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I am not a fan of the Saudis in general, but I am always impressed by their Foreign Minister, Adel Al-Jubeir. He really has command of the facts and can really put the Saudi argument in the best light.

Another factor to consider, which might be a factor - the Syrian Army and Iraqi Armies just captured Abu Kamal/al Qaim at the Syrian/Iraqi border. This means that Iran’s Shi’ite allies (some under Iran’s direct command) have just secured one of Iran’s big strategic objectives - a land route from Iran to the Mediterranean Sea and Israeli border.

Perhaps the Saudis (and possibly the Trump Administration) hope to cut Iran off by taking Lebanon back from Iran’s local surrogates, Hizbollah. For that to be completely effective, the Coastal strip of Syria between Lebanon and Turkey would have to be secured as well - which would include the Alawite heartland at the core of the Assad Regime, and the Russian Naval Base at Tartus - possibly requiring regime change in Syria. That would be a major undertaking, requiring potentially large US, Turkish, and/or Israeli commitment.

They might seek to limit their counter-stroke however, to just securing Lebanon, to keep the Russians (and Syrians) out.

It might also still be possible to block that Shi’ite Crescent running through the border crossing at Abu Kamal/Al Qaim through some negotiated settlement or future military action, but it will be a lot harder, now that the Shi’ites have possession.

It looks like the ISIS Caliphate is now essentially gone, and there will be a flurry of effort to settle out the new areas of influence - maybe even a major conflict. Get the popcorn ready...