777 Crash at SFO (San Francisco)

Twitter ^ | July 6, 2013

[FreedomPoster]

Currently just Tweets and locals talking about this, nothing on news sites yet. Lots of stuff in the Twitter feed, including links to uploaded videos of the smoking mess.

[Yosemitest]

And I hope you get over your own bloated ego.
In general, in Air Traffic Control, most women just can't keep up> And I know several situations, including the one at LAX, where women have killed people proving they can't keep up, or pay attention to detail!

[bluecat6]

“Are you familiar with a “Wing Slip” or a “Wing Slide” ?”

Is that were a pilot yaws the plane around a little so the lifting shape of the wing is less effective?

If so, I hope this flight crew was not trying get that fancy. The approach at SFO should be void of such dramatics since it is so straight forward.

[Yosemitest]

The Slip is a maneuverer that can get you in trouble fast, if you don't know what you're doing, and I DON"T recommend it.
But here it is in a training site.

is, however, still a very useful maneuverer and quite elegant when performed correctly.

Whether we are speaking about a side slip used to counteract cross-wind drift on landing, a forward slip used to lose altitude, or a slipping turn used to lose lots of altitude, the essential technique is the same. With a combination of aileron and rudder inputs, we induce the aircraft to fly sideways through the air. We transfer some of the lift from the wings to the fuselage and create a significant amount of drag in the process.

When we use a slipping technique to counter cross-wind drift on landing, we point the nose of the aircraft with rudder input to keep the longitudinal axis of the machine parallel to the centre-line of the runway or landing area. We apply aileron to maintain lateral position. Rudder points the nose; aileron slides the aircraft right or left as needed. Of course, we use elevator and trim to control our approach speed and power to control our rate of descent.

When using the slip to lose altitude, we normally enter from a power-off glide. All too often on a flight test, we see people enter a slip to lose altitude with cruise or only slightly reduced power. This defeats the technique. With enough power, we can fly the aircraft with full rudder and opposite aileron without losing any altitude at all.

We establish the aircraft in a glide, normally at best glide speed as specified in the POH. Once in the glide, it is very important to establish a clear visual reference so we know where we are headed. I like to pick out some obvious and prominent feature on the ground ahead—about where we would touch down if we continued our descent—and maybe even say out loud or to myself, "That’s where I’m going."

We also want to take note of the aircraft’s attitude. Once in a slip, depending on the aircraft we are flying, the airspeed indicator can become unreliable. The pitot tube and static port are now meeting the relative airflow at an unusual angle.

If we work from the attitude of the aircraft by looking outside, we won’t be confused or fooled by inaccurate indicated airspeed readings.

With our eye on our reference point and an appreciation of the attitude of the nose, we can apply aileron in the direction we would like to establish our slip. Left aileron results in a slip to the left and visa versa. We roll the aircraft with aileron and stop the turn with opposite rudder: roll left; right rudder. Roll right; left rudder. Particularly in the early stages of learning this manoeuvre, gentle application of control inputs is easier to understand. No big hurry. Strive for elegance rather than speed.

As we enter the slip, the aircraft may have a tendency to raise its nose. We are increasing lift by exposing the whole side of the aircraft to the relative wind. Maintain the attitude we observed in the glide with elevator input. Keep our eye on our ground reference point so we continue to know where we’re heading.

Many students are worried about stalling the aircraft and producing a spin because of the cross control inputs and have a tendency to point to nose excessively downward. This simply increases speed and reduces the effectiveness of the slip.

Most light aircraft are very reluctant to spin from a slip. If you are really worried about it, give yourself plenty of altitude in a safe area and try it. Put the aircraft into a slip and gently raise the nose until she stalls. Most light aircraft will shake and buffet and lose altitude at a great rate, but will not show any interest whatsoever in entering a spin.

In the early stages of learning a slip, I encourage students to use full rudder input and "steer" the aircraft with aileron. This simplifies things by giving the pilot only one input to worry about and control. Two variable variables result in just so many combinations that it’s easy to get confused. Keep things simple and success is more easily obtained.

