Posted on 07/26/2023 4:51:53 AM PDT by AdmSmith
Development aid from both the European Union and the U.S., constituting 40% of Niger's budget, had been halted after the coup.
“The impact of sanctions on Niger, particularly those similar to the ones placed on Mali, could potentially disrupt the pipeline project and affect Chinese investments,” said Kai Xue, a Beijing-based investment lawyer with a focus on Africa, referring to the PetroChina project.
The $4 billion pipeline project — that will link Niger's Agadem oil field to Benin's Cotonou port — was touted by Niger's government then as being the biggest investment in the country since it gained independence from France in 1960.
PetroChina has had a presence in Niger since 2011 when it formed a joint venture with the government to produce oil from the Agadem site. The current project was agreed in 2019 and if completed, it will be the longest cross-border crude oil pipeline in Africa. Contracted by China National Petroleum Corp., the pipeline is now over 75% complete and set to begin commercial oil transportation in late 2023. Niger's government then had said that the oil pipeline could generate up to a quarter of the country's gross domestic product and half its tax revenue eventually, up from 4% and 19%, respectively.
China's Sinopec had also signed an agreement with Niger's government in May for further cooperation in oil and gas projects. But China's interests in Niger extend beyond oil, encompassing solar power plants, agriculture development, infrastructure and construction.
https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Niger-tensions-threaten-Chinese-projects-as-dam-building-stops
Let's see if money talks
I'm a former Peace Corps Volunteer with three years experience in Niger.
President Bazoum of Niger was from a minority group within the country, Ouled Slimane, and was effectively interacting with another minority people, the nomadic Fulani (about 10% of Niger's population), who have been the main group being recruited by jihadist terrorists. The Fulani have traditionally had friction with the majority Hausa and Zarma, sedentary farming peoples who together comprise about 70% of the population.
President Bazoum’s sensitivity to minority needs and sentiments was likely why he was meeting increasing success in getting the Fulani to resist joining the terrorists or disarming if they already had. Niger had actually been making progress towards more security while the military juntas that overthrew their own democracies in neighboring Mali and Burkina Faso, with their allies the Russian Wagner mercenaries, were increasingly brutal towards their Fulani populations, generating increasing support and recruitment for the terrorists. If the generals who overthrew President Bazoum retain power, then invite in the violent Wagner mercenaries, then progress being made in Niger will likely come to an end.
The terrorist organizations will rejoice and Niger and all of West Africa will suffer ever increasing violence and instability. President Bazoum, democratically elected, was and is Niger, West Africa, and the West's best hope for a more peaceful future. Restore his Presidency.
The Alamo kid
https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/11/opinion/wagner-russia-prigozhin-bazoum-niger.html
Military coups in Africa: here’s what determines a return to civilian rule
In our analysis, we found that the single most important variable that accounts for different coup outcomes is the internal coherence of the military. When there’s internal coherence, militaries generally feel inclined to withdraw from executive power. This is because holding on to power challenges their internal cohesion.
Internal cohesion is based on the factors that triggered the coup. If a coup occurs in response to threats to the country’s territorial integrity, to the preservation of public order, or to the military’s material or reputational benefits, the junta will have the backing of the military at large. This is because the benefits of seeking power outweigh the risks of not being in power.
If a coup occurs for reasons outside these, the junta either won’t seek power or will face resistance from within the military and withdraw. We found this confirmed in all the coups that we analysed.
Another relevant yet less significant variable is the positioning of civil society toward the junta. Where civil society groups manage to rally the population to demand a return to democratic civilian rule, juntas depart from power. The most prominent example of this was in Egypt after the 2011 coup.
Interestingly, we didn’t find that aid dependency or membership in an international organisation with anti-coup rules exerted any discernible influence on juntas. This means that domestic variables – and in particular the drivers of the coup – influence political aftermaths.
In Sudan, Mali, Burkina Faso and Chad, militaries overthrew their governments because of threats to their countries’ territorial integrity or to the military’s material benefits. The juntas in these countries can rely on the backing of the military at large. This decreases the likelihood of a return to civilian rule.
