A common categorization of Salafism is Quintan Wictorowicz’s typology, which divides Salafism into three currents: purists, politicos and jihadis. Each current is united by a common Salafi creed, but they are sharply divided on how to interpret the context and reality in which that Salafi creed should be implemented. While a useful starting point, the typology provides little guidance in terms of understanding doctrinal disputes and conflicts within the jihadi current.
Furthermore, it may mislead us to think of contemporary jihadis as simply radicalized elements within—or as by‐products of—a broader Salafi phenomenon. Instead, as this chapter will show, it may be more fruitful to speak of a spectrum, or a continuum, of positions within contemporary Salafi jihadism, defined by two extreme positions. On the one extreme are hard‐line Salafi purists for whom doctrinal purity is of quintessential importance, even if it means fighting side‐battles, alienating allies and shattering any semblance of a common front against the Zionist‐Crusader enemy. At the other extreme are hard‐line jihadis who are primarily military strategists, and whose main preoccupation is political outcome, not doctrinal purity. This divide is far from the only fault line in the landscape of militant Islamism, and it is most visible when disagreements arise over the permissibility of alliances and cooperation with groups or individuals outside the immediate circle of al‐ Qa’ida and the global jihadi movement. In many respects, the strategist‐doctrinarian divide in the jihadi current corresponds to one of the most important fault lines in mainstream Islamism today, namely, the Salafi‐ Ikhwani divide addressed in more detail by Marc Lynch in Chapter 7 of this volume.
The fundamental differences between these two trends have been apparent since the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB, or in Arabic: al‐Ikhwan al‐Muslimun) in the late 1920s and 1930s in Egypt.During this period, when the Muslim Brotherhood became heavily involved in the political campaign to support the Palestinian revolt, its members’ Salafi counterparts mostly shunned politics and devoted their energies to fighting unlawful religious practices and spreading Salafi religious interpretations. This basic difference in priorities—upholding and enforcing a specific religious orthodoxy first versus giving primacy to politics and the struggle for an Islamic state—has made the Ikhwani‐Salafi divide a defining characteristic of Islamist politics in the 20th century.Given the importance of this divide, one should not be surprised to find cleavages within al-Qa’ida and the global jihadi current, which by and large are rooted in Ikhwani-Salafi cleavages.
pp. 103-104
link: http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/Self-Inflicted-Wounds.pdf
i.e. your basic Sunni.
Witness these Mohammedan "revolutions" as a deliberate Arab Sunni hegemony in opposition to Iranian Persian Shiite expansionist efforts.
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