If there is a wind blowing, we normally set ourselves up with the lowered wing towards the wind. This is particularly important when using a slipping manoeuvre on landing. With limited altitude, we don’t want to increase our vulnerability by giving the wind an opportunity to get under the raised wing and toss us into an unusual and potentially dangerous attitude.

To turn our side slip into a slipping turn, simply increase aileron input. A slipping turn can be a very effective tool for losing altitude in a hurry and can be a very nice little trick to store in our forced landing kit or our landing kit for fields with difficult or obstructed approach paths. We can really keep our base in close by making use of the slipping turn in an effective manner.

Whether you are an experienced pilot or a new arrival to the activity, honing and developing your skills is not only an excellent plan, it’s a lot of fun. Slips can be extremely useful in a variety of situations. Familiarity and comfort with the maneuverer is a fine addition to your repertoire. Flaps fail; cross-winds occur; engines catch fire; difficult situations arise. Keep your skills sharp and they will be there for you when you need them.

[bluecat6]

I remember when the puddle jumpers were so small there would not even be a flight attendant on board. Just the P and Co-P. When landing they would pull back the curtain (no double locked secure doors back then!). You could then watch the landing through the front windshield from the passenger compartment.

During heavy cross winds the side slip maneuver was obvious as the runway would be to one side or the other and we would ‘tack’ into it on decent.

I have never sensed that maneuver being used as a passenger in the 737s and 757s at SFO. Landing at SFO were always just a long, steady decent at steady speed that started south of San Jose - no matter the wind conditions.

[Yosemitest]

I want you ALL to read this post from another thread vette6387 sent me.

Just received this from a friend. I have no attribution, but it does provide, if true, insight into Korean pilots and their ability to take training.

Low-down on Korean pilots
After I retired from UAL as a Standards Captain on the –400, I got a job as a simulator instructor working for Alteon (a Boeing subsidiary) at Asiana. When I first got there, I was shocked and surprised by the lack of basic piloting skills shown by most of the pilots. It is not a normal situation with normal progression from new hire, right seat, left seat taking a decade or two. One big difference is that ex-Military pilots are given super-seniority and progress to the left seat much faster. Compared to the US, they also upgrade fairly rapidly because of the phenomenal growth by all Asian air carriers. By the way, after about six months at Asiana, I was moved over to KAL and found them to be identical. The only difference was the color of the uniforms and airplanes. I worked in Korea for 5 long years and although I found most of the people to be very pleasant, it’s a minefield of a work environment ... for them and for us expats.

One of the first things I learned was that the pilots kept a web-site and reported on every training session. I don’t think this was officially sanctioned by the company, but after one or two simulator periods, a database was building on me (and everyone else) that told them exactly how I ran the sessions, what to expect on checks, and what to look out for. For example; I used to open an aft cargo door at 100 knots to get them to initiate an RTO and I would brief them on it during the briefing. This was on the B-737 NG and many of the captains were coming off the 777 or B744 and they were used to the Master Caution System being inhibited at 80 kts. Well, for the first few days after I started that, EVERYONE rejected the takeoff. Then, all of a sudden they all “got it” and continued the takeoff (in accordance with their manuals). The word had gotten out. I figured it was an overall PLUS for the training program.

We expat instructors were forced upon them after the amount of fatal accidents (most of the them totally avoidable) over a decade began to be noticed by the outside world. They were basically given an ultimatum by the FAA, Transport Canada, and the EU to totally rebuild and rethink their training program or face being banned from the skies all over the world. They hired Boeing and Airbus to staff the training centers. KAL has one center and Asiana has another. When I was there (2003-2008) we had about 60 expats conducting training KAL and about 40 at Asiana. Most instructors were from the USA, Canada, Australia, or New Zealand with a few stuffed in from Europe and Asia. Boeing also operated training centers in Singapore and China so they did hire some instructors from there.