The implications of our findings for Niger and Guinea are less straightforward, however. Here, coups were staged by a sub-section of the military, even though such a move wasn’t in line with the interests of the armed forces at large. Our research findings suggest a more volatile dynamic for these two post-coup states. At this stage, no one can predict how the motives of Niger’s presidential guard will shape future action. Much will depend on coup leader Abdourahmane Tchiani’s ability to convince the military that a coup was the right thing to do politically.
The military takeover also has not stamped out jihadi violence, which the coup leaders originally cited as a justification for removing Bazoum. Fighters on motorcycles and believed to be with the Islamic State group ambushed Nigerien security forces on Sunday, according to a security report for aid groups seen by the AP. The attack and another last week claimed by the al-Qaida linked group known as JNIM are largely a consequence of military operations to combat extremist violence being suspended since the coup, according to Wassim Nasr, a journalist and senior research fellow at the Soufan Center.
“This is due to the halting of cooperation and the military being busy with consolidating their coup in Niamey,” Nasr said. Communications and dialogue attempts with some jihadi groups, which had been established under Bazoum, also were cut after the coup, he said.
A former jihadi, Boubacar Moussa, told the AP that he's received multiple phone calls from active jihadis saying they were celebrating the chaos created by the coup and the greater freedom of movement the revolt gave them. Moussa is part of a nationwide program that encourages jihadi fighters to defect and reintegrate into society. It is unclear if the program will continue under the military regime. He thinks as the situation evolves, jihadis will take advantage of the security gap and launch new attacks.
The Occam's-razor explanation may just be correct: A general who was going to be fired decided to fire the president instead. Many coups have such simple origin stories, triggered by factional rivalries within the military, and ambitious, self-serving men who would happily swap the barracks for the palace.
Russia will likely expand its influence because of the Niger coup (and there have been reports that the junta is requesting help from the Wagner Group mercenaries). But much of the speculation about the extent of Russia's involvement so far is based on extremely thin evidence—a few hundred people, in one protest, in one city, a handful of them carrying Russian flags, in a country that's twice the size of France and home to more than 25 million people. Even before the coup, Niger's capital city was an opposition stronghold, so one should hardly be surprised that some people who live there would demonstrate in support of soldiers who overthrew a president they loathed.
Niger's coup may not have originated in great-power competition so much as in politics and other dynamics nearer at hand—but it could still have serious international repercussions. The security situation in the Sahel is deteriorating as jihadism rises. The junta governments that have taken power in the past three years have proved unable to combat it. Moreover, although many of the new military regimes—notably in Mali and Burkina Faso—have allied themselves with Russia, the Russian government and the Wagner Group are not exactly flush with spare cash or bursting with well-trained troops waiting to deploy to Africa, bogged down as they are by their debacle in Ukraine. In the coming months, the postcoup regimes in the Sahel are likely to realize that they've swapped Western partners, which had deep pockets and a long-term commitment to supplying foreign aid, for a diminished Kremlin that will inevitably overpromise and under-deliver. The money will eventually run out.
If Niger's junta manages to stay in power, it will almost certainly align itself with Russia. The interim regime has already announced the cancellation of several military agreements with France. But it's in for a rude awakening if it cozies up to the Kremlin. Russia, as Mali and Burkina Faso are finding out, is rich enough to pay for small contingents of mercenaries and to line the pockets of greedy soldiers, but it is nowhere near rich enough to help provide for the broader population of one of the world's poorest countries, where the GDP per capita is less than $600 a year.
As is so often the case in sub-Saharan Africa, the victims will be those who can least endure it. The broader population of Niger will suffer as soldiers turned politicians enrich themselves. And that story, which is not about geopolitics, but rather about the ordinary distress of millions of vulnerable people, will be one that garners substantially less ink.
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2023/08/niger-coup-russia/674947/
Nothing new, but a good summary.
Abdoulaye Seydou, leader of the Movement for the Safeguard of Human Rights and Citizenship (M62) in Niger, is now free. The Niamey Court of Appeal overturned his nine-month prison sentence.
