Replies

The problem falls in the fact that the 14th is “NOT” a citizenship law in the sense that it makes a person a citizen. The 14th is a protection amendment to protect the rights of already existing citizens either born or naturalized. Under the US Constitution's definition that the 14th describes, only congress or nature can add to the citizenry. Congress via A1 naturalization and nature via A2 aka citizens parents. The reason the power to expatriate exists in A1 is that the person had a former allegiance and thus has a clear path to return to that allegiance. However, a born citizen under A2 had not other allegiance thus they would be truly left without country should they be refused their right to US citizenship under any other circumstances than taking the steps to acquire a 2nd citizenship they had never known.

If the 14th Amendment truly is a citizenship law by which one born in the US acquires citizenship via an act of congress, then those persons are ALL subject to expatriation, including A2 citizenship because then ALL citizenship is derived by as act of congress and not nature because of the "subject to the jurisdiction" phrase in the 14th. This would unlawfully subject ALL natural born citizens to unlawful expatriation and that is why the court is all over the place in it's decisions over the last 150 years. It all depends on who the majority of the court is, true constitutionalists or the living constitution worshipers.

As I'm reading @Rogers v. Bellei I note this... By Italian law the plaintiff acquired Italian citizenship upon his birth in Italy. He retains that citizenship. He also acquired United States citizenship at his birth under Rev. Stat. 1993, as amended by the Act of May 24, 1934, 1, 48 Stat. 797, then in effect. 2 That version of the statute, as does the present one, contained a residence condition applicable to a child born abroad with one alien parent.
He gained his citizenship simply through statutes because his Mother still retained her US citizenship. The central fact, in our weighing of the plaintiff's claim to continuing and therefore current United States citizenship, is that he was born abroad. He was not born in the United States. He was not naturalized in the United States. And he has not been subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. All this being so, it seems indisputable that the first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment has no application to plaintiff Bellei. He simply is not a Fourteenth-Amendment-first-sentence citizen. His posture contrasts with that of Mr. Afroyim, who was naturalized in the United States, and with that of Mrs. Schneider, whose citizenship was derivative by her presence here and by her mother's naturalization here. [401 U.S. 815, 828]
The plaintiff's claim thus must center in the statutory power of Congress and in the appropriate exercise of that power within the restrictions of any pertinent constitutional provisions other than the Fourteenth Amendment's first sentence.

Three types right there. Natural born citizen, statutory citizen and 14th Amendment citizen.
Enough for tonight. I've got to get to bed.