Posted on 07/28/2014 9:57:54 AM PDT by SLB
“- I believe that is an actual authentic antique Colt revolver...”
If that is so, the pictured gun has been the subject of extensive rework. Refinish is either nickel or chrome plate: difficult to differentiate in a photo, easier in person. But the rounded edges and dished-out holes where the three screws come through give it away. The placement of the stop notches in relation to the nipple recesses does not match an original, and there aren’t any nipples.
Interesting caliber conversion.
“- Sam Colt was quite stubborn and resisted updating to a much stronger one-piece full frame with the barrel firmly screwed into to frame.
- Sam Colt died in 1862 - early in the War between the States. ...”
Sam might not be so highly regarded had he lived. As devolve has noted, he resisted every innovation that made the revolver such a success in the last 1/3 of the 19th century (metallic cartridges, solid frames, double action).
His cap-and-ball configurations (frame, cylinder arbor, barrel wedged on the front) were indeed less stout, but they are easier to clean and maintain than any competing design. And any arm firing black powder simply *must* be taken to bits for thorough cleaning, if the owner wants it to remain reliable and to last.
The Smith & Wesson hinged frame was another amazing innovation for its time, but total strength was scarcely any better than the barrel-wedge configuration of the original Colts. Henninger and Mason’s solid frame Single Action Army was a better bet for strength and durability - key attributes for the Ordnance Corps. Annoyingly, the latch is the weakest point of the Nr 3 and all smaller S&W top-break revolvers; only a little wear loosens the joint to the point where the arm will pop open on firing, with serious results. Far better was the Webley configuration (present on earlier British revolvers I think), reversing S&W’s arrangement by mounting the latch on the standing breech. Revolver buffs will recall that the Nr 3 variant modified by George Schofield for the Ordnance Corps bears a latch quite different from other S&W hinged frames.
With deference to devolve’s historical research, my memory of what I read tells me that on 25 June 1876 George Armstrong Custer was not carrying the latest issue revolver (Colt Single Action). He was carrying a brace of revolvers gifted to him by some notable personage: S&W Old Model 1-1/2 or Old Model 2, chambered in 32 rimfire. They were hinged frame but not auto-ejecting. The Nr 3 Schofield had not yet been taken into US Army service.
In fairness to all involved, I cannot dispel serious doubts about the 7th Cavalry Regiment’s chances, even if they had been armed with Schofields. The odds were not in their favor.
And even the most talented commander can have a bad day.
- Yes - dished frame around the threaded frame screw holes
- Custer split his forces - his subordinates did not stay in close contact - his ego was always a problem
- He left several Gatling Guns behind
- I have also heard he may have been carrying Bulldogs
- The single-shot Springfield Trapdoor .45-70’s tend to jam on the cartridge shells
- The Indians had repeaters and the troopers had long distance single-shot carbines - not too swift
- I have read that Custer had his men using Spencer carbines - but the brains far away knew so much better than Custer did
- You can even find pre Little Big Horn Colt SAA’s on guns international
- PS
- That Colt 1860 Army is fitted with a “drop-in” KIRST .22 Caliber Cartridge Conversion - the cylinder has a rimfire adapter at the back and the cylinder is made in two pieces - the forward half is right behind a short 2-1/2 Inch .22rf barrel
- A .22lr cartridge will slide into the rear of the cylinder without enlarging the frame as in most conversions or the SAA - not cheap - but no black powder cleanup and smell
webpage
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- KIRST see all photographs : http://www.kirstkonverter.com/22-caliber-conversion-kits.html
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“- Custer split his forces - his subordinates did not stay in close contact - his ego was always a problem”
George Armstrong Custer (West Point, Second Class of 1861) was described as the foremost American Indian fighter of the age. He had used the split force/multi-axis attack before, with a better success record than other commanders. What, on that morning in June 1876, would have caused him to suddenly lose faith in a tactical approach that had worked well before?
