The interaction between this policy goal -- Saddam removed, but not killed -- and the question of public finger-pointing at Saddam for 9-11 is somewhat complicated. To say, "Saddam did 9-11, no question" and then offer him exile would sound pretty weak, although the people could be conditioned to accept it by appropriate manipulation (they don't want to die either).
There may be a hope that they can squeeze Saddam out without having to go all the way on finger-pointing. As long as things are left ambiguous, Saddam can be given an out without loss of face to the US -- in fact we would look tough in that circumstance. Then the Atta-Prague meeting and the anthrax can simply be consigned to the category of "unsolved mysteries," which will please everybody.
However, it is still quite likely, IMO, that Saddam will resist long enough that a full disclosure is required. For example, if they reach a standoff where we have to put a nuclear bomber over Baghdad to show earnest of intent, that's going to require getting pretty explicit about Saddam's threat.
There is a continuum here between half-accusations and atmospherics and full disclosure, and the manipulation of our position on that continuum is of vital interest to the national command authority.
To understand the anthrax story, or the Prague story, you have to grasp the problem the administration faces, and the tools at its disposal to address them. If you don't -- if you just take everything at face value -- you'll never understand what's really going on.