U.S.-Pakistani Relations Beyond Bin Laden

The past week has been filled with announcements and speculations on how Osama bin Laden was killed and on Washington’s source of intelligence.... [Snip]

Obfuscating on how intelligence was developed and on the specifics of how an operation was carried out is an essential part of covert operations. The precise process must be distorted to confuse opponents regarding how things actually played out; otherwise, the enemy learns lessons and adjusts....{Snip]

It is not inconceivable that Pakistan aided the United States in identifying and capturing Osama bin Laden, but it is unlikely. This is because the operation saw the already-tremendous tensions between the two countries worsen rather than improve....[Snip]

U.S. strategy in the Cold War included a religious component, namely, using religion to generate tension within the Communist bloc. This could be seen in the Jewish resistance in the Soviet Union, in Roman Catholic resistance in Poland and, of course, in Muslim resistance to the Soviets in Afghanistan.....[Snip]

As frequently happens, the lines of influence ran both ways. The ISI did not simply control Islamist militants, .......many within the ISI came under the influence of radical Islamist ideology. This reached the extent that the ISI became a center of radical Islamism, not so much on an institutional level as on a personal level: The case officers, as the phrase goes, went native....[Snip]

The Pakistani solution was to appear to be doing everything possible to support the United States....with a quiet limit on what that support would entail. That limit......defined as avoiding actions that would trigger ....uprising in Pakistan...[and]..threaten the regime. Pakistanis were prepared to accept a degree of unrest in supporting the war but not to push things to the point of endangering the regime...[Snip]

Real simple, if the Paks had any knowledge of the raid they would have insisted in being involved. The Paks are easily clever enough to know that later claims/accusations of ignorance or incompetence would get the military and ISI and (shaky) government leadership all fired or resigned in humiliation.

Didn't happen. There is an unconfirmed report that the Paks were given a cover story as the raid was underway, when we blew the helo, that the raid was in the mountains to the east, not in town, that Abbottabad was only where the helo went down.

The Paks did not scramble and there was no radar jamming. No need as the west looking radar was down as we know it often to be. We have so many unidentified drones flying in W Pak that the Paks are tired of tracking them and just shut off their radar at night because of the crowding.

"Real simple, if the Paks had any knowledge of the raid they would have insisted in being involved."

Not necessarily. From Mr. Friedman's point of view, in every aspect of Pakistan cooperation with the U.S., the question was/is what can they - Pakistani officials - do; how much, and what would be too much; what will get their own contingents of extremist locals more upset than they can handle. Their calculation may have been that it was simply less risky for them, in terms of domestic politics to NOT be part of the raid, even if they knew it could happen.

"The Paks are easily clever enough to know that later claims/accusations of ignorance or incompetence would get the military and ISI and (shaky) government leadership all fired or resigned in humiliation."

Again, so far, the assumption I provided in the paragraph above - which is the assumption offered by Mr. Friedman, seems to be holding true; and contrary to your assumptions. No one in Pakistan believes that (a)no officials knew Bin Laden was there and (b) that no officials knew at least that there was going to be a U.S. extraction of Bin Laden, possibly without knowing or wanting to know exactly when. So far, the public outcry against the Pakistani government, with those beliefs accepted, is loud but not massive, or threatening to the present political order.

By the way, it was reported yesterday that there is a ten year old secret agreement between the U.S. and Pakistan - between the WH and Musharraf in 2001, reconfirmed later by the new elected government in Pakistan and reconfirmed by the WH again in 2009 - that if Bin Laden was confirmed to be inside Pakistan that the U.S. would go get him and Pakistan would not prevent it.

So far, that actually seems consistent with the events that finally did take place.

The Paks did not scramble and there was no radar jamming.

Wrong again. They did scramble two jet fighters, but, for whatever reasons, their "birds" were not actually in the air before our helos were already leaving or had left the compound. Again, just Pakistani incompetence, or intentional "mis-communication" on the part of someone, or just a cover story for either one?

"I still fail to understand (completely) Friedman’s phobia about Indian power. I get the whole balance-of-power schtick, but if we end up in a Muslims-against-everyone-else global war— we will need the Indians."

Me too. I was wondering if he is simply too much believing anti-India sentiments from Pakistani perspectives, or does he have independent reasons for agreeing to some of those perspectives.

