Residents of North Carolina’s Outer Banks saw the same thing; according to historical records, almost 400 ships were sunk in U.S. waters from January to June 1942, and the area off Cape Hatteras was known as “Torpedo Junction.” The glow of burning tankers off-shore was bright enough (legend has it) that you could read a paper on the Hatteras beaches at night.
The Brits—who depended on our shipping as a lifeline— offered sound advice, which was largely ignored. We didn’t implement a convoy system until the middle of ‘42, and it took almost as long to enforce blackout policies along the coast. At one point early in the war, there was a single, antiquated Coast Guard cutter assigned to anti-sub patrols off the Carolina coast.
The results were predictable. A lot of merchant mariners paid with their lives for our lack of preparation early in the war.
Forgot his name but that failed policy was because of one admiral.
The American admiral you were thinking of was King, who at the time commanded the U.S. Atlantic Fleet. He has been severely criticized for failing to promptly organize submarine defenses and implement a convoy system. And for not getting blackouts organized faster. Some attribute his slowness to act to his hatred of all things English, who at the time were advising him what measures to take and even offered some patrol boats. Apologists claim that even if he wanted to act sooner King didn't have the resources, which were severely strained early in the war. In any event those were black days in a time of the war when it seemed every day was black.