It is fair enough and it worth a discussion.
The intra-service rivalries are very costly.
We already are halfway there, with the concept of Unified Combatant Command. If an Air Force officer has his evaluation reports (and future career) being in the hands of his Theater Commander rather than in his Air Force seniors, and he's being judged primarily on how well he provides air support to the ground mission, then perhaps that will get his attention.
A next step would be to have the theater commanders have a bigger role in approving weapons systems. Perhaps, rather than having branch-connected generals and admirals, once we get past two-stars you are not associated with a branch.
The problem is that ground pounders don’t understand how to use air assets. As an ALO at Ft Hood, and later during a tour in Afghanistan, I spent a lot of time trying to explain to brigade staff the implications of having aircraft that move at 500+ mph. I could set up the aircraft over a mountain range and support fights in 2 valleys 50 miles apart, with the local commanders in both valleys complaining that “their” air wasn’t sitting on top of them.
Most of the brigade commanders I worked with wanted air assets to be a ADDITIONAL force, hitting targets their own men could already hit. But to use air well, you need it to be a MULTIPLIER, shaping the battle beyond the range of the Army guns.
When air is hitting targets the Army can hit, you are doing a type of close air support - and that means you have already screwed up either your planning or execution, and are now trying to salvage a mess. That isn’t exactly wrong, because sometimes bad things happen and all there is left to do is a salvage operation with CAS. But most Army commanders want CAS as their first choice, which means they do not understand how to employ air effectively.
THAT is why the Air Force was split off from the Army in the first place.