Posted on 12/14/2015 5:23:54 AM PST by sukhoi-30mki
Early in 2015, a curious and disturbing report surfaced briefly and then disappeared—almost without a trace. The report, apparently published and then quickly retracted, had been posted by the French Ministry of Defense and concerned the successful operations of the French nuclear submarine Safir in an exercise pitting it against the U.S. Navy’s Theodore Roosevelt aircraft carrier battle group. The somewhat shocking content of the report—that the French submarine had succeeded in sinking “half the battle group†during the exercise—may explain its rapid purging from the internet. After all, close brothers in arms may demonstrate their tactical and operational prowess in a naval drill, but they should not gloat about that, and especially not in public, right?
The revelation that a U.S. Navy aircraft carrier group could be so vulnerable to a nuclear submarine did not make the mainstream media, and no mention was made by the many attentive defense analysts on this site, so it seems. However, the Chinese defense media does not miss much, especially concerning the capabilities of U.S. Navy carrier groups. In fact, a special issue of 兵工科技 [Ordnance Industry Science and Technology] (2015, no. 8) covered this “event,†featuring an interview with Chinese Submarine Academy professor 迟国仓 [Chi Guocang] as its cover story under the title: “A Single Nuclear Submarine ‘Sinks’ Half of an Aircraft Carrier Battle Group.â€
Prof. Chi makes clear that he understands that â€œæ¼”ä¹ æ— æ³•ä¸Žå®žæˆ˜ç›¸æ¯” [an exercise can hardly be compared to real combat] and that, moreover, he evaluates U.S. Navy anti-submarine warfare (ASW) to be a “highly efficient†and “harmonized†system comprised of multiple layers of defense for an aircraft carrier. Yet, he concludes in the interview that the French report “有比较大的å¯ä¿¡åº¦â€ [has a reasonably high degree of credibility] and this edition of Dragon Eye will examine his logic in this respect, attempting to gain insights into emergent Chinese views on the utility of nuclear submarines in modern naval warfare.
At the outset of the interview, Prof. Chi asserts that submarines are the “克星†[nemesis] of aircraft carriers. He explains that over the course of World War II, no less than seventeen aircraft carriers were sunk by submarines. With another nod to the U.S. Navy’s prowess, Prof. Chi points out that eight of those seventeen were put down by U.S. submarines. Yet the historical episode that comes up repeatedly in the interview is not from WWII, but rather the Falklands War. This short, but sharp conflict from the early 1980s seems to have had an outsized impact on Chinese naval development, yielding Beijing’s singular and relentless focus on anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) development. He demonstrates a very close study of that conflict, for example outlining the probable explanation for Argentine torpedo failures (complex and difficult hydrological conditions). He emphasizes the fact that the British nuclear submarine HMS Conqueror was able to track its prey, the General Belgrano, in that conflict over the course of fifty hours without detection before administering the coup de grace, as an example of the prowess of modern nuclear submarines. Yet he acknowledges that Argentine Navy ASW could not be compared to U.S. Navy ASW, of course.
So, the Chinese interviewer then asks bluntly: How is it that the French Navy was able to penetrate the formidable American ASW screen around the aircraft carrier USS Roosevelt, allegedly “sinking†the big deck and some of its escorts too? Prof. Chi offers many hypotheses with respect to this question, but focuses in particular on the small displacement of the French submarine. He observes that the Rubis-class submarine is the world’s smallest nuclear submarine (2,670 tons submerged) and that could make it more difficult to detect. According to this Chinese expert’s analysis, the Los Angeles-class submarines protecting the aircraft carrier have about three times the displacement—placing them at a disadvantage, especially in a circumstance where both crews have a similar level of training proficiency. This is not the first time that Chinese submarine experts have admired France’s small displacement nuclear submarines, which they seem to think could be particularly well suited for the shallow waters of the Western Pacific. It is argued in this Chinese analysis, moreover, that the French submarine’s comparatively slow maximum speed (25 knots) seems hardly to be a major deficiency.
Prof. Chi makes note of the comparative weaknesses of diesel submarines. In a related point, he explains that very significant U.S. air ASW assets are quite reliant on radar detections of submarines on or near the ocean surface. Against nuclear submarines, therefore, he concludes that the air asset ASW search is “如‘大海æžé’ˆâ€™ä¸€æ ·éš¾â€ [as difficult as fishing a needle from the vast ocean]. Other points made in this Chinese analysis include the observation that the larger the battle group, the easier it is to track this more conspicuous target at long distances. Prof. Chi also notes that the employment of ASW weaponry can inadvertently aid a submarine’s escape following an attack, because the weapons may significantly complicate the acoustic environment, thus hindering searches for the attacking submarine.
Another possible explanation for the skillful (simulated) attack of the Safir might be the French commander’s capable use of naturally occurring complex hydro-acoustic conditions. Prof. Chi describes a long list of such conditions, including well known phenomena such as “convergence zones,†“sound speed gradients,†as well as the more mysterious “cold eddy†[冷涡] and “afternoon effect†[åˆåŽè¾ƒåº”]. Likewise, the Chinese expert mentions that weather can be a major asset for a stalking submarine as it can significantly hinder the operations of surface and especially air ASW forces without significantly impacting undersea operations.
