I think you are misunderstanding what I am advocating. In cases where existing law is ambiguous and a judge has to invent rules sufficient to resolve the ambiguity, other judges who are faced with the same ambiguity should resolve it the same way. On the other hand, in any case where ambiguity genuinely exists, a judge should be able to justify his interpretation of the law as being consistent with the Constitution and statutes without having to cite precedent. The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution doesn't give list Supreme Court decisions as having authority; consequently, any authority they have must be subservient to the Constitution and statutes.
That having been said, even court rulings which contradict the Constitution or statutes may be binding to a significant degree, but not because they are legitimate. If a court issues a decision--legitimate or not--future courts should not act in such a fashion detrimental to those who act upon a good-faith in the former decision's legitimacy. The previous decisions should be regarded as "precedent" only to the extent necessary to protect those who rely upon it from unjust harm. Future courts may not be able to undo such decisions instantly, but should endeavor to "unwind" their effects gradually.
Essentially, what should happen in many cases would be for the Court to be willing to say that e.g. government agents have interpreted its decision on XX date as justifying YY behavior during searches; such behavior is in fact generally not legitimate, but as a consequence of the earlier decision, officers reasonably believed that it was. Provided that departments make a good-faith effort to inform officers that such behavior is not legitimate, no remedy shall be available against officers or departments who acted on a reasonable good-faith belief that it was, or who within fifteen days of this decision act on such such belief before they discover that it was erroneous. This protection shall not apply to willful ignorance, even within the fifteen-day window.
Compare the effects of issuing that decision, with those of issuing a decision which simply declares that an officer's action was legitimate. The immediate effects would be the same, but recognizing the officer's actions as having been illegitimate but without remedy would avoid the tendency of court decisions to allow more and more egregious behavior on the part of the government and its personnel.
Further, allowing for behavior to be found illegitimate but without remedy would also allow courts to be more honest when they issue their decisions. Frequently courts will find themselves in situation where the appropriate decision for the case at hand would appear to be at odds with the law; under current practice, courts feel compelled to pretend that the law says something it does not in order to justify their decision. It would be better for courts to instead acknowledge that the law says something which would appear to be at odds with their decision, but then explain why they feel the law should not be applied in the case at hand (e.g. because applying the law in the extant case would magnify the harm done by a failure to apply it in a previous case).
On a parting note, I think a lot of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence should be thrown out the window. Among other things, in many cases the difference between legitimate and illegitimate actions may be the intention of the officer performing them. If an officer forces open a container because he legitimately believes it contains evidence mentioned in a warrant, and if the officer takes reasonable efforts to avoid or minimize damage to the container, the fact that the container is damaged despite such efforts would not make the search illegitimate. If, however, the officer deliberately destroys a container as a means of punishing or terrorizing the owner, such action would constitute a deliberate violation of the owner's Fifth Amendment right not to be deprived of property except by due process of law. Since determining the legitimacy of a particular search would require making judgments of various witness' credibility, I can't see any fair way of making such determinations except in an adversarial fact-finding hearing; the most practical such hearing would generally be trial court.
My view is that especially in cases where ambiguity exists, a judge needs to adhere all the more closely to principles established in precedents. The law needs to be as predictable as possible, and judges should always adhere as closely as possible to the text, legislative history and the body of case law developed in accordance therewith in order to carry into effect the original intent of the statute.
Take just the First Amendment as an example: “Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech.” It would take a text of hundreds of pages to explain what this law means in the myriad of circumstances in which this issue arises. If every judge presented with a new case arising under this clause were free to ignore the principles established in prior case law there would be no ability for citizens to know what the law is, as it would vary radically depending on the happenstance of the individual judge deciding the case who would be free to ignore the prior developed body of law.
The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution doesn't give list Supreme Court decisions as having authority; consequently, any authority they have must be subservient to the Constitution and statutes.
The Constitution certainly DOES give Supreme Court decisions authority, by the very fact of vesting the judicial authority of the United States in that body. The Supremacy Clause is not limited to statutes of the United States, rather it extends to all “laws” of the United States made in pursuance of the Constitution. The power of the courts to interpret statutes under case law and for that case law to be considered “law” is the very heart of the English common law system that we inherited and continued. As if there were any doubt, the Constitution refers to the power of federal courts to decide cases “in law and equity” arising under the Constitution – the fact that the Framers contemplated judges applying principles of equity in deciding cases removes any doubt from the question of whether principles established in judicial cases were to be considered law.
Because I disagree with your premise that precedent should not be considered binding by virtue of being such, I also disagree with the rest of your reasoning that follows therefrom. The proper way for the Supreme Court to reverse rulings is to explicitly hold that such decisions, like Roe v Wade and Plyler v Doe, themselves are contrary to well-reasoned precedent that was soundly founded on the original intent of the Constitution, and NOT based on a claim of changing social attitudes or the peculiar jurisprudential philosophy of the judge or justice ruling in the case free to ignore the prior established body of law.