Bush admin must rectify Clinton-era's atrocious Afg policy http://www.omaid.com/english_section/back_issues_archive/455.htm
Published in issue #455 on 8 January 2001
A new administration is set to take power in Washington less than two weeks from now on January 20. Beside the usual fanfare involved in the transition of power between an outgoing and incoming US president -- in this case Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, respectively -- the latter is encumbered with reevaluating Executive branch positions on domestic matters and American policy on international affairs. A faltering US economy is the first issue Bush must face on the domestic front. Afghanistan, however, should be among the foremost matters that Bush and his foreign policy crew address if they want to stave-off major threats against US international interests within the next four years -- just about the same time the new president comes up for reelection.
The Clinton years have served as nothing but a death warrant against the people and independence of Afghanistan. The execution of convicted rapists and murderers under Bush's tenure as governor of Texas, much hyped by Clinton-Gore pundits during the presidential campaign, is nothing compared to the thousands of martyred innocents across Afghanistan whose death is due in part to Clinton's South Asia policy -- or, according to some analysts, the lack thereof. This failed American policy, rooted in a long-standing flaw of actions by previous US administrations, must be examined so that the next administration can rectify it and prevent further damage to both Afghanistan and US interests in the region.
The first phase of US miscalculations in Afghanistan can be traced to Washington's hastily reached judgment that the country was eaten-up, never to be seen again when the Soviets invaded in 1979. [eds: Omaid Weekly references to "the country" denote Afghanistan.]
US intelligence circles were convinced that the mujahideen's fight for freedom was simply a natural but doomed reaction to the Red Army -- a phenomenon, in their cynical and nullifidian minds, that had been repeated many times throughout the 20th century. Thus, all they were concerned with was bleeding the Russian bear for as long as possible, giving thought to nothing else.
Consequently, Pakistan was given carte blanche: Islamabad funneled the lion's share of US aid to its protégé, Gulbudin Hekmatyar; Hekmatyar stockpiled most of that aid, and used most of the rest against mujahideen forces, not the Soviets. When genuine mujahideen groups were set to defeat the Red Army, only then did Washington realize that the Afghan's jihad was indeed different than prior resistance movements: it was based on faith and an unquenchable thirst for liberty and freedom. But when Hekmatyar shelled Kabul with thousands of rockets and systematically murdered tens of thousands of innocent Afghans, the US stood by. Washington was content to wait and see if Pakistan's gamble to install her favorite son on Kabul's throne would succeed. To help her mythomaniac ally, however, the US closed down its embassy in Kabul just as the new, legitimate Afghan government took power from the Soviet-installed communist regime. As it were, the Afghan's defeat of America's archenemy was met with only a knife in the back.
But, no matter, the Afghans persevered and the Afghan government ejected Hekmatyar from Kabul and reduced him to a mere nuisance. That was when the Taliban war machine was devised by Pakistan's military intelligence agency, the ISI, chief architect of Islamabad's maleficent Afghan policy. Prodded on by Washington and helped by the Saudis and a sundry of Arab emirs, Islamabad let loose the Taliban. And with dreams of oil and gas riches, California-based Unocal was in line to support the new militia. While the extent to which Unocal helped Pakistan's new venture is still unknown, the company did admit to donating to the Taliban "administration" some fax machines and such -- but it's yet unclear what kind of fax machine is capable of firing salvos intended to kill and destroy.
Robin Raphel, Clinton's assistant secretary of state for south Asian affairs until mid-1997, is believed to have been instrumental in the rise of the Taliban militia. Raphel spent a number of years in Pakistan -- her husband was US Ambassador to that country until he was killed in the air bombing that also removed former Pakistani dictator Zia ul-Haq. While in Islamabad, Raphel acquired her flagrant pro-Pakistan trait, which colored her stint at the State Department.
Many in the Islamic State government have expressed their belief that Raphel, a number of other US officials, and even some Afghans residing in the US were on Unocal's payroll. They cite Raphel's fiery defense of Unocal, especially vis-à-vis the Taliban militia, in her negotiations with the Afghan government. During such an encounter, Raphel's words -- in effect asking the government to "give it up" -- were so insulting that Ahmad Shah Masood, Afghanistan's two-decade national resistance leader, threw down his trademark pakol cap, pointed to it and said, "I will continue to defend Afghanistan even if I control no more land than the size of this cap!"
It seems this teeth-shattering reply and unexpected blow to Raphel was the last straw. According to Afghan government intelligence sources, soon after this heated negotiation session the Taliban -- newly supplied with night-vision instruments, satellite maps, and other sophisticated gear -- aided by hundreds of Arab militants, Pakistani extremists and camouflaged Pakistan Army regulars stormed into Jalalabad and then into the Afghan capital.
Soon after the fall of Kabul, when the world witnessed the true face of the Taliban, and international condemnation of the militia started to coalesce, Raphel was discharged of her duties. Apparently she wasn't able to deliver total victory.
Just like Raphel, Karl F. Inderfurth, her successor, was not an experienced diplomat. Raphel got the job because of her close, personal relationship with Bill Clinton. Inderfurth had won favor with the then new Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright. But very much like his predecessor, Inderfurth, too, committed grave disservice to the people of Afghanistan.
