Use your downtime to read some Captain John Trimmer.
And make sure it's the 2nd edition, apparently Fitzgerald commanders were only issued the 1st.
They were probably too busy their sensitivity and diversity training. The expanded trans section learning the proper use of pronouns is very time consuming.
There’s only 1 captain and subordinate officers.
Good seamanship is discriminatory.
Everyone who wants to be a seaman, uh... sea person, uh... sea cis genderbender...
... should be able to be one.
The 41 page report of what happened immediately after the collision is located here.
Use your downtime to read some Captain John Trimmer.
And make sure it's the 2nd edition, apparently Fitzgerald commanders were only issued the 1st.
On Page 4 and 5 of the report there is some new news regarding the Fitzgerald prior to the collision. The Fitzgerald had left Yokosuka the morning of June 16, at 2300 on June 16 the ship left the Yokosuka area and headed to sea. Until this report we did not know if the Fitzgerald was headed to or from Yokosuka. Now we know.
“”7. On the morning of 16 June 2017,
FITZGERALD departed Yokosuka, Japan for
routine operations. FITZGERALD began an
outbound transit to sea from the Sagami Wan
operating area at approximately 2300. By 0130
hours on 17 June 2017, FITZGERALD was
approximately 56 nautical miles to the southwest
of Yokosuka, Japan, near the Izu Peninsula
within sight of land and continuing its transit
outbound. The seas were relatively calm at 2 to
4 feet. The sky was dark, the moon was relatively bright, and there was scattered cloud cover and unrestricted visibility.””
This is a report of the post-accident happenings that focuses on the injuries and deaths of the sailors. Nothing specific on what events took place that caused the collision.
No specifics as to who, what, when, where.
There was definitely more going on than a single man on watch dozing off.
On page 22 of the report we now learn the Fitzgerald was going to Subic Bay on a course of 230 degrees at 20 knots.
We also learn from the report the ship was darkened except for required navigation lights.
We also learn the collision happened at 01:30. Remember the Navy was unwilling to explicitly state the time of collision in the hours after the event.
“””0000 FTZ underway in the Sea of Japan on the way to Subic Bay, Philippines. She
was on a course of 230 degrees (True) at 20 knots with modified ZEBRA set
throughout the ship. The ship was darkened, with the exception of exterior
lights required for navigation. The Commanding Officer was off of the bridge.
Approx. 0130 Collision with the ACX CRYSTAL on the starboard side. Berthing 2 is flooded
within 30-60 seconds.
0132 FTZ sounds collision alarm”””
These three are “relieved.” What is that in Navy-speak? Desk job?
Didn’t Gordon Lightfoot write a song about the “Wreck of the USS Fitzgerald”?
The commanding officer, executive officer and command master chief took the hit. Pretty appropriate considering the incompetence. I wonder what happened to the OOD that was in charge on the bridge.
I guess Captain Obvious is alive and well and serving in the JAG Corps
In the press release where the three officers are relieved, the Navy is not taking blame.
“””The Navy formally attributed blame to both vessels. “The collision was avoidable and both ships demonstrated poor seamanship. Within Fitzgerald, flawed watch stander teamwork and inadequate leadership contributed to the collision,” Seventh Fleet said.”””
Its hard to know whether the captain is to blame as an outsider looking in. I know from my brother who is the second and a ships pilot in the merchant marine. that both the military and civilian navies of the world have as policy that when there is a collision or major incident with a ship the captain is removed permanently from command of a ship never to command again. there is no such thing as a second chance.
The reason being that the ships in question are worth 10 million and up. both governments and private owners feel even if the captain was sleeping in his bunk and the second was in charge during the incident the captain has failed in the training of the crew. my brother told me that every captain he has worked for (as second he has had 3 captains)he has been instructed to make sure that he wakes the captain up if they are asleep when something not in the norm of operating the ship comes up.
My brother also told me usually when there is an accident it is the second or one of the others fault because the captain hardly ever is piloting the ship because he is to busy with the paperwork. My brother has had several opportunities to become a captain but he does not want to become a paper shuffler he loves being the ships pilot.
As reported on FR:
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-chat/3578300/posts
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/3578326/posts
It would be interesting to read the Captain’s Night Orders, and to know the command climate regarding calling the Captain if there is any doubt or confusion among the Bridge or CIC Watch teams.
The best Commanding Officers would patiently and good naturedly (”If there is any doubt, there is no doubt - CALL ME.”) endure a significant number of “false alarms” (and the provide the appropriate positive training afterwards), to ensure they would always be called in a timely manner when it really did matter.
In the case of the worst Commanding Officers, the Watch teams would do anything to avoid having to call the Commanding Officer.
I also wonder to what extent the Officers of the Deck and Conning Officers had been allowed to really “drive” the ship and she what the Fitzgerald could during periods of daylight, good weather, and on the open seas. Did they have a real feel of how the ship handles, or had every order they ever issued to the helm and lee helm been tightly scripted to ensure “zero defects.”
You really don’t know what you and your crew can do with a ship, airplane, or vehicle, until you are given the opportunity to scare yourself (just a little, and with competent supervision close at hand).
Enjoyed is probably not the word, but being able to talk sailor talk again about my nineteen months in the Western Pacific was nice.
When serving on an LST homeported in Yokosuka, we didn’t set Special Sea and Anchor Detail until close to the time the ship made the turn to port to enter the harbor. In 1970 Tokyo Wan did not have regulated channels you could enter on a chart. Therefore standing a four hour watch left you pretty much exhausted.
At the close of an availability we did our sea trials in the shipping channel, and with the regular watch after setting Special Sea and Anchor Detail for crossing three lines of intense traffic. I remember having the watch one time when at end of travel on one course the CO directed me to head back on the opposite course when the way was clear. My JOOD checked the radar for ships closing, I went to both wings of the bridge to confirm the situation, and turned 180 degrees. We had a new OX, who was impressed by the maneuver and how tightly we turned. At the time, there were a couple hundred ships within five miles of us.
I suppose I stood at least twenty bridge watches both day and night in the area of the collision. I was always moving from port to starboard wing of the bridge and checking ship relative bearings using the gyrocompass repeaters. My junior officer of the deck might be at the radar repeater in the armored bridge area. We had few comforting electrics.
Timeline: USS Fitzgerald Collision https://news.usni.org/2017/08/18/timeline-uss-fitzgerald-collision
Document: Investigation into the Deaths of 7 Sailors Aboard USS Fitzgerald https://news.usni.org/2017/08/17/document-investigation-deaths-7-sailors-aboard-uss-fitzgerald
Fitzgerald: There But for the Grace of God Go I https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2017-08/fitzgerald-there-grace-god-go-i
All I know is that the Navy has been totally mismanaged for quite some time. All of these incidents could have been prevented. It seems since the Cole incident,the Navy has not been the same.
Then President Bill Clinton had poor Semenship, but he wasn’t relieved of Duty.