We are in such deep do do............
This prediction was seven or eight years ago.
In my next post, I will show just what a problem it is, but oddly enough the answer is not an exercise in crystal ball reading or sifting through stacks of intelligence reports. It is simply based in two things a) knowledge of the Kim Dynasty and mindset; and 2) knowledge of history. Please stand by, I will post it soon.
These missiles he is launching, if they had nukes on them, how much devestation would they do if they landed somewhere?
We didn’t have any [advance] information on this at all. It was a complete surprise to me as it was to nearly everybody else even all over the world. Nobody thought any such thing would take place. I didn’t think so. [The Commander in the Far East General Douglas] MacArthur didn’t think so. I didn’t know of anybody else who did. Then we had to meet the situation when it came up and that may be what you will be faced with when the time comes so just bear that in mind. Keep your minds open and be ready for whatever comes to meet it in the proper manner at that time and don’t try to live in the past. Look to the future but use the past as a basis on which to figure out what you want to do in the future.
President Harry S. Truman
Talent Associates Fort Leavenworth interview, December 15, 1961
Papers of Merle Miller
On Sunday morning I drove in immediately to the State Department and found that my colleagues there had been working through the night . . . with their colleagues in the Department of Defense, and they had brought together all the information available and necessary for decisions as to what should be done.
In the first place it was clear that this [attack by the regime of Kim Il Sung, premier of the Democratic Republic of Korea] was not a casual . . . or an isolated border incident. This was a general attack which extended all across the border and therefore was a matter of utmost seriousness. This was established by Sunday morning.
And [in] the second place it was established that it was an attack in very considerable force. The South Koreans were falling back. They had not yet lost contact with one another. The retreat was orderly but it was precipitate and it seemed fairly clear that before long the capital of South Korea would be overrun.
Therefore, we knew we had a critical military situation to handle. We then had reports on enemy strength in so far as our Intelligence was able to gather them, and they were somewhat meager but they indicated that these forces were well trained. Many of them had been within the Soviet Union for some time. They were well equipped and this was a dangerous attack.
Secretary of State Dean Acheson
Undated Talent Associates interview, c. 1961-2
Papers of Merle Miller
We had word [earlier in 1950] that they were building up [the North Korean army] in equipment and [the] size of their services and training, but I don’t believe we had anything definite which would indicate that they were about to launch an all-out war with complete equipment and large forces. I believe that we felt that the principal thing to be feared or most apt to happen were small raids into South Korea. They’d had those before. And I don’t believe any of us had the feeling that they were about to launch an all-out attack. I know I didn’t.
General Omar Bradley
Talent Associates interview, January 24, 1962
Papers of Merle Miller
Every morning the CIA had a private meeting with me personally, and I was kept informed on everything that anyone else knew, on everything that was going on around the world. But at the time we were more worried about Iran and Azerbaijan than we were about anyplace else.
President Harry S. Truman
Presidential memoirs interview, October 16, 1953
Papers of Harry S. Truman: Post-presidential Files
We then had an up-to-date report on our own forces. The nearest available, of course, were in Japan. These, for the most part, were untried Divisions [the First Cavalry, and the 7th, 24th and 25th Infantry Divisions]. The veterans had all been mustered out. A few of the soldiers had battle experience but not many. The navy [7th Fleet] was in the Philippines at Cavite. There were air force planes available and so that we knew what was happening. We knew what we had available.
We knew that the United Nations was convening at two o’clock on Sunday afternoon and there was about all the information that we could gather. We then began to get to work on recommendations to the President.
Secretary of State Dean Acheson
Undated Talent Associates interview, c. 1961-2
Papers of Merle Miller
Howard Anderson, . . . who formerly was a member of the White House [secret service] detail, . . . telephoned and came after me with a car to drive me to [President Truman’s house in] Independence. . . . We went to the grounds through the gate at rear in the high iron fence, which the secret service has had erected around the grounds to keep the public from trampling over the lawns and shrubbery. [An agent] . . . took me to the side door and the maid told the president I was there. He came down and took me into a library or study where we talked . . . .
He said he had talked to [Secretary of State Dean] Acheson by telephone last night . . . . The Security Council of the United Nations had been called to meet this afternoon, and . . . unless something developed he did not want to cut short his visit to Independence. He felt that if we were to do so it would alarm the people. . . .
Assistant Press Secretary Eben Ayers
Diary entry, June 25, 1950
Papers of Eben A. Ayers
Photo: U.S. Army. Source: Truman Library. Around 10:30 A.M., E.D.T., a telegram was received in the State Department from [Consultant to the Secretary] John Foster Dulles and Mr. [John] Allison [the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs] in Tokyo. They recommended that if the South Koreans could not repulse the attack, United States forces should be used, even though this would risk a counter-move by the Russians. They stated this was the only alternative to starting a disastrous chain of events which would probably lead to a world war.
Administrative Assistant to the President George Elsey Memorandum for the record based on Secretary of State’s Briefing Book “borrowed . . . from Averell Harriman,” no date
Papers of George M. Elsey
. . . I called the President about 12:00 o’clock and told him I thought it would be a good idea if he came back [to Washington DC]. He said he would be there about six o’clock our time. He wanted a meeting at Blair House [his current residence], and he told me the principal people he wanted there and to use my discretion in setting any others who ought to be there. So I went ahead.
Secretary of State Dean Acheson
Presidential memoirs interview, February 18, 1955
Papers of Harry S. Truman: Post Presidential Files
[Deputy Ambassador to the United Nations Ernest] Gross was an able lawyer and a very energetic man. We burned up the telephone throughout the night. . . . We talked about the possibility of whether [Jacob A.] Malik, the Soviet representative who had walked out because he wouldn’t sit with the [Nationalist] Chinese representative, would return. I asked Gross, since Malik had walked out if Lie felt that the Russians ought to be notified, Gross said that he had thought about that and hadn’t talked to [U.N. Secretary General Trygve] Lie, but he would mention it to him, but he was pretty sure that in all of the meetings notification was simply a matter of course, because they were a member and entitled to come, that they were sent a routine notification. Then we speculated, and incidentally we agreed that the chances were unlikely that Malik would come back. . . . He would have to get instructions from home about that, and he probably assumed they couldn’t do anything since the Security Council can’t order forces or take any real military action without unanimity. He probably assumed that he’d have time to come in. . . .
Well, he stayed away. The Security Council passed one resolution that day—calling on the North Koreans to go back. That passed unanimously.
Assistant Secretary of State for U.N. Affairs John Hickerson
Oral history interview, June 5, 1973
And that was all done by arousing people from their sleep and making sure that everyone would be on deck at two o’clock at Lake Success [New York], which was at that time the headquarters of the United Nations. This was the first emergency session that the Security Council had ever held.
Deputy Ambassador to the United Nations Ernest Gross
Talent Associates interview, February 2, 1962
Papers of Merle Miller