To acquaint himself with the Afghan crisis, Inderfurth regularly traveled to Pakistan. Maybe he did get to know the situation -- but only through Islamabad's eyes. One issue dominated his agenda: the extradition of Osama bin Laden. The atrocities committed by Pakistan and the Taliban against the people of Afghanistan -- such as ethnic cleansing, gender apartheid, scorched earth, cultural devastation and so on -- were either relegated to the bottom of the list, or dropped-off altogether.
It is widely speculated among Afghan observers that Inderfurth has always given the Taliban the option of full US recognition in return for Osama's extradition. Never mind the militia's torture of Afghan men and women, mass murder, drug cultivation, and training of international terrorists. Inderfurth has insisted that he's pressured the Taliban -- meaning their masters in Islamabad -- to desist from these activities. But, how can such rhetoric be credible when no results have yet manifested? And while Pakistan was forced to retreat from Kargil after a brief powwow between Clinton and Nawaz Sharif, why hasn't there been the slightest change in Taliban policy after these many years of US "pressure"?
Suffice it to say that during both terms in office, Clinton and his State Department were pulling for a Taliban military victory. Clinton administration jubilation at such a victory was mainly rooted in its support of oil and gas pipelines. James Phillips and other experts have cited the administration's cordial attitude towards the militia. While still others, including Congressman Dana Rohrabacher in his 19 May 2000 interview with Omaid Weekly, accuse the Clinton administration of providing covert support to the Taliban. And to make things worse, it seems US foreign policymakers, especially those couched in the State Department's South Asia bureau, have less knowledge of Afghanistan than any other country.
Anyhow, the coming of a new administration is a reason to hope for better days to come for US policy on Afghanistan. The time is ripe for Afghans, especially those in the US -- and anyone who wants the return of peace and realization of the will of the people of Afghanistan, the expulsion of Arab and international terrorist from the country, and an end to human rights violations and drug cultivation -- to write letters, call and otherwise contact the new administration to voice their concerns and call for an immediate shift in US policy in Afghanistan. (And while Pakistan and its ward, the Taliban, have already contacted the new regime in Washington, we've yet to see the Foreign Ministry and embassies of the Islamic State government make their case to the new administration.)
There are only a few things that the poor and beleaguered nation of Afghanistan wants from the new administration, so that the intentional or unintentional damage caused by Washington against the country is rectified, and the crisis is resolved. Among them include the appointment of a capable and knowledgeable candidate to the post that has been, thus far, defiled by Raphel and Inderfurth.
Also required is the designation of individuals with a firm grasp on the history, people and events of Afghanistan, especially in the latter half of the 20th century, to relevant posts in the State Department and elsewhere. Needed are individuals that will formulate a US policy on Afghanistan independent of Pakistani influences and interests.
On the footsteps of such an independent, untainted US policy, the new administration should waste no time or effort in pressuring Pakistan to desist from interfering in Afghanistan, withdraw its forces from the country, cease its sustenance and support of the Taliban militia, and finally relinquish its inveterate desire to bruise and bloody the nation of Afghanistan. And in this spirit, to help ensure the emergence of peace, justice, and the will of the people the US should strengthen the legitimate Afghan government.
In such an environment, Washington, too, will benefit from the consequent stability in the region, and the US will reach its goal of stemming the tide of international terrorism and the drug trade, and securing much needed energy supplies.
In an overhaul of Clinton administration policy, under which the people of Afghanistan have suffered -- yet the terrorists and extremists supported by and within the ranks of Pakistan's corrupt regimes and military establishment have prospered -- the Bush administration must target the one nation that has brought about this crisis and these dangers to the region and Afghanistan, namely Pakistan. The US must, with all its might, come down hard on Pakistan and let Islamabad know that Washington is no longer playing any games. Only will a heavy-handed approach allow US interests to be met: the extradition of Osama bin Laden and a halt to threats to regional stability. And, if its of any consequence to Washington, it will also end the needless suffering of the people of Afghanistan, to whom, after all, the US owes a great debt.
The sanctions placed on the Taliban last December have made it nearly impossible for the US to return to any sort of a conciliatory relationship with the militia -- even in the unlikely event of Osama's extradition. And the conditions placed on the lifting of sanctions are such that only a total reversal of all Taliban policies -- their basic and fundamental tenets, and the militia's purpose as designated by the ISI -- would make it possible. That is, the Taliban would cease to exist.
The best policy for the new administration and a revamped State Department is not only to harden the sanctions against the militia but to impose even harsher sanctions on the one nation that is most responsible for the growth of Taliban-brand Islamic radicalism, the training of terrorists, and the endangering of regional stability: Pakistan.
Osama and his terrorist network have already killed dozens of Americans. His activities are a growing and ever more perilous threat to American citizens and interests, both abroad and inside the US. But Osama's terrorism has inflicted far greater damage to Afghanistan. His terrorists have taken part in mass murders, and according to some estimates, he has been instrumental in the death of up to 100,000 innocent Afghans during the last six years.
The new administration must not take the bait from Pakistan. It must not seek to "negotiate" with the Taliban, who harbor and protect America's number one enemy, Osama bin Laden.
There is only one option for the Bush administration and his State Department to help solve the crisis in Afghanistan: financial and military assistance to Afghanistan's national resistance force; and helping to facilitate the Loya Jirga initiative of the former Afghan King. The national resistance force has not only voiced its support for the Loya Jirga but it urged the former King's delegation, which recently visited Afghanistan, to speed-up its efforts in convening the Grand National Assembly.
There is no time to waste for the Bush administration.