This solution has only been partially successful but still faces ingrained resistance from the Koreans. I lost track of the number of highly qualified instructors I worked with who were fired because they tried to enforce “normal” standards of performance. By normal standards, I would include being able to master basic tasks like successfully shoot a visual approach with 10 kt crosswind and the weather CAVOK. I am not kidding when I tell you that requiring them to shoot a visual approach struck fear in their hearts ... with good reason. Like this Asiana crew, it didn’t’ compute that you needed to be a 1000’ AGL at 3 miles and your sink rate should be 600-800 Ft/Min. But, after 5 years, they finally nailed me. I still had to sign my name to their training and sometimes if I just couldn’t pass someone on a check, I had no choice but to fail them. I usually busted about 3-5 crews a year and the resistance against me built. I finally failed an extremely incompetent crew and it turned out he was the a high-ranking captain who was the Chief Line Check pilot on the fleet I was teaching on. I found out on my next monthly trip home that KAL was not going to renew my Visa. The crew I failed was given another check and continued a fly while talking about how unfair Captain Brown was.

Any of you Boeing glass-cockpit guys will know what I mean when I describe these events. I gave them a VOR approach with an 15 mile arc from the IAF. By the way, KAL dictated the profiles for all sessions and we just administered them. He requested two turns in holding at the IAF to get set up for the approach. When he finally got his nerve up, he requested “Radar Vectors” to final. He could have just said he was ready for the approach and I would have cleared him to the IAF and then “Cleared for the approach” and he could have selected “Exit Hold” and been on his way. He was already in LNAV/VNAV PATH. So, I gave him vectors to final with a 30 degree intercept. Of course, he failed to “Extend the FAF” and he couldn’t understand why it would not intercept the LNAV magenta line when he punched LNAV and VNAV. He made three approaches and missed approaches before he figured out that his active waypoint was “Hold at XYZ.” Every time he punched LNAV, it would try to go back to the IAF ... just like it was supposed to do. Since it was a check, I was not allowed (by their own rules) to offer him any help. That was just one of about half dozen major errors I documented in his UNSAT paperwork. He also failed to put in ANY aileron on takeoff with a 30-knot direct crosswind (again, the weather was dictated by KAL).

This Asiana SFO accident makes me sick and while I am surprised there are not more, I expect that there will be many more of the same type accidents in the future unless some drastic steps are taken. They are already required to hire a certain percentage of expats to try to ingrain more flying expertise in them, but more likely, they will eventually be fired too. One of the best trainees I ever had was a Korean/American (he grew up and went to school in the USA) who flew C-141’s in the USAF. When he got out, he moved back to Korea and got hired by KAL. I met him when I gave him some training and a check on the B-737 and of course, he breezed through the training. I give him annual PCs for a few years and he was always a good pilot. Then, he got involved with trying to start a pilots union and when they tired to enforce some sort of duty rigs on international flights, he was fired after being arrested and JAILED!

The Koreans are very very bright and smart so I was puzzled by their inability to fly an airplane well. They would show up on Day 1 of training (an hour before the scheduled briefing time, in a 3-piece suit, and shined shoes) with the entire contents of the FCOM and Flight Manual totally memorized. But, putting that information to actual use was many times impossible. Crosswind landings are also an unsolvable puzzle for most of them. I never did figure it out completely, but I think I did uncover a few clues. Here is my best guess. First off, their educational system emphasizes ROTE memorization from the first day of school as little kids. As you know, that is the lowest form of learning and they act like robots. They are also taught to NEVER challenge authority and in spite of the flight training heavily emphasizing CRM/CLR, it still exists either on the surface or very subtly. You just can’t change 3000 years of culture.

The other thing that I think plays an important role is the fact that there is virtually NO civil aircraft flying in Korea. It’s actually illegal to own a Cessna-152 and just go learn to fly. Ultra-lights and Powered Hang Gliders are Ok. I guess they don’t trust the people to not start WW III by flying 35 miles north of Inchon into North Korea. But, they don’t get the kids who grew up flying (and thinking for themselves) and hanging around airports. They do recruit some kids from college and send then to the US or Australia and get them their tickets. Generally, I had better experience with them than with the ex-Military pilots. This was a surprise to me as I spent years as a Naval Aviator flying fighters after getting my private in light airplanes. I would get experienced F-4, F-5, F-15, and F-16 pilots who were actually terrible pilots if they had to hand fly the airplane. What a shock!

