Meade’s record over the remainder of the war is mixed at best. However, he was a far better leader than his predecessors, including Hooker (who was aggressive, but drunk and consorting with prostitutes much of the time); McClellan (a superb organizer and trainer but too cautious to exploit clear opportunities) and Burnside (marginally competent)
General Meade deserves great credit for successfully fighting a decisive battle literally on the fly. He assumed Command of the Army of the Potomac on the eve of Gettysburg, after Hooker was finally sacked. He faced the supreme challenge of moving his army on short notice to face Lee and coordinating the operation through Hooker’s existing staff. Meade also faced the liabilities of having Corps commanders like Dan Sickles and a chief of staff like Dan Butterfield. Both were cronies of Joe Hooker and worked actively to undermine Meade and his reputation.
In fact. Sickles almost lost Gettysburg—and quite possibly, the war—on his own, by repositioning his corps without permission and creating a large gap in the Union lines. Had the salient been fully exploited by the Confederates, Gettysburg would have ended on the first day, and Lee’s Army would have paraded in Philadelphia within a week.
Against that backdrop, Meade’s performance at Gettysburg was superb. And while he is often faulted for “failing” to pursue Lee back into Virginia, the truth is that the Army of the Potomac suffered terribly at both Chancellorsville and Gettysburg; Meade knew his Army needed more men and logistical support to mount the campaigns initiated by Grant in the spring of 1864. In fact, he probably deserves credit for not trying to fight another decisive battle in the weeks following Gettysburg. Engaging Lee on his home turf, Meade might have suffered another major defeat, leaving himself (and Grant) in a far less advantageous position in 1864.
Meade’s reputation has suffered for several reasons. First, he made some poor choices after Gettysburg, namely in the run-up to the Battle of the Crater outside Petersburg. He recognized the folly of the plan, yet failed to intervene when subordinates changed it. Meade also hated the press and made no secret of his contempt. As a result, reporters adopted an informal policy of blaming anything that went wrong on Meade, while giving credit for successes to other officers.
Finally, Meade had GRE misfortune of passing away just a few years after the war, while his enemies (notably Sickles and Butterfield) lived into old age, With their writings and political connections, they made sure that Meade’s reputation was thoroughly trashed, while enhancing their own. Sickles, the Tammany Hall politician, even succeeded in getting himself the Congressional Medal of Honor—30 years after the war ended.
I’m not sure if George Meade will ever be called a great general, but he was good enough to win at Gettysburg, despite being new to command of an army, and having subordinates who were as much a liability as an asset. He was a very competent, professional soldier at the very moment the Union needed those qualities. It’s worth remembering that Lincoln had a terrible track record in picking commanders before Meade; if someone else had been leading the Army of the Potomac at Gettysburg, the outcome would have been much different.
Pull out SPI’s Terrible Swift Sword, or, one of its children.
Then you can change history!
That is subject to debate. While I tend to agree, General Longstreet claimed that Sickles move probably is what won the second day for the south by tying up so many of Longstreet's troops before they could get to cemetary ridge and by frustrating Lee's plan for an "en echelon" attack on the Union's left flank.
Meade at least managed to get the high ground. You wonder if he would have succeeded at that had Jackson still been alive. The old artillerist would have fought Meade hard for it on the first day, maybe harder than one legged Baldy Ewell.
“In fact Sickles almost lost Gettysburg—and quite possibly, the war—on his own, by repositioning his corps without permission and creating a large gap in the Union lines. Had the salient been fully exploited by the Confederates, Gettysburg would have ended on the first day, and Lee’s Army would have paraded in Philadelphia within a week.”
Actually I think that would be the second day. I’ve an ancestor who was with the 13th Mississippi in that assault on Sickles’ position- ‘the battle of the peach orchard’, Barksdale’s Brigade. I have a picture of him in his uniform.
It’s my understanding that the Mississippians breached the Federal line but there was no one to follow up the attack. The attack was launched very late in the afternoon and darkness may have prevented any opportunity to exploit their position, which might have given Longstreet the chance to flank the Union line.
Was this actually a personal thing with him?