The July 26, 2023 coup, which ousted President Mohamed Bazoum, saw the M62 openly support the military. The movement even organized several demonstrations in favor of the National Committee for Security and Progress (CNSP). It is not excluded that the support of the M62 to the military junta could have influenced the cancellation of the condemnation of its leader. However, this hypothesis remains to be confirmed.
https://senego.com/niger-annulation-de-la-condamnation-dabdoulaye-seydou-chef-du-m62_1583780.html
Instead of 9 months, he has been in prison for 7 months, and Tchiami will have more problems if he wants to back down in the coming weeks.
A military detachment was attacked Tuesday afternoon as it moved between the villages of Boni and Torodi in the Tillaberi region, the Ministry of Defense said on state television Tuesday. The wounded were evacuated to the capital, Niamey.
It was the first major attack against Niger’s army in six months, a worrying sign of possible escalation, said Wassim Nasr, a journalist and senior research fellow at the Soufan Center, a think tank. “What we are witnessing today is both jihadi warring factions, the Islamic State group and (al-Qaida affiliate Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin), marking their territory because of the security void caused by the coup. This definitely should be seen in the context of the ongoing war between the two groups,” he said.
Many Bazoum supporters have been silenced or gone into hiding, and rallies to support the president are quickly shut down by police. Several ministers and politicians from deposed President Mohamed Bazoum ’s regime have been detained since the coup, with human-rights groups unable to access to access them.
Analysts say the longer the coup drags on, the less likely an intervention will occur as the junta cements its grip on power, likely forcing the international community to accept the status quo.
Tchiami should have been paid in the first week and sent to a country of his choice as described above in the thread. The same should have been done in Mali and Burkina Faso, and after what happened there, it should at least have been faster in Niger.
Niger Military Junta's Ties to Corruption Under Scrutiny
After ECOWAS decided to pursue a diplomatic solution while preparing for military intervention, the junta felt secure enough to send the delegation. One person who was in the delegation, according to social media posts, is a person with a dubious record. His name is Aboubacar Charfo.
The reason why Mr Charfo’s name is interesting dates back to 2020 when his name appeared in an audit conducted by the Inspector General of the Nigerien Armed Forces. This independent body found that during the review period from 2011 to 2019, out of a total of $875 million in arms purchases, $320 million were found to have problems. The period of the audit is also concerning, as it was during a time when Western countries were increasing their support for Niger in the Global War on Terror. A deeper look into the numbers shows this was a concerted effort by corrupt officials and brokers to siphon off government funds. The audit also found that 76 billion West African francs, or approximately $130 million, were lost to corruption.
Looking into the background of Mr Charfo presents some interesting reading. First, it is notable that he is a construction contractor with no previous experience in the defence sector. The allegations against him are that he worked with Aboubacar Hima, a known arms dealer, in a scheme where companies controlled by both men rigged bids in such a way as to create the illusion that they were in direct competition for government contracts. Their success points to the opportunities that are available to a small clique of insiders with close ties to the Niger government.
Two additional pieces of information are revealed. Mr Charfo is from the same political party and the same geographic region as former President Mahamadou Issoufou. Additionally, there have been no prosecutions for any of the allegations documented in the audit. Considering the rhetoric that has been levied against the recently ousted President Mohamed Bazoum regarding treason and other crimes, this background is quite revealing as to a potential reason why he was ousted.
It is clear that within Niger, the putschists and their allies are able to control the narrative that is being revealed to the population. The language used about the junta being willing to listen to democracy is being undercut by the decision to charge President Bazoum with high treason. Despite the rhetoric, members of the junta and other well-connected people apparently wanted President Bazoum removed from the scene so that they could resume their illicit activities.
The immediate future for Niger is looking bleak. The Sahel will suffer, as will Nigeria and Europe.
https://midstonecentre.com/2023/08/niger-military-juntas-ties-to-corruption-under-scrutiny/
https://t.me/logikamarkova/7905
Video w Eng subtitles https://twitter.com/TheShehus/status/1693741692510179729
Jihadist attacks have multiplied in recent days in Niger, especially in the so-called three border area between Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali. Thirty Nigerien soldiers and as many civilians were killed in this region in a series of attacks.
The region of the three borders is a sanctuary for jihadists, including those of the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (EIGS). France and the Nigerian army regularly carried out joint operations there. Military cooperation suspended following the military coup. And this has consequences for the fight against jihadism.
