Ukraine’s foreign direct investment but this amounted to only €5.5bn ($7.8bn, £4.4bn) in 2006.

“The main obstacles faced by EU investors so far have been frequent changes in regulations, lack of transparency, failings in implementation and enforcement of laws, discriminatory regulation and corruption,” says a European Commission paper.

Such problems are not the only argument cited by certain EU countries as a reason to withhold an explicit offer of membership from Ukraine. Another is the country’s sheer size – it would be one of the EU’s five or six biggest by population, forcing a complete rethink of the bloc’s agricultural and regional aid policies.

A third issue is Ukraine’s seemingly endless political instability. Only last week, the ruling coalition split up in acrimony and Mr Yushchenko threatened to call a snap election. “The Ukrainians are their own worst enemy,” sighs one EU foreign minister.

On the other hand, Ukraine has made huge strides since the 2004 Orange Revolution, with a political culture founded on pluralism and free elections. For all their similarities in language, customs and history, Ukraine appears set on a path different from that of Russia with its more authoritarian habits.

This poses perhaps the greatest challenge to the Kremlin. As Zbigniew Brzezinski, the former US national security adviser, observed in 1997: “Without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be a Eurasian empire.”

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BrIVvypEoSo

here it is... in case you do not know Russian, below is a rough translation of what he is saying:

In fact we are in a very serious situation here, may be even on the brink of the third world war and therefore, whatever happened now may only be nothing compared to what will happen next. This is not going to end. This is not some private theme. This is actually the beginning of the war with Russia in an open form. I think that in this situation everyone now has to redetermine anew what side of barricades he is on. This is not about being for or against Putin. This is not important anymore. This is for Russia or not. One has to be only for your country, for your people, and this means tanks onto Tbilisi! Who does not believe in TANKS ONTO TBILISI is not Russian. At ease! Either an idiot, or has not [grown up] yet, so ought to go to kindergarten then, or is a traitor, rotten during these 90s’. TANKS ONTO TBILISI – this is something that needs to be written on foreheads of all Russians! Or by the bedside… with the pictures of corpses in Tskhinvali. These are OURS, these are yours, these are we. These are our brothers. I still do not know the fate of several people from the group of Eurasians that were defending “vysota” (elevated point, military term). The war has come to each of us. Enough with building illusions. War is here, at our doorsteps. They attacked us… attacking US. We need to understand that we are, we are Russians, we are Russian state. And Georgians, under the leadership of Nato, Americans, attacked us. Of course they will start screaming SAVE US. What SAVE US? I think Saakashvili needs to be hanged on the pillar (light post). and we have to eliminate Georgian state as being [incapable of behaving properly]. That’s it. I think we have strength to do this. There was an aggression against us and we have to retort. Tanks onto Tbilisi!...

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