My ignorant perspective is that most of India is just as well happy to have those Muslims who insisted on their Muslim identity conjoined to a national identity - instead of a multi-confessional national identity, like India; and separated out by their own choice; and (the Indians) are not interested at all in hoping to absorb them again, by force. Therefor, minus the Kashmir dispute, my ignorant view does not see India "imperial" designs on Pakistan territory proper.

My ignorant mind has also observed what it believes to be a constant inferiority-complex on the part of Pakistan in relation to India. It seems to need to react and attempt to counter any move by India that constitutes India trying to play a more important role in the region; in terms of foreign aid and in terms of economic development. For instance it sees as "threatening" Indian attempts to aid Afghanistan in rebuilding and infrastructure development. If Pakistan did not feel so inferior, it would take those occasions as opportunities for India-Pakistan cooperation in the region.

So yes. Like you, I am perplexed by some of Mr. Friedman's views, regarding India. He seems too much supportive of Pakistani concerns; many of which to me are ultra-sensitive concerns about "national image" and not true security or economic development concerns. Maybe I am the one who is wrong.

Friedman completely missed the underlying Paki mentality of paranoia and deep distrust of the US and India. He also ignores the fundamental nature of Paki self-serving and self-interest.

No Paki would lose one minute of sleep worrying about preserving any sense of cooperation with us. They would never sacrifice their political image for the security of any one operation.

Any considerations otherwise are a fantasy.

Any Paki seen to be a part of the raid would be marked for death and they know it. Their protests are sincere and necessary for survival.

There is obviously a longstanding agreement that we can conduct ops inside Pakistan, witness the drone attacks that only we control, from bases inside Pakistan. Nothing new there, but also witness the official Paki protests after every one of them, calling them unauthorized.

The Paks did not scramble during the raid until after we were out of Pakistan and after we told them about the raid.

“Friedman completely missed the underlying Paki mentality of paranoia and deep distrust of the US and India.”

Allot of Pakistan's behavior would not change regardless of that “paranoia”.

It's separate independence and the aftermath with India over Kashmir was violent and left the Kashmir issue unsettled. A certain level of ongoing mistrust would be normal.

Pakistan has borders with both China and India. Besides the original 1947 war with India over Kashmir, Pakistan twice went to war with India - in 1965 and 1971 (and a brief border engagement in 1999). China went to war with India in 1962. At none of those points was the U.S. particularly aligned with India, a leader of the “nonaligned” movement in global politics at the time. Thus, little translation there for “mistrust” of the U.S. by Pakistan.

No, Pakistan has used “friendship” with China, for its rational national interest; a counter to India and a goad to the U.S. to TRY to be on good terms with Pakistan if we don't want Pakistan “closer” to China. This is not maneuvers out of paranoia, but global politics colored by rational national pure self-interest.

Am I saying that there is not an exuberance of “paranoia” on Pakistan's part, vis-a-vis India? No. I am just saying some things that Pakistan does it would still be doing even were that “paranoia” absent.

Consider this, a CNN poll yesterday in Pakistan asked if they hated, liked, or didn't care about the USA. 80% said they hated the USA, 8% said they liked the USA, 7% didn't care.

On the same poll, 48% stated that they didn't believe that the USA gives any money to Pakistan. That's in the face of $32 billion dollars a year that everyone in the government and military knows very well about. The reason that 48% of the people don't believe it is that Pak leadership at all levels is embarrassed and angry about taking the money.

If you study the struggle of the millions of muhajirs that left India you will see a depth of hatred for India that will be there for generations.

I agree that without the national paranoia, Pakistan would still be complex problem. However without the organizing tool that paranoia brings, Pakistan would have broken up by now.

“However without the organizing tool that paranoia brings, Pakistan would have broken up by now.”

I believe you continue to overstate things. Ethnic rivalries and challenges related to ethnic identities alone, without “paranoia”, would still have separated the people that became Pakistan from those that became India.

Is Pakistan herself a complex of ethnic groups? Yes. And so is India. But, in each case, “paranoia” is not necessary to put the ethnic groups of either nation together or completely drive them apart within each of those nations.

“Paranoia” may be a useful political tool at times, as even the Hindus have tried not so very long ago in India, but it alone is not the glue that holds Pakistan or India together. Many factors, including much history, is involved and centuries of ethnic identification, ethnic differences and ethnic rivalries would remain, in the culture, no matter what religion was being practiced and no matter what religious paranoia the political class made use of. Don’t overstate that paranoia. You’ll miss the other parts that would remain equal factors in what separates people.

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