FDR:December 7, 1941, "A Date Which Will Live in Infamy" (Video)

You Tube ^ | December 7, 1941 | Staff

[skeeter]

To date there has not been any - not a one - IJN message identified as part of radio deception.

BTW I believe there are numerous written testimonies from Hypo personnel who will refute this claim.

I'll have to look them up when I get home.

[skeeter]

Now you're playing games.

Not interested.

[jamaksin]

Please add to your list, from PHA Part 36, Page37, testimony of Rochefort:

"... There was perhaps a certain amount of padding or repeating of messages, but in our opinion at the time, and our opinion today, of all of the trained RI personnel, there was no attempt on the part of the Japanese to practice radio deception in any of its forms."

So sayth Rochefort.

Layton's And I Was There offers more detail, but same comments.

[skeeter]

Excerpted from 'Japanese radio denial and deception and the attack on Pearl Harbor' - Naval War College Review, Autumn, 2008 by Robert J. Hanyok

To set the stage for the deception, in early November 1941 the Naval General Staff ordered the First Air Fleet and other ships, under the direction of the DF Control Center of the 1st Combined Communications (that is, radio intelligence) Unit in Tokyo, to establish a regular schedule of drill communications. From 8 November through the 13th, Akagi, Hiei (the flagship of the 3rd Battleship Division), and the 24th Division of Ships (Destroyers) were to communicate with the Tokyo communications center three times a day--at 0600, 1200 (noon), and 2000 (8 PM), all Tokyo time. The participation of the DF Control Center was significant, suggesting that it was monitoring the radio traffic for purposes of evaluating the transmissions for later imitation, as well as for security. (46)

On 15 November, the Combined Fleet discreetly substituted new drill call signs for the various task forces, including the Striking Force. (47) The stations involved in the radio deception were to use the old drill calls of the carriers, principally Akagi, and other ships of the Kido Butai for the next three weeks. These false communications were to be sent by regular radio operators from the major ships of the Kido Butai who had been sent ashore to bases at Kure, Sasebo, and Yokosuka. A communicator's "fist," or the characteristic unique way a radioman taps out characters on Morse keys, was a method of identifying operators and, by extension, their ships. So, when American listening posts heard the familiar fist of an operator known to have sent messages from Akagi, using that ship's call sign, they construed the carrier to be on the bearing taken of his transmissions--in this case, in the direction of one of the home-island bases.

[jamaksin]

Thank you very much for your reply.

I believe, however, I was rather specific - the message(s) along with its associated communications header is what I remarked upon; a true copy of the raw intercept.

Oh, Hanyok is now retired ... last NSA publication was with Mowry on "The Winds" saga.

Again, thank you, but I have this article, no raw message was provided.

Of course, Rochefort was there then - a tad more solid by these lights.

[skeeter]

LOL. Its been fun - good luck with your research.

[John S Mosby]

Talisker has posted an excellent compendium site, on the several courts of inquiry. De-classification in 1978 opened a whole lot of information. One of the many document entries from the Army Board was a dated intercept :”1 Dec. - The tanker Shiriya, which had been added to the strike force in an order intercepted Nov 14, radioed “proceeding to a position 30.00 N, 154.20 E. Expect to arrive at that point on 3 December.” (near HI). The Navy knew where they were from this intercept. All PBY traffic out of the Aleutians was suspended.

The fact that this message is in the National Archives destroys the myth that the attack fleet maintained radio silence. From traffic analysis, Hawaii intercepts reported that the carrier force was at sea and in the North.

The NSA in its analysis, comments on MacArthur’s reply to this report in three messages Nov 26,29,and Dec.2 deliberately placing the fleet in the South China Sea. The NSA called these messages “inexplicable” in the face of the confirmed position report.The US Government refuses to identify or declassify any pre-Dec 7, 1941 decrypts of the jap code JN-25 on the basis of national security, more than a half-century after the war. FDR and Marshall were in receipt of these intercepts, and fully briefed. The night of Dec 6th they both had 13 parts of the 15 part jap declaration of war. There is no question they knew what this meant and even where- and no warnings were directed.

My previous postings here refer to a war patrol my father made, leaving Pearl on Oct.31 with live weapons, and “free to shoot” orders he received against jap shipping made by ComSubPac,a month and a week before the attack. Within naval command throughout the war it was well recognized that the attack was allowed. Navy officers not of the grade who sucked up to FDR and were protected by him, risked their career in exposing this during the war— the ones that is who survived. The overall review of this information shows that the suppression of intelligence and warnings to Hawaii extended over more than one department. The direction to do this came from the very top and was quite thoroughly designed- it was not a series of mistakes.

[skeeter]

One of the many document entries from the Army Board was a dated intercept :”1 Dec. - The tanker Shiriya, which had been added to the strike force in an order intercepted Nov 14, radioed “proceeding to a position 30.00 N, 154.20 E. Expect to arrive at that point on 3 December.” (near HI). The Navy knew where they were from this intercept.

