Two. The dysfunctional system isn't dysfunctional, it is neglected. This system has produced weapons systems that are the benchmark for the rest of the world. What has been neglected is the contracting integrity from the government, not industry. Sharpen the pencils, define the terms, get good results. It has happened before. We were and still are the arsenal of democracy. We produce more and better equipment than anyone else. If there are bad systems they do not last or are supplanted by newer ones.
A good example is the M-4 we used. The army did a series of tests due to the higher rate of malfunctions of the M-4 and showed the rifle came in last among those tested. There were better rifles available including the XM-8. This is where the politics come in. The better rifle isn't selected. Not the industry fault, the military decided they didn't want to commit when something better might be coming down the road from the dysfunctional system. That was an organizational choice.
As for not needing air superiority for the past 70 years, that is a comment so out there it is difficult to address. The Russians wouldn't have reached Berlin without Allied air superiority. How you can divorce the Western front from the Eastern front is beyond me. Any more than you can divorce the air war from Italy against the oil supplies of Germany.
And finally, since the pie analogy was already discredited, in no way do I advocate shorting one service on behalf of the next.
As to the comments of officer quality, I find your examples lacking, your analogy wanting, and really a poor view of a large group of people.
If anyone else would like to comment on the current crop of officers, please chime in. I would defer to more direct contacts and examples.
Ok, lets just look at your M-4 example to get some idea as to the, ahem, quality of your...notions.
First we already have them in large numbers, the troops trained with them. Paid, trained, experinced.
So, even if a new spanky, gee whiz rifle exist, what does the cost of junking the perfectly fine existing stock effect the Army. I’d say about half a billion. Maybe more. You got the new costs, and the waste of the old and all it’s experiences with the operators for decades now. And in the Army’s case, what does the Army not fund for this marginal improvement? Real world, your call, tell me who in the Army Pie gets it in the neck?
So, in this one example, you show yourself unable to handle simple variables of captured cost investment returns vs wasted expenditures on replacement equipment, with marginal, if any, improvement.
And I’m suppose to think you can handle more complex, costly, longer term examples? Yeah. Right.