It’s an acknowledged truism that anybody who would presume to command troops in battle cannot do so without a very healthy ego. Custer was no standout among Army officers when it came to that aspect of character. And such egotism was no surprise: he pinned on the stars of a brigadier general only a couple years after graduating from USMA, then demonstrated the faith superiors had placed in him was justified, again and again during ACW.
It’s been argued that he ignored reports on the number of Indians present, but real-time battlefield intel has always been an iffy thing - truer in 1876 than today. Much had to be left to any commander’s discretion; difficult choices made in the heat of the moment, on scanty information, sometimes go wrong. So also do carefully considered choices, taken at a deliberate pace, backed by reams of data. One of the uncertainties of armed conflict.
“- He left several Gatling Guns behind”
I’ve walked the ground at the Little Big Horn site. Peering southeast from the monument, back over the terrain Custer and troopers crossed to arrive, it took me less than 30 seconds to realize that no Gatling gun could ever have made it in time. The chunk of territory in question was simply too rough and broken to allow anything with wheels to pass.
There’s every chance that even if the regimental Gatlings had somehow made it there with the troopers, they’d not have been much help. The 7th’s hurried ride to the field, frantic deployment, and general confusion preceding the engagement would have degraded their effectiveness.
“...- The single-shot Springfield Trapdoor .45-70’s tend to jam on the cartridge shells”
Little has been conclusively proven, but cartridge case metallurgy was still in its infancy. Solid-drawn brass cases were years in the future; the copper-case inside-primed 45-70 cases then being issued were notorious for sticking in the chamber after firing, especially during rapid fire on a hot day. Operational testing of the Allin-designed Trapdoor had been sketchy to nonexistent; no documented warnings nor special-use instructions were ever posted to field units about such jams. And the 7th’s defeat did not help the situation one bit; the site, remote even today, was past the far edge of beyond 138 years ago. Forensic science was unknown; even if an Ordnance Corps investigation team had been sent to collect evidence, precious little would have been usable, or findable, months after the fight. Not that the US Army would have admitted any errors; into the 1960s, the Army hierarchy was legendary for ignoring results it did not care for.
The poor reliability of 1876-vintage 45-70 ammunition may have worked its dark magic on Gatlings, had any managed to get there. Throughout the years 1865 to 1890, the Gatling earned a worldwide reputation for reliability and stoutness. But it also earned a reputation (thankfully less common) for falling victim to the most spectacular jams imaginable, always at the worst possible moment of battle. Cartridge cases of the day had an evil tendency to tear their heads off on occasion, thanks to the uncertain metallurgy. Additionally, primers had a much higher rate of delayed ignition, or hangfire. Bad enough in a single-shot rifle, pure disaster in a hand-cranked machine gun: if a primer chanced to delay ignition only a short while, the gunner rarely noticed (especially in the heat of action). When the round finally did fire, the barrel where it was had already been rotated part way along, the breech bolt often unlocked and cammed partially open. Now unsupported, the case head instantly split from the body and would be ejected, but the forward part of the case body stayed behind in the chamber. All unknowing, the gunner continued to turn the crank. Very shortly after, a fresh round would be driven forward, only to stick inside the remnant of the previous case’s body and fail to fully chamber. Result: jam, total tieup, gun out of action until it could be completely disassembled and the offending case body removed - a process that might require hours of false starts and frustration, even on a peaceful day back at the fort. In battle, defeat and disaster might be in the offing. Happened often enough that British forces composed a poem about it.
“- The Indians had repeaters and the troopers had long distance single-shot carbines - not too swift”
It seems blindingly obvious now, that repeaters were a good idea, but Army leaders in the 1870s argued constantly that any such weapon would tempt troops to exhaust their ammo too early. Please bear in mind that Plevna was still more than a year in the future when Custer was defeated.
