Nearing coffin corner: US air power on the edge

American Enterprise Institute ^ | 3/21/2012 | Mackenzie Eaglen, Douglas A. Birkey

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Air power stands as a cornerstone of the Obama administration’s recent decision to prioritize defense efforts in the Asia-Pacific region. To make this strategy successful, the administration and Congress must ensure the nation has the necessary capabilities and capacity to secure national interests in an area defined by vast distances, limited basing options, and a pronounced threat to assured access. This means real investments—not budgeting sleights of hand that dilute America’s presence in other vital areas around the globe—and the ability to maintain strength across the national security portfolio. Though the United States currently dominates the skies, this will not continue if resources are spread too thin and are inadequate to meet potential threats. Despite the considerable costs, policymakers must invest in the necessary assets and capabilities to be prepared to effectively defend US interests in the Asia-Pacific region.

Key points in this Outlook:

•The Obama administration has declared the Asia-Pacific region to be a new priority for US defense efforts, and air power is a key part of this strategy. •The United States now has fewer than one-third the number of bombers that it had during the Vietnam era, and existing B-2 long-range strike aircraft are nearly two decades old. •Policymakers must stop hiding behind rhetoric and quickly make the necessary air power investments to equip the nation to face potential threats in the Asia-Pacific region, particularly from China’s rapidly advancing aerial capabilities.

The administration’s decision to prioritize the Asia-Pacific region represents an important step forward in realigning military forces with America’s global interests. It follows the wisdom of the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel, led by William J. Perry, Bill Clinton’s secretary of defense, and Stephen Hadley, George W. Bush’s national security adviser, which found:

[equaviator]

My assumption was that if the plan to cut Selfridge, the last remaining base in MI of any kind with airpower capabilities, is being fast-tracked then why shouldn’t I assume that ANG bases in states with regular USAF bases won’t also be getting the axe or at least downsized.

Now, you say that is wrong and because I made assumption on top of assumption, I admit that it could be but can you explain why you disagree?