“...suggest the people that should have the biggest say are the experienced ground units. Which units do they prefer for air support.” [Steve Van Doorn, post 79]
This doesn’t work either. As the British Army found out in North Africa, early in the 1940s when the Allied cause stood on the brink. Then the US Army insisted on doing it almost the same way, though the RAF warned US decisionmakers it wouldn’t work. Luckily, American largesse rescued the entire effort.
Ground forces cannot see enough of the total picture to make optimal use of air support across the battlespace. The most ornery among their apologists have even asserted that it’s the most “proper, heroic, and honorable” thing to do, to attend only to that portion of the front line directly in front of them. Combat is something a bit bigger than the 20 ft directly in front of the private solider. It’s also bigger than the 20 miles or so a division commander must attend to.
Close support requirements are better filled by rotary wing assets, which do have limitations of their own.
More generally, “let the experts design it” or “give it to the experts and let them see what can be done with it” has historically resulted in disaster. This has been true for more than a century. Interested parties should track down a copy of _Ideas & Weapons_ by I B Holley Jr. Not a very long book.
based on what?