Military doctrine of that period enshrined long-range fire, which could only be done with a large and powerful cartridge. Large cartridges are heavy, and require equally large, heavy rifles. It was decided that the average troop could not learn to use a repeater so large and heavy, and would balk at carrying around such heavy guns. If any forum member finds this spurious, I would urge them to go find an 1876-vintage repeater chambered for 45-70, load it fully, then carry it around for a day or two. But it cannot be done, because no repeater then in existence was strong enough, reliable enough, or durable enough to handle the 45-70, and keep it up for one battle. Gunmakers could not simply take, say, the Winchester 1873 and scale it up to handle the 45-70; the Winchester firm tried exactly that, but all they managed to bring forth was the 1876: shockingly large and heavy, yet still unequal to the 45-70. One would have to skip several years down the timeline, to the 1880s, to find viable repeaters like Winchester’s 1886, early Marlins, the Whitney-Kennedy, the Hotchkiss, the Remington-Keene, or the Chaffee-Reese. And each one of these is heavy empty, far worse when loaded.
No repeater made the grade until nitro propellant arrived (first fielded by the French, in 1886), fired from “small bore” cartridges of 25 to 32 caliber.
Accepted Army wisdom of the 1870s had it that trained troops firing single-shot rifles could defeat any enemy armed with repeaters, before the enemy could get close enough to render their repeaters effective.
“- I have read that Custer had his men using Spencer carbines - but the brains far away knew so much better than Custer did...”
George Custer is known for leading the first US troops into action firing repeaters: Spencers, at the battle of Gettysburg in 1863. But by 1876 it was peacetime (at least compared to the ACW), and peacetime rules were applied with a vengeance. It’s most unlikely that Custer would have flouted Army regulations by arming his troopers with weapons not officially approved, and for which no supply system of ammunition, spare parts, or trained armorers existed. It’s been reported he did take occasional advantage of his wife’s money (her father was a big wheel back in Monroe, Michigan), but for that purpose it would not have been very likely.
The “brains” - Army brass and civilian officials who bear ultimate responsibility for building up and controlling America’s military in this, our republic - have always held sway. A top-down system of hierarchy and constituted authority can really tolerate no other arrangement. And it’s true that sometimes the overlords are out of touch, behind the times, willfully flying in the face of reality, or merely incompetent. But sometimes they actually do know things the private soldier on the line doesn’t. Armed conflict is never so fully delineated, so completely understood that every possible alternative can be worked out beforehand. Sometimes the situation goes sour despite every effort of preparation and prior understanding. In those instances, the top-down command structure can be onerous, even deadly. But abandonment of all structure and negation of all authority may succeed no better: individual initiative can be a help, but it may not thrive nor survive long enough, once loss of cohesion degrades morale to the point where chaos sets in. Onerous and deadly after its own fashion.
“- Custer split his forces - his subordinates did not stay in close contact - his ego was always a problem”
George Armstrong Custer (West Point, Second Class of 1861) was described as the foremost American Indian fighter of the age. He had used the split force/multi-axis attack before, with a better success record than other commanders. What, on that morning in June 1876, would have caused him to suddenly lose faith in a tactical approach that had worked well before?
It’s an acknowledged truism that anybody who would presume to command troops in battle cannot do so without a very healthy ego. Custer was no standout among Army officers when it came to that aspect of character. And such egotism was no surprise: he pinned on the stars of a brigadier general only a couple years after graduating from USMA, then demonstrated the faith superiors had placed in him was justified, again and again during ACW.
It’s been argued that he ignored reports on the number of Indians present, but real-time battlefield intel has always been an iffy thing - truer in 1876 than today. Much had to be left to any commander’s discretion; difficult choices made in the heat of the moment, on scanty information, sometimes go wrong. So also do carefully considered choices, taken at a deliberate pace, backed by reams of data. One of the uncertainties of armed conflict.