We see that since the putsch, the security situation has deteriorated. The Islamic State in the greater Sahara is taking advantage of the recent unrest to accentuate its abuses,” said Bakary Samb, regional director of the African Center for Peace Studies.
Encouraging results were recorded in Niger over the first six months of 2023, with a 49% drop in attacks on civilians compared to the six first months of 2022.
https://www.dw.com/fr/niger-pusch-tiani-djihadisme-sahel/a-66598881
On August 16, one of northwestern Nigeria's most notorious bandits, Dogo Gide, released a video in which he claimed his fighters were responsible for downing a Nigerian air force helicopter in Shiroro, Kaduna State; this attack killed 20 soldiers and three senior military officers. Shiroro is where Ansaru, an al-Qaeda-affiliated and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)-loyal faction, attempted to recruit villagers and establish hideouts in 2021. Ansaru also employed the same tactic when it shot down another air force helicopter en route from Kaduna to the Nigerian capital of Abuja in 2020. These factors combine with reports of Dogo Gide allying with Ansaru to lend credibility to Gide's claim that his group brought down the aforementioned helicopter.
The video suggests Dogo Gide is now reaching out to the jihadists, whereas previously it was the jihadists who sought the alliance with the bandit groups. This may be caused by the bandits’ lack of funding or weapons, if not also the need for training. If either Ansaru or the Shekau faction cannot capitalize on Dogo Gide's increasing jihadist tendencies, then Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP) may seek its own expansion in the northwest—and possible alliance with Dogo Gide or other bandit groups.
About eight communities in the Shriroro local government area of Niger state have reportedly surrendered themselves to the leadership of notorious bandits warlord Dogo Gide and have decided to pledge their loyalty and allegiance to the group.
Naija News reports that this is barely two weeks after the bandits’ group led by Dogo Gide took credit for shooting down a Military Helicopter on an evacuation mission in Kusasu Village in Shriroro local government area. The communities that have allegedly pledged loyalty to Gide and his group are Kusasu, Kwaki, Chukuba, Gulana, Apai, Nakuna, Yanka, and Kurebe, where the bandits’ warlord has continued to operate with impunity for the past years.
Sources disclosed that the people's decision to accept Gide as their leader was informed by the fact that despite the killing of the soldiers and the shooting down of the helicopter by the bandits, the Nigerian authority has not taken any major step towards the Bandits.
According to the source, the only way for the communities is to submit themselves to the group “because it appears that there is nothing anybody can do about the situation.”
“As I speak with you, the people are planning to give a title and made Dogo Gede their king in these communities. At the moment, they refer to him as their governor because since the Bandits have been operating in the area for the past eight years and killing the people, no governor of the state or any political leader has visited them.
“These people have lost hope in their leaders, and they believe that nobody can rescue them from the hands of these Bandits and restore peace in these communities. So you don't blame them for pledging loyalty and allegiance to the warlord and his group if that is the only way they can have peace and embark on their farm business”, the source added.
Bandits group loyal to Dogo Gide and members of the Boko Haram sect have shared territories within which to operate among themselves to prevent any further clash.
The demarcation of Territories by these Terrorists is coming barely seven months after the last bloody clash between the two groups, leading to heavy casualties on both sides in February this year. The new boundary adjustment by the two groups shows that the Boko Haram Sects will now operate in communities within Hudawa and Kurebe, while Bandits warlord Dogo Gide and his group will now hold on to communities between Kurebe and Iburo.
https://www.naijanews.com/2023/08/23/breaking-notorious-bandit-terrorists-governor-dogo-gide-takes-over-eight-niger-communities/
When the cat’s away, the mice will play.
The French army headquarters on Tuesday refuted a report from the official Algerian radio that Algeria had refused to grant France permission to fly over its territory for a military operation in Niger.
The general staff invalidates the request by France to fly over Algerian territory and therefore the refusal of the Algerian authorities, he told Reuters.
Algerian radio reported on Monday that Algeria had denied France such overflight permission. Algeria opposes any foreign military intervention in Niger and favors diplomatic means to restore constitutional order in the country since the July 26 military coup, public radio added.
https://www.reuters.com/article/algerie-france-niger-idFRKBN2ZX0JY
The French army would not ask this of the Algerians, because they know that Algeria has a dark relationship with Islamists and Russia.
