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You have extreme cognitive dissonance. Being given the same rights as a natural born citizen does not mean that you are a natural born citizen.

You exhibit a severe learning disability.

Lynch v. Clarke, 1 Sand. Ch. 583, 3 Owen 236, 250 (1844)

6. Upon principle, therefore, I can entertain no doubt, but that by the law of the United States, every person born within the dominions and allegiance of the United States, whatever were the situation of his parents, is a natural born citizen.

Which part of that confuses you?

As the U.S. Supreme Court wrote, and as I quoted in my #186:

Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 664 (1898).

That all children, born within the dominion of the United States, of foreign parents holding no diplomatic office, became citizens at the time of their birth, does not appear to have been contested or doubted until more than fifty years after the adoption of the Constitution, when the matter was elaborately argued in the Court of Chancery of New York, and decided upon full consideration by Vice Chancellor Sandford in favor of their citizenship. Lynch v. Clarke, (1844) 1 Sandf. Ch. 583.

All children, born within the dominion of the United States, of foreign parents holding no diplomatic office, became citizens at the time of their birth.

All persons born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States, and of the State wherein they reside.

United States Supreme Court, Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 705 (1898).

The evident intention, and the necessary effect, of the submission of this case to the decision of the court upon the facts agreed by the parties, were to present for determination the single question, stated at the beginning of this opinion, namely, whether a child born in the United States, of parents of Chinese descent, who, at the time of his birth, are subjects of the Emperor of China, but have a permanent domicil and residence in the United States, and are there carrying on business, and are not employed in any diplomatic or official capacity under the Emperor of China, becomes at the time of his birth a citizen of the United States. For the reasons above stated, this court is of opinion that the question must be answered in the affirmative.
Order affirmed.

And what order was affirmed? That was the order found in In re Wong Kim Ark District Court, N. D. California. January 3, 1896, No. 11,198.

Arriving at the conclusion, as I do, after careful investigation and much consideration, that the supreme court has as yet announced no doctrine at variance with that contained in the Look Tin Sing decision and the other cases alluded to, I am constrained to follow the authority and law enunciated in this circuit. Counsel for the United States have argued with considerable force against the common-law rule and its recognition, as being illogical, and likely to lead to perplexing, and perhaps serious, international conflicts, if followed in all cases. But these observations are, obviously, addressed to the policy of the rule, and not to its interpretation. The doctrine of the law of nations, that the child follows the nationality of the parents, and that citizenship does not depend upon mere accidental place of birth, is undoubtedly more logical, reasonable, and satisfactory, but this consideration will not justify this court in declaring it to be the law against controlling judicial authority. It may be that the executive departments of the government are at liberty to follow this international rule in dealing with questions of citizenship which arise between this and other countries, but that fact does not establish the law for the courts in dealing with persons within our own territory. In this case the question to be determined is as to the political status and rights of Wong Kim Ark under the law in this country. No foreign power has intervened or appears to be concerned in the matter. From the law as announced and the facts as stipulated, I am of opinion that Wong Kim Ark is a citizen of the United States within the meaning of the citizenship clause of the fourteenth amendment. He has not forfeited his right to return to this country. His detention, therefore, is illegal. He should be discharged, and it is so ordered.

Lynch v. Clarke, 1 Sandf. Ch. 583., 3 Owen 236, 252 (1844)

Judge Wilson, in his law lectures, delivered soon after our national government was organized, says that an alien, according to the notion commonly received as law, is one borne in a strange country, and in a foreign society, to which he is presumed to nave a natural and a necessary allegiance. He also says, that between a subject natural, and a subject naturalized, the distinction as to private rights is merely nominal: on one they are devolved by his birth, on the other by the consent of the nation. (2 Wilson's Works, 448,449.)

Lynch v. Clarke, 1 Sandf. Ch. 583., 3 Owen 236, 253 (1844)

Mr. Rawle says explicitly: "Every person born within the United States, its territories or districts whether the parents are citizens or aliens is a natural born citizen, within the sense of the constitution, and entitled to all the rights and privileges appertaining to that capacity." (Rawle's View of the Constitution of the United States, 86.
Other authorities to the same point are, 1 Bouvier's Law Dictionary, title Alien, p. 98, and Allegiance, p. 99.

What is your profession?

Evidently, child care.