For accuracy's sake, Shiriya was not part of the PH strike force - she west of the Bonins on Dec 1, this message wasn't decrypted until after the war.

[jamaksin]

Let's see, morning coffee - check.

HIJMS SHIRIYA, an Imperial Japanese Naval (IJN) tanker, has an interesting and often erroneous folklore related to the Pearl Harbor Attack and the Striking Force (Kido Butai) level of radio transmission discipline.

Prados (Combined Fleet Decoded, of 1995, on pages 148 and 156) discusses her whereabouts briefly. Within the multiple-part Congressional Hearings on the Pearl Harbor Attack (PHA), SHIRIYA appears in Parts 1 and 17, and the usage SHIRIYA MARU is found in Parts 13 and 30. Further, in Stinnett’s book (Day of Deceit, 2001, Touchstone paperback edition), his comments on pages 20-21 and pages 216-217 are augmented with a photocopy insert of the “Tracks of Japanese Naval Units – between Japan and U.S. ports, Oct. 1 to Dec. 5, 1940” where the track taken by SHIRIYA is shown. There are several other SHIRIYA references.

One such example of other SHIRIYA citations is found amongst the so-called SRN (Special Research Navy) messages. SRNs can be found at several websites and in a variety of books. A caution, however, should be noted here as these SRNs can appear with various degrees of completeness, and where their “true copy” accuracy should not be assumed. These published flaws are not surprising for many “things” Pearl Harbor.

Given the above, SRN-115398 is frequently pointed out singularly in the tale of the SHIRIYA. This message, of 1 Dec 1941, from SHIRIYA to ComDesDiv7 (Commander Destroyer Division 7) is given as “This ship is processing direct to position 30.00N, 154.20E. Expect to arrive that point at 1800 on 3 Dec. Thereafter will proceed eastward alone 30 degrees North latitude at speed 7 of knots.” [FYI: Bonin Islands are located approximately at 27N, 142E.]

The folklore goes as follows … Well, yes, admittedly SHIRIYA transmitted SRN-115398 and it was intercepted. But, because she was not a part of the Pearl Harbor STRIKING FORCE, where strict and absolute radio silence (viz., all frequencies at all times) was absolutely maintained. Her mission was that of refueling the destroyers supporting the Wake Island Neutralization Force. Or so the story goes …

So was SHIRIYA part of the STRIKING FORCE or not? And, are there any other peculiarities regarding the SHIRIYA in the weeks prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor?

Some other SHIRIYA messages (by date) in addition to SRN-115398 above provide greater detail and include:

Nov. 14

From: CINCCOMBINED

To: 7 Marus

Message assigned 5 Maru vessels to CINCS1stAirFlt, 2ndFlt. One of these specifically assigned was the Shiriya.

Nov. 18

From: Sec1stAirFlt

To: CdrDesDiv7

Info: CO SHIRIYA

STRIKING FORCE Secret Operations Order No. 6 was not sent to the SHIRIYA. Please arrange to supply her with a copy of same.

20 Nov

From: SHIRIYA

Action: COS CarDiv1, Combined Fleet

1. I will complete loading aviation gasoline and other miscellaneous equipment 21 Nov.

2. The main generator and other minor repairs will be completed 23 Nov.

3. Expect to get underway on 24 Nov and join up during morning of 27 Nov.

4. STRIKING FORCE Secret Operations Order No. 6 has not been received.

[Sic: Item 1 ... aviation gasoline ...]

21 Nov

From: CO SHIRIYA

To: CrdDesDiv7

We are undergoing overhaul at Yokosuka. Expect to depart 24 Nov and arrive at Sea on 27 Nov. Advise rendezvous point your unit. Regarding refueling at Sea …

[N.B., DesDiv 7 (Destroyer Division 7) was the escort assigned to CarDiv1 (Carrier Division 1) – namely CVs AKAGI and KAGA]

PHA, Part 13, Page 407 has: “ … (1) The MIDWAY Neutralization Unit (AKEMBONO, USHIO) left TOKYO Bay about 1 December, arrived at MIDWAY during the night of 8 December, bombarded the air base, and returned to the western part of the INLAND Sea. The SHIRIYA moved with this unit and served as a supply ship.”

Oddly, the 21 Nov message SHIRIYA above contradicts the PHA reference in that: (a) sortie is from Yokosuka and not TOKYO Bay, and (b) departure is 24 Nov and not 1Dec.