The European Union is moving ahead with the legal groundwork to impose sanctions on members of a junta that seized power in Niger last month, EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell said on Wednesday. In deciding on sanctions, the EU will aim to mirror any measures taken by the West African regional body ECOWAS, Borrell said.
“We will follow, trying to implement the same kinds of sanctions that they have decided,” Borrell told reporters after a meeting of EU defence ministers in Toledo, Spain. Borrell said he would propose establishing a legal framework for sanctions against those responsible for the coup when EU foreign ministers meet on Thursday, also in Toledo.
https://www.reuters.com/world/eu-prepare-ground-sanctions-niger-coup-leaders-borrell-2023-08-30/
The officers also said they had arrested one of Mr Bongo's sons for treason. Mr Bongo's overthrow would end his family's 55-year hold on power in Gabon.
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66654965
Confession: The only thing I and many of my friends know about Gabon is the
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gaboon_viper
Niger’s military rulers have ordered police to expel France’s ambassador, a move that marks a further downturn in relations and one that French authorities say the army officers who seized power in Niamey last month had no authority to make.
The coup’s leaders are following the strategy of military governments in neighbouring Mali and Burkina Faso in distancing themselves from the region’s former colonial power amid a wave of anti-French sentiment.
https://twitter.com/Charles_Lister/status/1700157180400308577
Unbeknownst to most, #Mali is in deep, deep trouble. AlQaeda’s JNIM has killed 120+ in 3 days, with massive attacks (some involving suicide car bombs) throughout Gao & Timbuktu, & Timbuktu city under a sustained siege.
- ISGS is outside Menaka & could storm it at will.
https://twitter.com/Charles_Lister/status/1700156342407737722
ISGS = IS Greater Sahara
Soon, we may see a JNIM ‘emirate’ emerging in the #Sahel as in 2012, ISGS will follow suit and the region will implode. Mali's army (FAMA) is too weak, unwilling to act and preoccupied with holding to power, PMCWagner will not risk dying, but the #Tuareg #Azawad will rise.
https://twitter.com/SOFDoctor/status/1700557280343683350
When will the coup leaders understand this.
The U.S. has more than 1,000 troops in Niger who had been, at least up until July of this year, participating alongside Nigerien troops in counterterrorism operations and security force assistance training. Those efforts were paused and continue to be paused, following a coup that overthrew Nigerien President Mohamed Bazoum on July 26.
“The United States has not restarted counterterrorism operations, or any security force assistance training with Niger,” Singh said.
https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3526515/us-resumes-isr-flight-operations-in-niger/
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-17-2023
... but the Russians have neither the resources nor the will to fight the Islamists..
PMC Wagner started having problems in Africa
As expected, the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin has already begun to change the situation on the African continent. Firstly, the Ministry of Defense tried to seize control of the private army. However, globally this attempt failed. Then, with the help of special services, arms baron Viktor Bout tried to take control of the PMC. So far, too, all is not well, thank God. It turned out that each of the units of the Wagner PMC is subordinate to the commander on the spot, and they, in turn, coordinate with each other and carry out the tasks that are assigned to them in a particular country. There is no single control center as such yet. Recruiting camps remain on the territory of Belarus, which are under 24-hour police and military protection.
And recently, in Mali and Sudan, units of the Wagner PMC suffered serious losses. In Sudan, for example, a convoy of PMC equipment was attacked by unknown kamikaze drones. American media admit that this is the work of Ukrainian intelligence. At the same time, our sources say that Defense Minister Shoigu is not giving up attempts to get a sweet piece in the form of a private army with a ready-made structure and resources. And most importantly - with contracts for work in a whole list of African countries. “There are rumors that Shoigu transferred not only drones to Africa, but also several units that are now hitting the Wagner PMC, forcing them to submit. They say we are talking about 2-3 units of 5-6 people,” said our source at PMC Wagner.
We cannot yet somehow confirm this information. But besides Sudan, there are problems in Mali. There, one of the PMC bases was attacked by drones. Three soldiers were killed after the explosive device was dropped.
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