[Timber Rattler]

Long overdue.

[military cop]

Out of curiosity: did I pay for that?

RLTW

[JonPreston]

[paintriot]

And the gaze rejoiced.

[tlozo]

Back in 2012, 28% of Russians and 23% of Ukrainians viewed Stalin in a positive light.

Today, 63% of Russians do while only 4% of Ukrainians support that position.

[dforest]

Suprised it wasn’t done a long time ago.

[Worldtraveler once upon a time]

The notion of symbols is most interesting. As with others commenting, it is surprising the "trident" advocates didn't get around to dumping the "hammer and sickle" earlier. Seemed like a thing to do.

But it remains a problem with the symbols and their histories and uses. One from about 1917 and the other from about 1929.

Ref: Hammer and sickle

Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hammer_and_sickle

Ref: Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists

Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Organisation_of_Ukrainian_Nationalists

Strife over symbols is quite the human phenomenon, such as the disagreement between Christians over the "corpus Christi" crucifix and the "empty cross." It is sure such disagreements will be around long after we all are gone.

[conservativeimage]

[Rattlesnake_Snook]

No surprise the same people here who support Ukorruption were also the same ones who wanted confederate monuments torn down

[BlackbirdSST]

What a game changer.

[wardaddy]

My middle combat infantry deploys to EE very soon as in two weeks for 9 months to Sabre Rattle

CW amongst leadership who share is they likely will be peacekeeping contingency in western Ukraine along with poles etc

When the partition eventuates

[Kazan]

No, the Hammer and Sickle and communism has been replaced with monuments and streets named after Nazi collaborator Stepan Bandera.

Trading communism for neo-Nazism isn't an improvement.

[Kazan]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Fo3PfWYsDVA

Update on the conflict in Ukraine for August 9, 2023:

- Western analysts and media sources are beginning to admit the poor progress, heavy losses, and fundamental flaws of the Ukrainian offensive and beyond that, the unsustainable nature of the proxy war in the first place;

- Ukraine is shifting away from attempts to storm Russian lines and attempting instead to conduct attritional warfare, however, it lacks the material resources to do so which necessitated “storming” tactics in the first place;

- As Ukraine’s offensive falters on the battlefield, Kiev and its Western sponsors have been focusing on aerial and naval drone strikes to create the illusion Ukraine maintains the initiative;

- Quantities of artillery, armor, and trained manpower determine the duration of Ukraine’s offensive. The disposition of both Ukrainian and Russian forces including the reserves of both sides will determine if a breakthrough will occur;

- Russian military industrial capacity and the material resources it produces for the ongoing military operation ensures that no matter where Ukraine’s offensive ends on the battlefield, it will leave Ukrainian forces exhausted, depleted, and unable to sustain their fighting capacity;

- Industrial capability between the collective West and both Russia and China is and will remain into the foreseeable future leaning in favor of Russia and China;

- The West gambled and lost on “small wars” as it enters an end game for geopolitical unipolarity against Russia and China and the reality that modern warfare against peer and near-peer competitors requires industrial capacity the West doesn’t have and cannot obtain;