The Cost of Life (Clinton/Gore Sellout of Security for Campaign Contributions) **FR EXCLUSIVE**

At the invitation of UPI, Jon Loose and I wrote this op-ed and submitted it a week ago. UPI told us that every single person who read it there said that this was not commentary but that it was news. They have told us they were assigning staff to cover this story.

Since Newsmax has broken the story, I thought it time to put out information that has not yet come to light.

Hindsight is always 20/20. You see causes and proactive avenues that could have altered the outcome. Sometimes these ignored actions are discounted as unreasonable. Other times, you point your finger at a deserved party.

In the wake of the terrorist attack on the United States on September 11, 2001, the most compelling raison d'être is that we failed to take our own advice. More specifically, the weaknesses in airport security were largely identified a number of years ago.

In July of 1996, in the wake of the crash of TWA flight 800, President Clinton convened the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security by executive order 13015 to take place on August 22, 1996. He gave the commission 45 days to “study matters involving aviation safety and security, including air traffic control and to develop a strategy to improve aviation safety and security, both domestically and internationally,” then present their conclusions. He named Vice President Al Gore to head the commission. By special invitation of the President, Victoria Cummock was named to the commission. Ms. Cummock lost her husband in the explosion of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scottland some eight years prior. According to Newsday, Cummock held the reputation at the time of “the airlines’ most tenacious foe.”

Five years prior to September 11, 2001, Gore held a press conference to announce the commission’s preliminary report that promised, “to take the strongest measures possible to reduce the risk of terrorism and sabotage to airline passengers and crews.” Gore further stated that their upcoming proposed measures will, “be put into place quickly and effectively and will help ensure that airline travel remains as safe as possible for all travelers.” A solid and factual preliminary report backed up Gore’s comments.

Ten days later, just prior to the 1996 election, Gore penned a letter to airline lobbyist Carol Hallett, promising that the commission's findings would not cause the airlines any loss of revenue. The very next day the Democratic National Committee received a check in the amount of $40,000 from TWA. Over the next two weeks Northwest, United and American Airlines donated $55,000 more.

In the next two months the Democratic National Committee pocketed over $250,000 from American Airlines. United Airlines threw in an additional $100,000. Northwest Airlines added $53,000. That’s a grand total of over half a million dollars. According to the Washington Times, Whitehouse Spokesman, Ginny Terzano gave no denial when asked whether Al Gore solicited these airline donations personally.

Contributory advice and suggestions were being sought and incorporated into the draft(s) of the report by all sides of the aisle and divisions of government including intelligence agencies, transportation agencies and military personnel. The draft final form was presented to the 21 participating commissioners in January of 1997. According to the Washington Times, a significant number of security measures were removed from the proposed final draft of the report.

Victoria Cummock and CIA Director John Deutch were resolute in their opposition to the “softball” report. Gore was given no choice but to pull back the report. Reinstalled were sensible new procedures that would cost the airlines millions of dollars.

· Conduct airport vulnerability assessments and develop action plans
· Require criminal background checks and FBI fingerprint checks for all screeners, and all airport and airline employees with access to secure areas
· Deploy existing technology
· Signifi cantly expand the use of bomb-sniffing dogs
· Complement technology with automated passenger profiling
· Certify screening companies and improve screener performance
· Aggressively test existing security systems
· Use the Customs Service to enhance security
· Give properly cleared airline and airport security personnel access to the classified information they need to know
· Begin implementation of full bag-passenger match · Providing more compassionate and effective assistance to families of victims
· Improve passenger manifests
· Significantly increase the number of FBI agents assigned to counter-terrorism investigations, to improve intelligence, and to crisis response
· Provide anti-terrorism assistance in the form of airport security training to countries where there are airports served by airlines flying to the US

The security measures were in the final recommendation report. However, the implementation timetable was nowhere to be found.

In February of 1997, Victoria Cummock called the report “toothless.” She informed Gore that unless specific implementation dates were added in the report she would file a dissent, because the airline industry would not have to do anything until such measures were mandated.

On February 12, 1997, an open meeting was held on the commission’s final report. Gore made a point to inform Ms. Cummock that he would leave room for her dissent to the final report. NBC Dateline caught these comments on videotape. Also on videotape was Mr. Gore presenting the final report to President Clinton minutes later and pronouncing that the report had unanimous consent. But it didn’t.