Finally, I’ll get off my box and talk about the total flight hours they claim. I do accept that there are a few talented and free-thinking pilots that I met and trained in Korea. Some are still in contact and I consider them friends. They were a joy! But, they were few and far between and certainly not the norm.

Actually, this is a worldwide problem involving automation and the auto-flight concept. Take one of these new first officers that got his ratings in the US or Australia and came to KAL or Asiana with 225 flight hours. After takeoff, in accordance with their SOP, he calls for the autopilot to be engaged at 250’ after takeoff. How much actual flight time is that? Hardly one minute. Then he might fly for hours on the autopilot and finally disengage it (MAYBE?) below 800’ after the gear was down, flaps extended and on airspeed (autothrottle) . Then he might bring it in to land. Again, how much real “flight time” or real experience did he get. Minutes! Of course, on the 777 or 747, it’s the same only they get more inflated logbooks.

So, when I hear that a 10,000 hour Korean captain was vectored in for a 17-mile final and cleared for a visual approach in CAVOK weather, it raises the hair on the back of my neck.

Tom

---

And here is my response.

I believe every word of what your friend said.

Oh man, this brings back so many memories from the R.O.K.
First, let me state that I've got 5 tours in South Korea, some of them were 14 months long (DEROS is a month, not a date; i.e. in before the 5th, out after the 25th).


"You just can’t change 3000 years of culture."
They told us in Korea, that Korean teachers in grade-school and college, told their students
that since they were young and energetic, they only needed half the sleep that adults needed.
Adults sleep 8 hours (they drew the number ''8" on the chalk board), and learning students need to apply themselves learning by studying.
(They then took an eraser and erased the left half of the number "8" and left the number"3".) This is how much sleep good students should be getting if they study properly.
And they meant it.

A friend of mine went to Kunsan AB in the early 80s and then the Koreans were flying F-86s.
He was working local when, in clear weather a Korean F-86 pilot on a PAR Approach, flew into "Big Coyote" a hill west of the approach end of RWY36 for no reason.
When they asked the PAR Controller what happened, he reported hearing "snoring" on the frequency, and said he tried to raise the pilot when the pilot started veering off course.
He got no response.
They played back the controller tapes, and verified the "snoring" on the frequency.
The pilot fell asleep while flying the PAR Approach, flews into the small mountain/large hill and killed himself, and totally destroyed the F-86.
The Korean Wing Commander wanted the PAR Controller in jail, but the tapes saved him.
In Korea, someone had to answer for the lost aircraft, so the pilot being dead, the South Korean Commander found the aircraft "crew-chief" responsible, and sentenced him to death by firing squad.
The Korean Commander ordered all ROK military stationed at Kunsan AB to attend the execution on the ramp, west of the large old F-86 hanger, north of the 06/24 TWY and north of the Control Tower.
They took the crew-chief out to the west side of the ramp, blind folded him, stuck a cigarette in his mouth, marched a firing squad out east of him, and read the sentence, and shot him dead.

When I was at Kunsan AB in the late 80s, we had a Korean flight of 4 F-5s depart going to the Koonie Range west of Osan AB.
It was a Saturday and not much was going on, and they were scheduled for refueling and were to return in 2 hours.
When they returned to Kunsan, there were only 3 F-5s that landed.
I asked them three times, "Where is Number Four of the Flight?" and I got no response at first, but on the third time, one of them keyed up the mic and gave three seconds of dead air, and then unkeyed.
We called the ROK Command post, and asked them, but they wouldn't say anything. They just hung up on us.
I thought no more of it, thinking that number 4 might have diverted.
Two weeks later, on a Sunday Swing shift, an USAF Captain came up and asked my crew some questions about the flight.
We told him what had happened, went down and retrieved the tape and played it for him.
He made a copy, and then told us that Number 4 had crashed into Koonie Range without saying a word about any problems.