At the end of the interview, Prof. Chi is asked whether the Soviet nuclear submarine-centric model for naval development or the American aircraft carrier group-centric model is inherently superior. But the Chinese expert rejects the question as too simplistic. He says that Soviet Admiral Sergei Gorshkov wanted a “balanced fleet,†but Moscow’s efforts in the naval realm ultimately fell short of that aspiration. Meanwhile, the U.S. Navy, Chi contends, did succeed in this endeavor, so that the Washington’s fleet has â€œä½œæˆ˜å®žåŠ›å’Œèƒ½åŠ›æ— äººèƒ½æ¯”â€ [combat power and capabilities without any peer] across all domains of naval warfare. It is likely positive from a deterrence perspective that Chinese experts have such esteem for American naval prowess, of course, but the article also illustrates how Chinese military analysts are diligently probing for cracks in the U.S. Navy’s armor, as they seek to develop their own naval capabilities that likewise cause “有人敬ç•ï¼Œæœ‰äººæ€•â€ [people to admire and people to fear].
Lyle J. Goldstein is Associate Professor in the China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, RI. The opinions expressed in this analysis are his own and do not represent the official assessments of the U.S. Navy or any other agency of the U.S. Government.
I’m afraid the Navy is “still fighting the last war” when it comes to fielding carriers. They certainly are able to project massive airpower, but they can only do this in limited situations where the enemy does not have a modern navy. Otherwise they are far too vulnerable, even with the very numerous surface ships and submarines arrayed around them, whose sole purpose is to protect the carrier.
Billy Mitchell taught the Navy about its invulnerability didn’t he?
With today’s technology we can fix this problem.
It is readily within the scope of our capabilities to build underwater drones to trigger torpedo proximity charges cheaply and with minimal damage to the real ships.
I was always lead to believe that in the event of a real war the Navy didn’t expect the carrier to last any longer than it took to get rid of its planes.
The Navy, like the rest of the US military, is in the process of unlearning the lessons of past wars and warfare; from the DDG-1000s, to the F-35, to women in all combat positions - no stone is being left unturned in the quest to spend vast amounts of money to solve non-existent problems ...
I disagree ... in a war-time scenario, every Chi-Com sub is a target, an “immediate” target ... and the Carrier groups are blasting away at 45+ knots to escape detection ...
I’ve always heard, but have no direct knowledge of... That in exercises with allies our subs intentionally emit extra noise. This would help a simulated adversary (ie. the French sub) detect and avoid our subs screening the carrier. I’ve also heard that just because we detect a sub, the Navy doesn’t always react/acknowledge it - particularly if it was an extremely difficult detection or would reveal extents of capabilities. So yes, even in practice against our allies they may not be seeing the full picture. That French commander may only think he could survive long enough to launch an attack. Maybe. Like I said, I don’t know, but it seems reasonable to hold some capability in reserve because you know the real enemy is always watching.
Carrier battle groups will be easy targets in the next major war.
Ballistic missiles, hypersonic cruise missiles, & torpedoes, both conventional & nuclear armed, will decimate a carrier battle group. With satellite surveillance there is no place on earth such a group can hide. ICBMs mean the group can never be out of range of the enemy. Relatively slow moving vessels will be no match for high speed missiles & torpedoes with sophisticated targeting systems fired in mass volleys.
The loss of just one nuclear aircraft carrier by the above methods would neuter our entire US naval strategy for power projection.
Unmanned missiles, torpedoes, & drones will win the next war. For a carrier battle group it will be like Goliath vs. the killer bees: Goliath will be lucky to get out alive.
Yes you are absolutely correct and he is an excellent example to cite. I suspect very few people these days are even aware of Billy Mitchell.
For not falling in line, Mitchell was court martialed and thrown out of service. I'd guess the same thing, or possibly worse, would befall anyone questioning the wisdom of current strategy. Much later, when proven correct, he was awarded the Medal of Honor (postumously).
It’s probably necessary to note that the French subs are good and their crews probably top-notch. But these stats can be a little misleading. During joint exercises it’s not uncommon for a sub to score simulated “hits” on a battlegroup. When these “hits” occur they are typically reported as “kills”. I suspect that’s what is being reported here. The likelihood of these hits being kills is pretty low if it was a carrier. The likelihood of hits being kills against the escorts significantly higher. It is actually the escorts job to screen the carrier and absorb these hits/kills, if necessary, so the carrier can survive. But still, the way the hits/kills are reported in exercise summaries tend to skew the statistics.
I agree with post 2 that the carrier task force maybe outdated.
I do wonder, if the Japanese idea (WWII) of a sub that could carry mid size drones so we could stand off submerged and use the drones to spot targets that then are taken out by aircraft and missles such as enemy ships and defenses wouldn't be better ?
I fear in the next big shooting war we will see a video of a carrier roll over and sink with almost no survivors. It might cause the USA to give up or spark anti-war demonstrations in what cities we have left.
sure , we’ll lose a carrier ... that’s expected ... and the others will unleash “unholy hell” on the bad guys ...
Just plain give up, eh?
That is not how this great nation was built and I do not relish my grand children speaking Chinese because we were too chicken$hit to fight for this country.
In wartime the Navy would not send a CVBG in sanitized waters. Kind of like air superiority and the Air Force. You don't send in level bombers unless you have air superiority.
Quote: “I disagree ... in a war-time scenario, every Chi-Com sub is a target, an “immediate†target ... and the Carrier groups are blasting away at 45+ knots to escape detection ...”
By a real war, I meant nuclear war.
The air craft carrier will become obsolete when the concept of air superiority over huge swaths of ocean becomes obsolete. Which means never.
Woah. Ok here's your chance to go an record; so you would feel safer as a US citizen if we scrapped all A/C carries? Hmm?
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