Let the Venezuelans decide their own destiny, as did we.
But did we decide our own destiny? I seem to recall that we sent Franklin, Adams, Jay and Jefferson off to France to enlist their aid which was ultimately delivered by France without whose Navy we would not have won at the time and place we did.
But by Thursday, it was again clear that no matter what Washington had been told and anticipated, the army remained loyal to Maduro.
But Guaido and the Americans miscalculated. The army stood by Maduro. The trucks were kept out.
If so, this represents a very dangerous shortfall in our intelligence. We do not know for sure what Washington had been told, we do not know if Washington was telling us the truth, but assuming the above, this intelligence misstep is shocking because it is reminiscent of our fatal lack of intelligence in Vietnam, our disastrous intelligence concerning weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, our equally disastrous ignorance of the Chinese intentions of crossing the Yalu River into Korea, the strike against Pearl Harbor and on and on. It tells us that we cannot be sure that our intelligence is adequate to making the decision whether to intervene or not intervene. The cost of such ignorance can be decisive, the consequences fatal.
There could be again Americans killing and dying in a country where no vital interest was imperiled.
When we considered intervening into Iraq we thought in terms of the first Gulf War, in other words, a quick in and out with indisputable victory and only minimal casualties. On invading Venezuela, we must consider whether it is more like Iraq, Mogadishu, Lebanon, or Vietnam than the First Gulf War, Japan, Germany, Granada or Panama.
… Where no vital interest was imperiled…
Venezuela is not a faraway country like Afghanistan or Iraq, it is not a country of deserts and barren mountains like Afghanistan, it is not a nation of warlords and seven century Islamists, it is rather modern, rather well educated, with immense oil potential located on a land bridge to America and very, very close across the water.
Our interest in Latin America has been acknowledged since the Monroe doctrine under President Madison in the early 19th century (although actually initiated and maintained by the British Navy) because of its proximity to the United States and because European intrigues would constitute real danger to the United States. We have already seen in Venezuela the introduction of Armed Forces by Russia, China, and especially Cuba. Did we not see the like under Castro in Cuba?
Bolton also had strong words for Vladimir Putin: "(T)his is our hemisphere. It's not where the Russians should be interfering. This was a mistake on their part."
If we had a vital enough interest in our situation with Cuba when the Russians were installing nuclear tipped missiles there, an interest vital enough to go to the very brink of nuclear war, why do we not have a similar vital interest in Venezuela when there are already reports, albeit unconfirmed, that the Russians have placed missiles in Venezuela? The Venezuelan relationship with Iran has been widely reported and it is not unlikely that they would install Missiles tipped with atomic weapons obtained from Russia, China, Pakistan or North Korea.
This civil conflict is not our war. We have not been attacked. Not only is there no justification for U.S. military intervention
Clearly we have not been attacked but is this a actually a Civil War now? Does not the arrival of 20,000 Cuban soldiers and Russian and Chinese elements change all that? Does that not provide adequate "justification" for military intervention?
Also any arrival of U.S. troops on Venezuelan soil could turn into yet another 21st-century strategic debacle.
That danger is certainly real, we should have learned that lesson in Vietnam, but we did not, did we learn it in Iraq? But turn the coin over, would it not be a greater 21st-century debacle if Venezuela becomes another Cuba, a launching pad for mischief throughout the entire hemisphere, a provocateur, an unsinkable aircraft carrier for the Chinese, Russians or Iranians? Would another Cuban missile crisis gone wrong be something akin to "another 21st-century strategic debacle"?
These reactions to Buchanan's observations are not set forth to drive a conclusion and certainly not set forth to work backward from a preferred conclusion, as is often the case on these threads, the purpose is to help sort out our thinking.