Your friend commented:
"By normal standards, I would include being able to master basic tasks like successfully shoot a visual approach with 10 kt crosswind and the weather CAVOK.
I am not kidding when I tell you that requiring them to shoot a visual approach struck fear in their hearts ... with good reason.
Like this Asiana crew, it didn’t’ compute that you needed to be a 1000’ AGL at 3 miles and your sink rate should be 600-800 Ft/Min."
The Kim-Hae Massacre
Later that year at Kunsan, we had a new SOF (Supervisor Of Flying) come up and the weather was W0X0F.
It was so foggy from sea fog, you couldn't see the parallel taxiway at the base of the control tower, less than 100 feet away.
After about 15 minutes, we got a hole in the sea fog blowing from south to north, and the new SOF started calling the ROK alternates.
They all reported 1,000 ft ceiling and 3 miles visibility. The SOF looked at me and said he was going to launch the fleet.
As watch sup at the time, I told him,
"Don't do it. It's mail-order weather.
Launch one F-16 for a weather ship, and have him check the weather, and report back to you.
The SOF looked at me in disgust, picked up the phone and called the 8th TAC Fighter Wing Command Post and said, "Launch the fleet!"
In 10 minutes ground control had 4 flights of 4 F-16s requesting clearance and calling for taxi.
In 5 minutes the parallel taxiway was full of F-16s taxiing to RWY 36, and the second squadron was calling for their clearance.
The fog showed up again as the second squadron started taxiing.
With the south hammerhead full of F-16s, and the parallel taxiway full, the SOF waited another 10 minutes, checking with Kunsan weather station, and another break in the sea-fog showed up and rolled north.
One more call from the SOF to the ROK alternates who all reported 1,000 and 3, and he said launch 'em.
I again told him, "Don't do it. It's mail-order weather!"
Again the SOF said "Launch 'em now!"
So we launched 8 flights of 4 F-16s each.
As the last flight got airborne, the sea-fog rolled in again, and again we were W0X0F, and couldn't see shit.
The departing F-16s said the tops were at 4,800 feet, and were solid as far as he could see.
The SOF sent the first flight of 4 to Osan AB, and to Suwon AB.
He sent the second flight of 4 to Tae-Gue.
He sent the third flight to Pusan, and the fourth flight to Kim-Hae.
All flights reported in a few minutes later, that they flew down to decision height and didn't see the approach lights.
The phone rang at the base of the tower, and I answered.
The Wing Commander wanted in and up into the cab, and I let him in.
When the Col got up the stairs, he looked at me and said.
"(My last name), you know he's(the SOF) new. Didn't you tell him?"
Yes sir, I did. I told him twice, and he didn't want to hear it!
The Col. ask me
"Well now I've got 32 fighter airborne and no place to put 'em, so what do you recommend?"
Call Osan or Kadena and get a refueling tanker airborne, and get the fighters as high as you can in holding.
If nothing else, recover here in W0X0F with the PAR controller.
We got a tanker airborne, and we waited another 30 minutes, and then we got lucky.
Kim-Hae started reporting more that 1,000 and 3.
He started landing at Kim-Hae and got 20 of them down, when one had to take a BAK-12 cable at the approach end.
Our own weather was improving and we recovered the rest of the F-16s at Kunsan.
The point being, you can't trust Korean weather stations to tell you when their base is below minimums.
Needless to say, I never saw that Captain again in the tower, and I spent another 8 months at Kunsan after that.

Hot Brakes
Another time at Osan AB, we had some ROK F-5s divert from Kunsan into Osan, but we had one of our own F-16s in the de-armimg hammerhead with HOT BRAKES.
We tried several times to get the Korean F-5 pilots to exit the runway at threequarter field, telling them HOT BRAKES IN THE DE-ARM AREA.
The didn't get it.
Anything out of the ordinary, AND I MEAN ANYTHING, and they're like a deer frozen in the headlights.
Koreans just don't do alternate plans.
They never plan for screw-ups.