Victoria Cummock filed suit claiming that Gore pressured her to abandon her call for counter-terrorist measures, the right to see commission files of which she was denied, and the right to file her 42-page dissent. It was her ambition to see the commission’s findings presented accurately within the final report. Gore painted Cummock, who had lost her husband in a terrorist act, as a disgruntled commissioner.

In mid 1999 Ms. Cummock won her case in the D.C. Court of Appeals. In the long drawn out and impeded discovery process a memo was discovered from a CIA staffer, specializing in psychological profiling. According to The American Spectator, the memo stated that Cummock could be "kept in line if she believes progress could be made" but "could become a major problem."

On September 11, 2001, those ultimately responsible for the destruction of thousands of precious lives were the terrorists who pulled the knives and steered the planes.

But playing politics and intentionally ignoring obvious safety and security voids in an industry that has been a target of terrorists for over thirty years is unconscionable.

Not for commercial use. Solely to be used for the educational purposes of research and open discussion.

NBC News Transcripts
DATELINE NBC (8:00 PM ET)
September 15, 1997, Monday 10:56 AM
Boarding Pass?
GORE COMMISSION ON AVIATION SAFETY AND SECURITY Has Done Nothing To Make Flying Safer

STONE PHILLIPS: Good evening. It's been over a year since the crash of TWA Flight 800. Within weeks of the crash and amid much fanfare the White House created a national commission to address public fears and improve air safety. Do you feel any safer? Tonight, one member of the commission says she doesn't and you shouldn't either. Here's Chris Hansen.

President BILL CLINTON: (Voiceover) We do not yet know what caused Flight 800 to crash. Whether it was mechanical failure or sabotage, but we will find out.

(Wreckage site at night; pieces of plane) CHRIS HANSEN reporting: (Voiceover) The investigation into the crash of TWA 800 last summer revealed shortcomings in the nation's aviation security system and the president promised to take immediate action to restore the confidence of air travellers.

(Pieces of plane; men pulling bodies out; plane taking off)

President CLINTON: The safety and security of the American people must be our top priority.

HANSEN: (Voiceover) But in the year since Mr. Clinton said those words and established a presidential commission to improve aviation security, were any new ideas really put forth to make the skies safer or was it a public relations tactic? What has really changed?

(Clinton talking to press; plane taking off)

Ms. VICTORIA CUMMOCK: Is the flying public vulnerable? We're wide open. Are we going to do anything about it? Nope. I think that's an outrage.

HANSEN: (Voiceover) An outrage Victoria Cummock says because she's been fighting to improve airport security for nine years. Her husband was killed when Pan Am Flight 103 was blown out of the sky by a terrorist bomb over Lockerbie, Scotland. And as you'll see, she's had a front row seat in the battle to improve our nation's air security ever since.

(Cummock and Hansen walking through airport; wreckage from Pan Am; men looking through luggage)

Unidentified Man #1: Take you around to security right now.

HANSEN: (Voiceover) But she says she watched in frustration as anti-terrorism recommendations went unimplemented after Lockerbie. After TWA 800 she wasn't about to let it happen again. And Cummock says she made that clear to President Clinton himself when she met with him in the aftermath of the tragedy.

(Man checking in bags at airport; luggage; TWA wreckage; photo of Clinton)

Ms. CUMMOCK: I said to him, Mr. President, I think that the flying public needs to be assured that when they put their loved one on--on a plane that they're going to walk off at the point of their destination and not come home in a body bag like my husband did.'

HANSEN: (Voiceover) This time the president assured her it would be different. Cummock was appointed to a commission led by Vice President Al Gore. Its mission, to review the nation's aviation safety and security and recommend improvements. Its 21 members reached consensus early on. Whatever brought down TWA 800, the threat of terrorism is real. The commission produced this video which talked about a foiled plot to blow up jetliners.

(Clinton talking to press; commission; Al Gore; commission members sitting around a table; TWA wreckage; video)

Unidentified Voice: (Commission video) He and a small cell of co-conspirators plan to spirit bombs aboard 11 US flag aircraft and blow them from the sky.

HANSEN: (Voiceover) That's the kind of real threat Cummock believed the commission would address.

(Wanted poster; plane taxiing)

Ms. CUMMOCK: I was elated. My gosh, this is going to be a serious look at what we need to do to ensure the flying public flies safely and securely.'

HANSEN: By the time the commission finished its work, her experience in Washington would leave Victoria Cummock bitterly frustrated. Cummock now says the entire process was flawed from the start. That by the time all of the commissioners were appointed, their preliminary security recommendations were already due on the president's desk. The result, Cummock says, the recommendations had to be written for commissioners by government staffers.

