[ExSoldier]

That's fascinating, I didn't know all of that, except about the tank farms being a potential logistical nightmare if they'd been taken out. I thought the carriers had been ordered out of the harbor and away from the area for their own protection, much as had the aircraft been ordered into tight groups on the tarmac so they could be better secured from the possibility of sabotage. As it turned out they were just lining them up as perfect targets. A few of the aircraft were dispersed to secondary strips and they were the ones into the air and making sure the game that day wasn't a total shutout.

I'm glad you gave me this info, since as a history teacher I want to be sure my students get the best info possible. This year I'm teaching the first half of World History so it won't be so important, this specific stuff. We might barely get to the time of Christ this year. They'll finish the course in another grade. Then later on they'll get the second half of American History and that's where this info will become important. I'll pass this along to the social studies teachers in my district who teach that level. Have you got any links to a primary source that will confirm that? My bosses will ask.

[tanknetter]

Glad to have helped!

There's (obviously) a LOT of material out there on Pearl Harbor. I've only read a small chunk of it, but enough that I can't recall specific sources for particular material off the top of my head.

Good place to start would be the report of the Hart Inquiry. Yes, this is an official investigation and one that took place in wartime so might be considered somewhat suspect. A decent contemporary summary, with citations of Hart, can be found here.

For the information about half the battleships being kept in harbor when the carriers were absent, you can look here, as a start. I've read that multiple places, so just conducted a quick couple google searches until I found what I was looking for:

Ironically, Kimmel preferred to keep the Pacific Fleet's battleships in harbor due to the unavailability of fleet carriers to provide air cover. The carrier Enterprise was between Wake and Oahu, the carrier Lexington was out near Midway and the carrier Saratoga was on the west coast of the American mainland. Kimmel instead left the battleships at Pearl Harbor, where they could be protected from enemy air attack by large contingents of local army aircraft. Unfortunately Lt. General Short had decided that sabotage was the most likely threat, and he had ordered that all aircraft ammunition be locked away, and for aircraft to be arrayed in neat rows for observation. The fact that the senior Navy and Army commanders for the most important American installations in the Pacific implemented somewhat conflicting policies apparently did not occur to anyone. So as the hours ticked by, and the alerts and warnings piled up, the bulk of the US Pacific Fleet remained in Pearl Harbor and took its usual weekend off.

Of a little interest is the nugget in the Hart Report saying that three battleships (Nevada, Oklahoma and Arizona) were sent out of Pearl when Enterprise left in order not to raise suspicions. Just another group of BBs heading out, as normal, under a carrier's watchful protection, right?

One more quick thing ... there's been some pretty good research recently, although I can't recall the source at all, about why Nagumo didn't go for the third strike. Which would have (allegedly) gone after the oil farm and machine/repair shops. The accepted wisdom is that, knowing that the three US Pacific carriers were absent, and thinking that they might be in the neighborhood somewhere, he decided to skedaddle.

The added wrinkles to that are 1.) that other Japanese carrier operations showed a pattern of two big strikes being followed by a pull-back to replenish. And 2.) that Japan had limited replenishment capability meaning Kido Butai was already operating at its the extreme operational limit.

This would seem to show that, rather than being a nervous nellie (as he's been portrayed), Nagumo actually acted pretty sensibly in deciding to forgo a third strike, since it might have negatively impacted his ability to get his force home. It also shows the folly of the suggestions that Kido Butai would have been better aimed not at Pearl, but at the US West Coast or the Panama Canal. Put simply, the Imperial Japanese Navy lacked the capability to operate that far out - even assuming that they would do so unopposed.