In addition to the above SRNs, consider from a senior NSA historian,. In Parker’s article “The Unsolved Message of Pearl Harbor” (Cryptologia, 1991, Volume 15, Number 4, pages 295-313), the following:

“ … the intercepts would have disclosed Japanese preparations for the surprise attack, including the positioning of a tanker where its only purpose could have been to refuel a long-range strike force.” (p. 295)

“ … One of the most significant of the intercepted message was sent 1 December 1941 (sic SRN-115398). It offered a tantalizing clue as the whereabouts of the objectives. One of the tankers assigned to the Strike Force (sic emphasis added) was Shiriya …” (p. 305)

The Parker article also provides, in Figure 2 on page 306, the estimated position for SHIRIYA based on the 7 knots as given in SRN-115398 – approximately 30.00N, 170.00E His assessment: “ … If solved before 7 December, this message would have shown clearly that the carriers of the First Air Fleet were not involved in the southern operation (see Figure 2).”

Attention should also be given to one more SRN and also to comments expressed in SRH-406.

25 Nov

From CinCCombined Fleet

To: All Flagships

From 26 Nov ships of the Combined Fleet will observe radio communications procedures as follows:

1. Except in extreme emergency the Main Force and its attached force will cease communicating.

2. Other forces are at the discretion of their respective commanders.

3. Supply ships, repair ships, hospital ships, etc., will report to parties concerned.

[Sic: This message is very often seen in a truncated form with ellipsis after item 1.]

So from documents within the public domain, SHIRIYA communicates with the First Air Fleet, CarDiv1, Combined Fleet, and DesDiv7; is aware of the STRIKING FORCE and particularly its Secret Operations Order No. 6; is loading aviation gasoline (an odd cargo in the support of destroyers); is positioned in an unexpected place as noted by Parker, and is a “Supply ship” that is directed to “report to parties concerned.”

What does Parker, a senior National Security Agency (NSA) historian, say again - “... One of the tankers assigned to the Strike Force was Shiriya …” That, along with the 25 Nov SRN-116866’s communications flexibility (e.g., “ …will report directly to parties concerned.”) and the 21 Nov SRN requesting a rendezvous point, … yields a very talkative SHIRIYA.

For more contemporaneous views of the role SHIRIYA had, SRH-406 and PHA provide more perspective. SRH-406, “Pre-Pearl Harbor Japanese Naval Despatches” (found in NARA II, Record Group 457; note an un-redacted version of SRH-406 is reported in private hands) is:

“ … We now have the six largest carriers of the Jap Navy unplaced. CARDIV1 as a unit was last noted 12 November when it was scheduled to be in Sasebo. One of its carriers, the KAGA, was scheduled to undock as Sasebo 11 November, and was assigned an anchorage at Saeki Wan on an unspecified date. The other carrier, AKAGI, was scheduled to be in Saeki Wan the 15th. CARDIV 1 plane guard, DESDIV 7, was linked with the STRIKING FORCE tanker SHIRIYA (emphasis added) who was to arrive Western Inland Sea 27 November and rendezvous with DESDIV 7. …”

In addition, PHA, Part 13, page 426, shows a chart “Disposition of Supply Ships for first period (Dai Ikki) Operations” where SHIRIYA MARU is listed first in the “Oilers” supporting the STRIKING Force.

It is also important to recognize that SHIRIYA was an IJN ship and not a conscripted vessel from Japan’s merchant fleet. She was clearly facile with extant IJN naval radio communications procedures.

SHIRIYA was a crucial Kido Butai vessel. She broke radio silence several times and those messages were intercepted, as the now public SRNs abundantly demonstrate.

Or is NSA’s Parker in error? Supporting this assessment is also Layton, et al., Chapter 21, “Self-Deception” on page 232. Is Layton, he being there, in error?

But, there is more. From the US Navy’s Japanese Navy Movement summaries, in Station H Monthly Report of November 1941, on page 111, is found (FOIA release of March 2000):

CALL IDENTIFICATION INDICATOR POSITION TIME SHEET NO.

…

28 November

…

HANU 1 SHIRIYA Code Movement 1300 94630

…

[N.B., Wilford (2001) in his book, Pearl Harbor Redefined – USN Radio Intelligence, on page 64 and page 73, uses HA NI 1 as the SHIRIYA’s call sign. This is an error; it should be HA NU 1 as shown.]

All FOIA requests to date for SHIRIYA’s Sheet No. 94630, giving fully the details regarding this specific code movement message, have been denied – for national security reasons – still – nearly 70 years after the Pearl Harbor attack.

Imagine, from just the code movement messages known to be largely readable at that time (see Pelletier, Cryptolog, Summer 1992, page 5), what could be found and what would be resolved – perhaps the entire disposition of Japanese naval units.

Consider, after all, as the folklore tells us – all, some, or most – of the IJN personnel have been steadfast on total radio silence, where does Sheet No. 94630 from a 28Nov41 report above, come from? Ooops … radio deception – must be?

Now, given the SHIRIYA radio transmissions (SRN-115398 and code movement report) … and those alone … did the US Navy’s radio direction finder (RDF) network detect her? Recall from Stinnett’s text above – that tracking chart and SHIRIYA.

So it goes ...