The genesis of the problem is the American practice of throwing money at people instead of cultivating motivated and trustworthy allies.
This hasn’t changed since the forties. Chiang Kai Shek was better funded than Mao, but Mao’s followers were better motivated than Chiang’s.
The US lost China.
The South Vietnamese were better funded than Ho Chin Minh, but Uncle Ho’s forces were better motivated. The same applies to the Afghan Government and the Taliban today. (A notable exception was when the US was on the side of the Mujaheddin (forerunners of the Taliban) in the 1980’s).
The lesson: don’t waste your time on a protracted war in a foreign land unless you have motivated allies (e.g the Kurds). Don’t attempt to buy loyalty with money, if you have to, then ensure that the engagement is very short or conducted at arms length.
The US needs to learn to carve up countries. Iraq’s Kurds should be given a separate country, as should the Iraqi Christians. In Afghanistan the north-east should be carved and given to Tajikistan, the nother-west to Uzbekistan and the Hazaras should be given their own protectorate. The Pashtuns need to be reunited with the Pathans in the N-W Frontier province of Pakistan. At the same time, detach BAluchistan from Pakistan and make it a separate country (this will cause problems for the Iranis who have Sistan-e-Balochistan as their south-eastern province) and separate Punjab from Sindh.
I’m still trying to understand exactly how and why a punitive expedition to uproot and disrupt Al Qaeda in Afghanistan became a ten year long “nation-building” campaign. My best guess is that the Al Qaeda issue was only one of the motivess behind our intrusion, with the other unspoken goal being to establish a client state on the eastern flank of Iran that would be friendly to US interests. If so, this venture will stand as a testimonial to unrealistic adventurism on the part of the US State Department (and possibly the Bush White House).
Wars have a shelf-life beyond which they become unwinnable. Wars must have:
1) An overwhelming moral and self-interest imperative.
2) An ultimate objective (i.e.; total victory, acquisition of a specific territory, regime change, etc.).
3) A clear strategy to accomplish the objective, and
4) A timetable acceptable to the populace to accomplish the objective.
>The South Vietnamese were better funded than Ho Chin Minh, but Uncle Ho’s forces were better motivated.
On the other hand, some ARVN units did indeed fight very well.
> (A notable exception was when the US was on the side of the Mujaheddin (forerunners of the Taliban) in the 1980’s).
Actually, the Muj were the forerunners to the Northern Alliance, though the Taliban started out as a bunch of former Muj.
>The lesson: don’t waste your time on a protracted war in a foreign land unless you have motivated allies (e.g the Kurds). Don’t attempt to buy loyalty with money, if you have to, then ensure that the engagement is very short or conducted at arms length.
True.