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Stinnett's book makes a credible case based on intense research and new information. His case is enhanced by the later withdrawal from public view of many of the documents that he relied on. More than half a century after Pearl Harbor, evidence of warnings of the attack continues to be suppressed.

In fairness to FDR, he seems to have been under the belief that the commanders at Pearl Harbor had been warned and could easily repulse an air attack. In truth, the early warnings were not clear and urgent and the last one was not transmitted in a timely fashion due to technical problems.

In addition, there was a lack of recognition by the US government and military about the capabilities of Japanese aircraft. This was due to cultural blindness and an unwillingness to accept contrary information from sources like Claire Chennault of the Flying Tigers.

On the whole, FDR, George Marshall, and Ernest King seem to have expected that the US would enter the war with a stunning defensive victory at Pear Harbor. That would free the US to move aggressively in Europe, with an invasion across the Channel in 1942 or 1943. Meanwhile, the US Navy would have defeated the Japanese Navy in the west Pacific and invested the home islands.

Stinnett's book makes a credible case based on intense research and new information. His case is enhanced by the later withdrawal from public view of many of the documents that he relied on.

I found Stinnett's book to be a mess. He confuses terms & therefore draws the wrong concusions. For instance, one tool that intelligence uses is "Traffic Analysis". This is NOT the same thing as reading the actual decrypted message. Stinnett confuses the reader into thinking this is the same thing. It is not. Traffic analysis is simply recognizing patterns of communications between bases & fleet units. You can guess an awful lot by just knowing who is talking to who, how much & maybe having a cross-bearing on the mobile units, without ever knowing what is being said.

It should also be noted that the IJN code was not actually cracked until AFTER Pearl. We were reading their diplomatic code thanks to some Black Bag jobs funded by Naval Intelligence prior to the war.

from #110: "In fairness to FDR, he seems to have been under the belief that the commanders at Pearl Harbor had been warned and could easily repulse an air attack. In truth, the early warnings were not clear and urgent and the last one was not transmitted in a timely fashion due to technical problems."

This is exactly the right point. The various "war warnings" sent to commanders were ALL clear on one thing: Japan MUST be allowed to strike the first blow. The reasons are obvious and entirely political -- Roosevelt could not, would not, lead a divided America into war.

But neither could he have imagined the level of destruction the Japanese delivered on December 7. So, Roosevelt needed the Japanese to strike first, and for that was willing to sacrifice a ship or two.

How does the old saying put it? Be careful what you wish for...