On the other hand, the British Navy is a shell of what it was in 82. They decomissioned their last harrier squadron. I don’t know if they have the ability to project any air power in the South Atlantic.
They have a nice little airbase on the islands now, with I think 4 Eurofighters based there. Which is about 3 more than you need to down the entire Argentine Air Force and hole any hostile ship that heads that way.
Britain has much better strategic power projection capabilities than she had in 1982, but perhaps slightly inferior tactical power projection capabilities.
The islands could be reinforced heavily within the space of 24-48 hours by heavy airlift if neccessary thanks to RAF Mount Pleasant’s large and capable runway. It would be hellishly hard for them to take the islands.
On the other hand if they did, things might be more difficult, although not having fixed wing aircraft might not be as much of a handicap as it was in 1982. I’m not an expert by any means but the ‘Daring’ class destroyer is an extremely capable AA platform that would probably completely deny Argentina use of the air, whilst Apache gunships filled some of the gap by providing an air support role that the harriers would have done had we still had them. We also have SSNs with Tomohawk cruise missiles, which means that the Royal Navy can strike anywhere the Falklands or even mainland Argentina at will with virtual impunity, unlike with the extremely tenuous ‘Black Buck’ Vulcan bomber missions we relied on back in ‘82.
Basically, despite the loss of the harriers, a British task force would still have considerable anti-air and and strike capabilities that are probably even better overall than they were in 1982..