I’d drop the admitting priveleges provision.
That was my thought as well.
Make the law STRICTLY about cleanliness.
It will pass.
Then throw it back at the supremes and have then come down on the side of filthy, back alley Gosnells.
Wouldn't matter. The court completely ignored the severability provisions built into the law. This was purely a political decision, as is made clear by Justice Thomas' dissent. Alito's was almost funny to read, because he goes on and on about how precident and generally accepted legal theories were tossed out the door merely because the justices wanted to. Of course, he didn't mind twisting himself into a pretzel to save obamacare. He's just lucky they didn't need his vote on this, or he'd have had to break out the twister board again.
JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting.
Today the Court strikes down two state statutory provisions in all of their applications, at the behest of abortion clinics and doctors. That decision exemplifies the Court’s troubling tendency “to bend the rules when any effort to limit abortion, or even to speak in opposition to abortion, is at issue.” Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U. S. 914, 954 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting). As JUSTICE ALITO observes, see post (dissenting opinion), today’s decision creates an abortion exception to ordinary rules of res judicata, ignores compelling evidence that Texas’ law imposes no unconstitutional burden, and disregards basic principles of the severability doctrine. I write separately to emphasize how today’s decision perpetuates the Court’s habit of applying different rules to different constitutional rights-especially the putative right to abortion.
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Ultimately, this case shows why the Court never should have bent the rules for favored rights in the first place. Our law is now so riddled with special exceptions for special rights that our decisions deliver neither predictability nor the promise of a judiciary bound by the rule of law.
=snip=
The majority’s furtive reconfiguration of the standard of scrutiny applicable to abortion restrictions also points to a deeper problem. The undue-burden standard is just one variant of the Court’s tiers-of-scrutiny approach to constitutional adjudication. And the label the Court affixes to its level of scrutiny in assessing whether the government can restrict a given right—be it “rational basis,” intermediate, strict, or something else—is increasingly a meaningless formalism. As the Court applies whatever standard itlikes to any given case, nothing but empty words separates our constitutional decisions from judicial fiat.
Preach it Thomas.