“Ok, are you saying that no one could alter the code and/or the data translation? How can anyone know they’re vote was counted as they wished?
This stuff has been pretty thoroughly discussed in the past. Here’s the quick run down on a secure, properly designed electronic voting booth: “
So, when an all electronic big name voting system (no print out of a paper ballot) that had no paper anything was open to tampering? When I was a poll worker a few years ago, that’s what there was. One voter said then that the lack of even a receipt to her showed her the system could be compromised.
Yup. If it doesn't produce a hardcopy that can be verified by the voter and used for auditing/recounts, it was designed to be compromised. However, you can't have the voting system produce a 'receipt' as such, because if the voter takes with him, a receipt that shows who they voted for, that can facilitate fraud.
Suppose Mallory, a malicious democrat wants to pay Alice $5 to vote for Zero. As it stands, with a secret ballot, Alice could go vote, tell Mallory that she voted for Zero, even though she actually voted for CINO Romney. She'd still pocket the cash, and Mallory would be none the wiser. With a receipt that shows your vote, Mallory can validate that the vote was made per her instructions.
Also, anyone who supports internet voting needs to be boiled in oil. The problem isn't that internet voting couldn't be done securely, but the protocols necessary to both guard against fraud, and guarantee the secrecy of an individual's ballot is not simple. I'd be willing to put money that anyone trying to implement internet voting will get one or both sides of that equation wrong.