Ms. CUMMOCK: We had no time to be briefed. We had no time to give thoughtful consideration or deliberate on these recommendations.

HANSEN: (Voiceover) And five months later when the final report was finished, Cummock charges the section dealing with aviation security offered little more than recycled recommendations from previous commissions, recommendations that were never fully implemented after Pan Am 103. For example, explosives detection equipment at airports. Criminal background and FBI fingerprint checks for airport workers in secure areas. And passenger bag matching on domestic flights to make sure that no unaccompanied luggage gets on planes. With minor exceptions, none of these recommendations have been implemented even today, although the Federal Aviation Administration's Barry Valentine says the security measures are being put in place as quickly as is practical.

(Commission report over footage of plane taking off; Cummock flipping through commission report; explosives detection equipment; man looking at luggage; man signalling to plane; man taking luggage off belt; woman picking up and bag; man tagging bag; plane landing; Federal Aviation Administration seal; Valentine)

HANSEN: Some of these recommendations were made before TWA 800, after the explosion of Pan Am 103. Why are we talking about them again now?

Mr. BARRY VALENTINE: Actually a number of measures have blen--been implemented continuously over a period of time. We are continually l--looking at the best technology to achieve our security goals.

HANSEN: (Voiceover) But Cummock says another opportunity has been missed because the commission didn't set firm deadlines for implementing the recommendations or determine where the money would come from to pay for them. Remember the recommendation on explosions detection machines? As of today only a few hundred machines have been ordered for the nation's 450 airports and only a few dozen have been installed. It may be another year before the rest are in place. Criminal background checks for airport workers, that's still not being done at all. The FAA is now seeking input from the aviation industry and it could take another year before background checks are mandatory. And what about the passenger bag matching proposal. The plan is to only match bags randomly on domestic flights unless the passenger fits a potential terrorist profile. But that's not going to start, at least, until the end of this year. Cummock and some security experts say there are many more examples of where the Gore Commission failed.

(Commission members; closing in on Cummock; explosives detection machine; plane taking off; detection machine; luggage coming out of chute; woman using detection machine; man taking luggage off belt; luggage being loaded into plane; hatch being closed; luggage being loaded; people carrying bags; man loading luggage onto belt; Cummock at computer; commission report)

Mr. NEIL LIVINGSTONE: And I think it was designed largely to reassure the public that the government was doing something because they hadn't been.

HANSEN: (Voiceover) Neil Livingstone, a top counter-terrorism expert, agrees that aviation security in US airports is anything but secure. He thinks part of the problem is that while in most other countries the government pays for security, here, it is left to the airlines to shoulder most of the costs.

(Livingstone; people waiting in line with luggage; men carrying guns; people pulling luggage up to counter)

Mr. LIVINGSTONE: They essentially hire people that if they were not working in the airport would probably be working for Burger King or McDonalds turning hamburgers.

HANSEN: These are people at the front line of security?

Mr. LIVINGSTONE: These are our front line shock troops, in terms of the security of the flying public and it--it's a disgrace.

HANSEN: Should the government in the United States be running security for airplanes and airports.

Mr. LIVINGSTONE: Common sense and all the experience throughout the world says that the government should be in charge of all aviation security.

HANSEN: (Voiceover) Livingstone says while the commission may have had good intentions it lacked that common sense along with the will to force radical change.

(Clinton and Gore shaking hands)

Mr. LIVINGSTONE: I don't think it was effective. I think it was almost political masturbation.

HANSEN: Some security experts say that to implement everything that you wanted would cost more than $ 200 million per life saved.

Ms. CUMMOCK: I think that a human life has no price. So, I take great offense at people who try--the bean counters who try to decide what your life is worth or what my life's worth or what your child's life is worth.

HANSEN: (Voiceover) But in the end, Cummock says, it wouldn't even be that expensive. In fact, she says, a $ 4 per ticket tax could raise $ 2 billion per year for security advances. But that's not something the Gore Commission was willing to recommend and so Cummock felt she needed to take a stand for herself and for the other families of victims.

(People checking bags in; people carrying luggage; Clinton and Gore; Cummock at computer)

Vice President AL GORE: Thank you all very much and thanks to the commission members again.

HANSEN: (Voiceover) It began when the vice president presented the final report to the press and to the commissioners for their signatures. Cummock balked and was called in to meet with Gore.