“- He left several Gatling Guns behind”
I’ve walked the ground at the Little Big Horn site. Peering southeast from the monument, back over the terrain Custer and troopers crossed to arrive, it took me less than 30 seconds to realize that no Gatling gun could ever have made it in time. The chunk of territory in question was simply too rough and broken to allow anything with wheels to pass.
There’s every chance that even if the regimental Gatlings had somehow made it there with the troopers, they’d not have been much help. The 7th’s hurried ride to the field, frantic deployment, and general confusion preceding the engagement would have degraded their effectiveness.
“...- The single-shot Springfield Trapdoor .45-70’s tend to jam on the cartridge shells”
Little has been conclusively proven, but cartridge case metallurgy was still in its infancy. Solid-drawn brass cases were years in the future; the copper-case inside-primed 45-70 cases then being issued were notorious for sticking in the chamber after firing, especially during rapid fire on a hot day. Operational testing of the Allin-designed Trapdoor had been sketchy to nonexistent; no documented warnings nor special-use instructions were ever posted to field units about such jams. And the 7th’s defeat did not help the situation one bit; the site, remote even today, was past the far edge of beyond 138 years ago. Forensic science was unknown; even if an Ordnance Corps investigation team had been sent to collect evidence, precious little would have been usable, or findable, months after the fight. Not that the US Army would have admitted any errors; into the 1960s, the Army hierarchy was legendary for ignoring results it did not care for.
The poor reliability of 1876-vintage 45-70 ammunition may have worked its dark magic on Gatlings, had any managed to get there. Throughout the years 1865 to 1890, the Gatling earned a worldwide reputation for reliability and stoutness. But it also earned a reputation (thankfully less common) for falling victim to the most spectacular jams imaginable, always at the worst possible moment of battle. Cartridge cases of the day had an evil tendency to tear their heads off on occasion, thanks to the uncertain metallurgy. Additionally, primers had a much higher rate of delayed ignition, or hangfire. Bad enough in a single-shot rifle, pure disaster in a hand-cranked machine gun: if a primer chanced to delay ignition only a short while, the gunner rarely noticed (especially in the heat of action). When the round finally did fire, the barrel where it was had already been rotated part way along, the breech bolt often unlocked and cammed partially open. Now unsupported, the case head instantly split from the body and would be ejected, but the forward part of the case body stayed behind in the chamber. All unknowing, the gunner continued to turn the crank. Very shortly after, a fresh round would be driven forward, only to stick inside the remnant of the previous case’s body and fail to fully chamber. Result: jam, total tieup, gun out of action until it could be completely disassembled and the offending case body removed - a process that might require hours of false starts and frustration, even on a peaceful day back at the fort. In battle, defeat and disaster might be in the offing. Happened often enough that British forces composed a poem about it.
“- The Indians had repeaters and the troopers had long distance single-shot carbines - not too swift”
It seems blindingly obvious now, that repeaters were a good idea, but Army leaders in the 1870s argued constantly that any such weapon would tempt troops to exhaust their ammo too early. Please bear in mind that Plevna was still more than a year in the future when Custer was defeated.
Military doctrine of that period enshrined long-range fire, which could only be done with a large and powerful cartridge. Large cartridges are heavy, and require equally large, heavy rifles. It was decided that the average troop could not learn to use a repeater so large and heavy, and would balk at carrying around such heavy guns. If any forum member finds this spurious, I would urge them to go find an 1876-vintage repeater chambered for 45-70, load it fully, then carry it around for a day or two. But it cannot be done, because no repeater then in existence was strong enough, reliable enough, or durable enough to handle the 45-70, and keep it up for one battle. Gunmakers could not simply take, say, the Winchester 1873 and scale it up to handle the 45-70; the Winchester firm tried exactly that, but all they managed to bring forth was the 1876: shockingly large and heavy, yet still unequal to the 45-70. One would have to skip several years down the timeline, to the 1880s, to find viable repeaters like Winchester’s 1886, early Marlins, the Whitney-Kennedy, the Hotchkiss, the Remington-Keene, or the Chaffee-Reese. And each one of these is heavy empty, far worse when loaded.