I could give more examples of the Koreans' inability to analyze situations and change their plans on the fly ... but this is enough.

[vette6387]

“The Slip is a maneuverer that can get you in trouble fast, if you don’t know what you’re doing, and I DON”T recommend it.”

No kidding! It can lead to as cross-control stall and a spin “out the bottom” as I recall from my flight training. It’s one thing to do a forward slip in a Cessna 150 with it’s low wing loading and stall speed, but it’s another matter with a swept-wing air transport. With the availability of spoilers on transports, there really is very little if any need to perform a slip. The neat thing about spoilers is that you don’t have to change any of your other control inputs or make changes in power settings. I flew gliders for a while. The spoiler is a very useful control feature on a glider to help you “make the runway” when you don’t have an engine!

[Yosemitest]

I was just wondering if the Korean pilots were trying a "slip maneuverer" to lose some altitude fast in this 777 crash,
but after reading the input from your friend Tom, I doubt it.

[vette6387]

“I was just wondering if the Korean pilots were trying a “slip maneuverer” to lose some altitude fast in this 777 crash, ,,,,,”

Someone posted the vertical speed data on the Asiana flight from some service that can provide you with altitude data for the entire flight. If that information is correct, the plane was never in a “stabilized” decent. The data presented showed that the rate of decent varied from more than 1300 ft/ min down to less than 300. It can be best described as a “yo-yo.” Evidently they were high at the FAF (the Outer Marker) so they pulled power, and nosed the plane down to position it properly. But they never got it stabilized at around 600fpm. It looks as though they were always behind in being where they needed to be on the glide slope. With something this big, you can’t be making large corrections in attitude, because the plane is incapable of responding. They simply ended up at the runway threshold with too high a rate of decent and too little airspeed, and when they tried to pull the nose up to stop the decent they simply stalled, banged the tail down first, tore the gear off on the seawall, and became wreckage moving at about 100 mph. along the ground. As far as slipping the plane, they would have more likely been using the spoilers to adjust their decent rate. That said, at the end of the flight a slip would have been counterproductive to their situation, because a slip is used to loose altitude. My flight instructor used to say that there are two things that are useless to a pilot 1) The runway behind you and 2) the sky above you.

[BatGuano]

“Slip maneuver” in a swept wing jet? No way Jose, or Kim. It just is not done, PERIOD! Please do not cross pollinate civilian experience with military or commercial jet flying.

[BatGuano]

Here I am again...you just do not slip a swept wing airliner!
No way!

[Yosemitest]

Your thoughts about vette6387 friend Tom's comment #846?

[BatGuano]

Tom Brown?? He is right on the mark. Great observations and he does a great job of writing what I have been saying from the beginning. “The dreaded visual approach”, truer words were never said. One cause of pilot deficiencies in “stick and rudder” or hand flying is that the companies discourage hand flying because the autopilot does a better job economically. One wag in my company said, “if you want to fly, go rent an airplane”. Sort of bit Asiana in the ass, huh?

[Yosemitest]

I would say it bit the passengers as well.

[American Constitutionalist]

It all comes down to saving face even if it endangers those whom these Korean pilots fly in their planes.
Remember that one New Zealand referee Keith Walker was physically assaulted by Korean boxing officials ?
I say ? all American and European costumers boycott flying on any Korean airlines until they change their attitude towards their training of their pilots.
Even if it cost you more with a plane ticket fly only US airlines to a Asian country.

[American Constitutionalist]

Well the same standard or attitude even here in the USA in the liberal mindset in hiring people and in government.
It's not about who's qualified, or competent, it's all about racial quotas or keeping a certain group happy.
Hillary Clinton and John Kerry were never qualified or competent to be Secretary of State.

[Yosemitest]

I agree.
Saving face, that was a big deal when I was in Korea, during those 5 tours.
I don't imagine that it has changed any at all.