(Gore shaking commission members' hands)

Ms. CUMMOCK: He calls me into the back room and he said, Victoria, I would like for you to ride with me in my motorcade to present this report to the president.' And I said to him, Thank you Mr. Vice President, that's very thoughtful but I think my time is going to be better spent meeting with the family representatives from the different air disasters to put together my dissent.'

HANSEN: What did he say to you?

Ms. CUMMOCK: He said, I see.' He said, Well, can you please sign the transmittal letter on your way out?' And I said, No, Mr. Vice President, it's my understanding that if I sign that letter that means I agree with the report.'

HANSEN: You told the vice president no.

Ms. CUMMOCK: Yes.

HANSEN: Not going to sign it.

Ms. CUMMOCK: I didn't sign the report and there is no signature there to this date. Because when the next plane goes down, because of the lack of security in this country, I don't want them to go back and say, My God, there were victims' families on this and they agreed to--to do--to implement changes that were meaningless.

HANSEN: (Voiceover) Instead, Cummock filed a 42-page dissent and now she has filed a law against Vice President Gore and the Department of Transportation. In it Cummock claims presidential commission rules were broken and she seeks to have the final report nullified.

(Documents)

TEXT:

substantial flaws in the Commission's proceedings

HANSEN: Are you saying this is a corrupt system?

Ms. CUMMOCK: Yeah, I guess I am.

HANSEN: The vice president's office declined DATELINE's repeated request for an on camera interview or even a written statement answering Cummock's claims instead, suggesting that we speak to other commissioners. So we did. Some agreed that Cummock's criticisms have merit but others defended the commission's work.

Mr. JOHN DEUTCH: There were a series of things which the commission addressed which will help make flying both safer and more secure for Americans in the future.

HANSEN: (Voiceover) Former CIA director John Deutch also served on the Gore Commission. In fact, he sat next to Cummock for most of the proceedings.

(Deutch; Cummock)

HANSEN: How would you rate her work as a commissioner?

Mr. DEUTCH: I thought she was an excellent commissioner and I was very sensitive to and influenced by many of her concerns. But I do not think that the characterization is correct to say that none of the recommendations have been seriously considered.

HANSEN: (Voiceover) While he defends the commission over all, Deutch says it lacked focus. Its goals were so broad it was virtually impossible to accomplish them all. But he says having some many agencies set an agenda was a good first step.

(Commission members shaking hands with Clinton)

Mr. DEUTCH: I'm convinced that the Gore Commission has improved the safety and security of US and world wide airlines. The issue is how much and how quickly the full benefits will be seen.

HANSEN: (Voiceover) But Cummock charges the process was tainted from the start and that instead of demanding tough reforms, the commission fell victim to back room deals and Washington politics as usual. For example, remember the commission's recommendation on passenger bag matching? The vice president had publicly called for 100 percent of the bags on domestic flights to be matched. But sources on the commission say after the airline industry protested warning it would cause delays, the commission scaled back the recommendation.

(Cummock at desk; Gore showing Clinton the report; man tagging luggage; luggage being loaded into cart; people waiting in lines)

HANSEN: Did you feel pressure from the aviation industry?

Mr. DEUTCH: No.

HANSEN: Not at all?

Mr. DEUTCH: No.

HANSEN: (Voiceover) But at least one other commissioner did feel pressure. DATELINE obtained this memo written by the commissioner who says he felt pressure and heat from the airline industry not to make big changes. Dealing with terrorists is easier,' he writes, at least you know who the villains are.' And DATELINE obtained this memo, written to John Deutch by a CIA staffer, advising him that Cummock can be kept in line if she believes progress is going to result. But it warns, If the effort is headed in the direction of appeasing the airlines, she could become a major problem. For Victoria Cummock the memos are further proof of what she says really went on behind the scenes.

(Commission members; memos; Cummock talking to Hansen)

TEXT: adds to the heat I am feeling

HANSEN: What did the Gore Commission represent to you when you were first appointed to it?

Ms. CUMMOCK: I really felt that our mandate was to look at ways to enhance aviation safety and enhance aviation security.

HANSEN: And what does the Gore commission represent to you now?

Ms. CUMMOCK: A scam.

PHILLIPS: The Air Transport Association, the trade group that represents the airline industry, declined to talk to us, but in the past it has said that it cooperated both with the Gore Commission and the FAA in implementing the commission's recommendations. Meanwhile, the federal government has moved to have Victoria Cummock's lawsuit dismissed. It has also offered to settle lawsuit by publishing her dissent in the Library of Congress. She has refused to settle.

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