No repeater made the grade until nitro propellant arrived (first fielded by the French, in 1886), fired from “small bore” cartridges of 25 to 32 caliber.
Accepted Army wisdom of the 1870s had it that trained troops firing single-shot rifles could defeat any enemy armed with repeaters, before the enemy could get close enough to render their repeaters effective.
“- I have read that Custer had his men using Spencer carbines - but the brains far away knew so much better than Custer did...”
George Custer is known for leading the first US troops into action firing repeaters: Spencers, at the battle of Gettysburg in 1863. But by 1876 it was peacetime (at least compared to the ACW), and peacetime rules were applied with a vengeance. It’s most unlikely that Custer would have flouted Army regulations by arming his troopers with weapons not officially approved, and for which no supply system of ammunition, spare parts, or trained armorers existed. It’s been reported he did take occasional advantage of his wife’s money (her father was a big wheel back in Monroe, Michigan), but for that purpose it would not have been very likely.
The “brains” - Army brass and civilian officials who bear ultimate responsibility for building up and controlling America’s military in this, our republic - have always held sway. A top-down system of hierarchy and constituted authority can really tolerate no other arrangement. And it’s true that sometimes the overlords are out of touch, behind the times, willfully flying in the face of reality, or merely incompetent. But sometimes they actually do know things the private soldier on the line doesn’t. Armed conflict is never so fully delineated, so completely understood that every possible alternative can be worked out beforehand. Sometimes the situation goes sour despite every effort of preparation and prior understanding. In those instances, the top-down command structure can be onerous, even deadly. But abandonment of all structure and negation of all authority may succeed no better: individual initiative can be a help, but it may not thrive nor survive long enough, once loss of cohesion degrades morale to the point where chaos sets in. Onerous and deadly after its own fashion.
“...probably a Uberti made modern replica of a Colt Model 1851 Navy revolver ...”
Very attractive piece. Good to know more manufacturers are offering conversion units. The Kirst setup looks like a step beyond, in terms of imaginative approach.
Handling qualities are irreducibly subjective, but the ‘51 Navy has always impressed me: the veritable pinnacle of perfection. Many have tried to outdo it, but it reigns supreme 164 years later. Simply the best combination of length, width, height, curves, and angles. Light enough to carry, sleek enough to wield quicker than a rattlesnake
The revolver in the image is suitably gorgeous, in blued steel, case-colored iron, and silver-plated brass. Alas, I fear we’re never going to see again, the paler slate-blue finish gracing the older (pre 1940?) guns. Nor the fire-blue screw heads either. Not on production guns.
“...probably a Uberti made modern replica of a Colt Model 1851 Navy revolver ...”
Very attractive piece. Good to know more manufacturers are offering conversion units. The Kirst setup looks like a step beyond, in terms of imaginative approach.
Handling qualities are irreducibly subjective, but the ‘51 Navy has always impressed me: the veritable pinnacle of perfection. Many have tried to outdo it, but it reigns supreme 164 years later. Simply the best combination of length, width, height, curves, and angles. Light enough to carry, sleek enough to wield quicker than a rattlesnake
The revolver in the image is suitably gorgeous, in blued steel, case-colored iron, and silver-plated brass. Alas, I fear we’re never going to see again, the paler slate-blue finish gracing the older (pre 1940?) guns. Nor the fire-blue screw heads either. Not on production guns.
- Hey boys! let’s all go get killed and butchered! - Errol Flynn
- There are great documentaries on The History Channel on the Little Big Horn area, cartridges found, numbers of fired cartridges, and grouping of the troopers fired cartridges. It proved the cartridges fired by the troopers was vastly exceed by those fired by the Injuns.
- The indians worked their way up close and got within range for Henrys, and even the 1873 Winchesters to be effective against the troopers; the troopers started gathering closer together thereby offering easier massed targets.
