. . . accused the Russian defense industry of squandering massive budget allocations disbursed in recent years, while leaving the defense industry technologically backward. According to Medvedev, the quality of armaments for export and the ones procured by the defense ministry is lagging. Moreover, he accused the defense industry of grossly overpricing its produce, “so it makes less and less sense to buy it.” Research and development of new weapon systems drag on for decades, according to Medvedev, until they become obsolete while “money is spent to modernize hopelessly outdated equipment” (www.kremlin.ru, October 26). The Minister of Trade and Industry Victor Khristenko declared that the quality of defense produce is falling, while the defense ministry and foreign customers are filing more complaints (RIA Novosti, October 26).
. . . Medvedev has announced plans to re-equip the armed forces with new weapons by 2012, but it does not seem to be happening. The Russian defense industry is in deep crisis and it is good that the president has publicly acknowledged the facts. But simply scolding an industry in which the government itself has a controlling stake will not result in change. The Russian defense industry has been able to continue to produce Soviet-era weapons using equipment, know-how and stockpiles of components left over from the Cold War. In some cases, modernized weapons like the Su-30 jet sold to India and other foreign buyers have been produced using Western avionics and other components. But the defense industry has utterly failed to produce weapons the Soviet inventory did not have – like modern intelligence-gathering drones. Another embarrassing public frustration is the Bulava sea-launched ballistic missile that has failed test after test. Sloppy workplace discipline, the growing lack of a qualified workforce, shortages of modern materials and components are plaguing the defense industry.
In a recent monograph on Russian military reform, Dr. Dmitry Gorenburg of the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies at Harvard University observed that
. . . Once the initial conflicts surrounding the personnel reforms are resolved, the Russian military will have to deal with the fact that the country’s military industrial complex is no longer capable of producing modern weaponry in the quantities necessary to reequip the Russian military in a timely manner. In the short term, it will have to shed its insistence on buying only domestic military hardware and make more purchases from abroad, such as the unmanned drone aircraft it recently purchased from Israel. In the long term, it will have to reform and modernize its defense industry, a project that may also require foreign assistance.
Russia’s New Model Army, The Ongoing Radical Reform of the Russian Military, PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 78, Dmitry Gorenburg, American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies September 2009
Available via: russiamil.wordpress.com/publications/
Shortcomings in Russia's military were apparent during the Russian attack on Georgia. For the details, I recommend an article in the US Army War College's quarterly by Roger N. McDermott, “Russia’s Conventional Armed Forces and the Georgian War.” Spring 2009. pp. 65-80.
As for the Scorpion, it went down in the open Atlantic in deep water while returning from patrol during the Cold War. The cause of the sinking is attributed to mechanical defects but is still disputed. There is lingering suspicion of a Soviet attack.
In contrast, the Kursk sank in peacetime in shallow littoral waters close to major Soviet naval bases. The Kursk was on exercises at the time, with major fleet vessels and ranking admirals nearby. An effective rescue effort was not mounted though for lack of proper equipment and training.
. . . accused the Russian defense industry of squandering massive budget allocations disbursed in recent years, while leaving the defense industry technologically backward. According to Medvedev, the quality of armaments for export and the ones procured by the defense ministry is lagging. Moreover, he accused the defense industry of grossly overpricing its produce, “so it makes less and less sense to buy it.” Research and development of new weapon systems drag on for decades, according to Medvedev, until they become obsolete while “money is spent to modernize hopelessly outdated equipment” (www.kremlin.ru, October 26). The Minister of Trade and Industry Victor Khristenko declared that the quality of defense produce is falling, while the defense ministry and foreign customers are filing more complaints (RIA Novosti, October 26).
. . . Medvedev has announced plans to re-equip the armed forces with new weapons by 2012, but it does not seem to be happening. The Russian defense industry is in deep crisis and it is good that the president has publicly acknowledged the facts. But simply scolding an industry in which the government itself has a controlling stake will not result in change. The Russian defense industry has been able to continue to produce Soviet-era weapons using equipment, know-how and stockpiles of components left over from the Cold War. In some cases, modernized weapons like the Su-30 jet sold to India and other foreign buyers have been produced using Western avionics and other components. But the defense industry has utterly failed to produce weapons the Soviet inventory did not have – like modern intelligence-gathering drones. Another embarrassing public frustration is the Bulava sea-launched ballistic missile that has failed test after test. Sloppy workplace discipline, the growing lack of a qualified workforce, shortages of modern materials and components are plaguing the defense industry.
In a recent monograph on Russian military reform, Dr. Dmitry Gorenburg of the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies at Harvard University observed that
. . . Once the initial conflicts surrounding the personnel reforms are resolved, the Russian military will have to deal with the fact that the country’s military industrial complex is no longer capable of producing modern weaponry in the quantities necessary to reequip the Russian military in a timely manner. In the short term, it will have to shed its insistence on buying only domestic military hardware and make more purchases from abroad, such as the unmanned drone aircraft it recently purchased from Israel. In the long term, it will have to reform and modernize its defense industry, a project that may also require foreign assistance.
Russia’s New Model Army, The Ongoing Radical Reform of the Russian Military, PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 78, Dmitry Gorenburg, American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies September 2009
Available via: russiamil.wordpress.com/publications/
Shortcomings in Russia's military were apparent during the Russian attack on Georgia. For the details, I recommend an article in the US Army War College's quarterly by Roger N. McDermott, “Russia’s Conventional Armed Forces and the Georgian War.” Spring 2009. pp. 65-80.
As for the Scorpion, it went down in the open Atlantic in deep water while returning from patrol during the Cold War. The cause of the sinking is attributed to mechanical defects but is still disputed. There is lingering suspicion of a Soviet attack.
In contrast, the Kursk sank in peacetime in shallow littoral waters close to major Soviet naval bases. The Kursk was on exercises at the time, with major fleet vessels and ranking admirals nearby. An effective rescue effort was not mounted though for lack of proper equipment and training.