Thanks RM. Zero is going to royally screw the whole works up that is for sure. And he surely has not a clue as how military must plan counter insurgency campaigns and it appears does not heed the warnings of those that know how to proceed in Afghanistan, nor how to maintain the many meet goals in Iraq.
Your note reminds me I update the following letter when ever I see our “hopeless” situation in Afghanistan hit the news cyle.
Afghanistan is at risk, because people like General Petraeus and his philosophy are scarce commodities. NATO, Pentagon and intelligence bureaucrats, many masquerading in military uniforms, have consistently ignored and depreciated counterinsurgency warfare. Successful career development worldwide requires resumes applying advanced technologies for conventional warfare in Europe and on blue water seas to third world small wars. Counterinsurgency warfare receives scant attention for being low tech, labor intensive and unspectacular.
When General Petraeus commanded the 101st Airborne in Iraq in April 2003 he said, “Now the hard part begins”. However, he had only two stars and did not co-author Army’s counterinsurgency field manual until 2006. The Marine Corps, not Army, has unpopular distinction for embracing the culture of counterinsurgency warfare. As Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, Marine General Peter Pace had the watch for internal political battles allowing General Petraeus prominence. Seldom would such a gifted, experienced soldier obtain significance needed within ossified intelligence and defense bureaucracies to implement proven counterinsurgency tactics.
Application of counterinsurgency tactics would increase momentum among local religious, tribal and political leaders to reject the Taliban and accept national government. The objective would be to help them make pragmatic, consistent decisions recognizing utility of and alignment with Kabul. Afghan and NATO combined units would clear Taliban from marginal regions, remain militarily present, and allow reconstruction teams entry. Locals would assume authority as behavior confirmed commitment to national goals. In rebellious regions attacks would disrupt Taliban units planning offensives, until regular presence expanded from adjacent pacific areas.