- The Indians worked well together and were efficient in their use of multiple-shot repeaters while the Springfield Trapdoors took forever to load against lever-action carbines and rifles and revolvers.
- Being about 25% American Injun (East Coast) myself I would say that Custer’s men had poor combat discipline, the wrong weapons, split forces, and lousy training.
- I am baffled as to why Custer let his officers go off in another area a few days before the Greasy Creek massacre. I believe his Indian Scouts had warned him that he was going to be in deep stuff - and who would they be siding with when the rubber hit the road?
- I do not have a S&W Scofield .45 - I do have a nice c.1898 Colt .44-40 FSS revolver that I often fit with original Colt 1860 Army 1-piece (c.1872 Open-Top) grips, matching SN numbers backstrap, and brass trigger guard from an c.1862 CW Colt 1860 Army, and a rare Colt Model 1876 skeleton shoulder stock. Much better in my hands with the larger grips.
- I would have preferred the S&W Scofield in combat - loading speed; Jim Supica (now at the NRA) recommends a late 1800’s S&W double-action Model Three in .44-40 or .45 - but they are hard to get at decent prices today - look up the S&W book by Jim Supica - he has done some great YouTube videos - Jim is a recovering attorney and antique firearms dealer at “Old Town Station” - I miss his great mailed-out catalogs
- GOOGLE up “Taylor’s” for replicas and cartridge converted Colt & Remington handguns built as cartridge firing revolvers - they sell as a “part” drop-in cartridge conversions cylinder of late 1850’s Remington conversion style; a 2-piece part based on the Rem original (under patent from S&W) - and around $200 - Howell re-design of high strength steel
- KIRST Konversion are a bit more pricey - I have two (2) here for the Colt Model 1860 Army -one is for .45LC and one is for .45 Colt ACP - plus two (2) KIRST Konverters in .45 LC for the Remington Model 1858 (made with a loading gate tahe requires some careful grinding/polishing or machining)
- Smokeless “Cowboy Loads” in .45 caliber (under 1000fps) will be powerful enough - and safe and clean -
- Black Powder gets old fast after a few days - Michelle - don’t call me Smoky!
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 Kirst Konverter® offers a cartridge conversion cylinder for both the 1851 and the 1861 Colt Navy revolvers manufactured by Uberti or Pietta which is available in .38 Long Colt caliber, as a six shot cylinder. |
The .36 caliber percussion revolver barrel has a bore diameter of .375 inches, and more important is the fact that today’s .38 caliber cartridges are loaded with .357-inch diameter bullets. Therefore, to attain accuracy with a modern .38 caliber cartridge, in your reproduction .36 caliber percussion revolver, you must shoot soft lead .38 Special, hollow base wad cutters, .38 Colt hollow base or .38 Colt healed ammunition. The soft lead hollow base bullet will “bump up” to the .375-inch bore diameter and shoot very accurately.
The chambers will actually accept .38 Special hollow base wad cutter cartridges; however the cylinder is too short and is not intended for use of the standard .38 Special cartridge. The cylinder has been made this way so that the shooter can use commercially loaded hollow base, soft lead bullet ammunition, it is not intended for the standard .38 Special cartridge.
Click here for calibers and ordering info.
1851 Colt Navy, (.44 caliber) Sheriff and Civilian model reproductions
convert these guns to a five shot .45 Schofield cartridge/.45 Long Colt. It will also accommodate the .45 Long Colt cartridges if the bullet is seated slightly deeper. (The SAAMI specification for overall length, for the .45 Long Colt, is 1.600 inch. The longest overall length that 1851 Pietta cylinder in .45 caliber will accept is 1.58 inch)
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. . insert .22lr cartridges here----> |
http://www.thefirearmblog.com/blog/2014/07/08/weekly-dtic-hitchman-gustafson-reports/
Documentation on how firepower doctrine changed. And when.
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