Update:Readdy tells CAIB 'no rationale' for requesting in-flight spy satellite inspection ...

CBS News Coverage of Mission STS-107 ^ | 03:00 p.m., 03/14/03 | William Harwood

[brityank]

03:00 p.m., 03/14/03, Update: Readdy tells CAIB 'no rationale' for requesting in-flight spy satellite inspection of Columbia; sets up return-to-flight team

William Readdy, associate administrator for spaceflight and a former shuttle commander, told the Columbia Accident Investigation Board he did not consider asking for a spy satellite inspection of Columbia's left wing during the doomed ship's mission because the agency had already concluded the shuttle could land safely.

But in a letter to the CAIB, the Senate and House Intelligence committees and the NASA Inspector General, Readdy said he agreed that NASA could accept an offer from an unnamed government agency - presumably the National Imagery and Mapping Agency - to perform such an inspection on a "not-to-interfere basis."

But no such inspection was ever formally requested by NASA and no such remote inspection ever took place.

"If we had thought for a moment there was a problem, we would have asked," Readdy told reporters today in Washington.

During Columbia's launching Jan. 16, three pieces of debris broke away from the shuttle's external fuel tank about 81 seconds into flight. One piece, roughly the size of a suitcase, slammed into the underside leading edge area of the orbiter's left wing.

When the impact was discovered during routine post-launch analysis of ascent film and video, NASA managers ordered Boeing to carry out an analysis to determine what sort of damage such an impact might have caused. The Boeing team ultimately concluded the tank debris could have caused enough damage to the shuttle's fragile heat-shield tiles to produce localized, potentially severe damage. But the engineers concluded the potential damage did not pose a safety-of-flight concern and that Columbia could safely land.

NASA's mission management team, chaired by Linda Ham, a former ascent/entry flight director, accepted that analysis and the space agency never requested help from NIMA or other agencies operating the nation's most sophisticated imaging satellites and ground-based satellite-tracking telescopes.

That decision has been the subject of second-guessing and criticism in the wake of the disaster. In the days after the mishap, shuttle program manager Ronald Dittemore said no request for satellite imagery was made because the resolution of the imagery, based on past NASA experience, would not be high enough to reveal damage to individual tiles and because the Boeing analysis had concluded Columbia could land safely.

During Columbia's mission, however, Wayne Hale, a senior flight director now serving as launch integration manager at the Kennedy Space Center, made inquiries about the possibility of Air Force help inspecting Columbia. But those initial efforts were terminated by senior management.

"The SSP (space shuttle program) did not want any data and in fact there was never a formal MOD (mission operations directorate) request made from the FDOs (flight dynamics officers) or the Flight Director," Steve Stich, a flight director himself, wrote in an email to a colleague.

In a February interview, Hale declined comment on the matter, saying "I probably ought to wait until I tell the board my story. That's coming up."

Readdy's letter to the CAIB, obtained by CBS News today, shows more senior managers also discussed the issue.

"A NASA individual visited me in my office," Readdy's letter to the CAIB begins. "That person and another individual from another agency had been discussing the external tank debris issue during STS-107 ascent. He wanted to discuss an 'offer of support' from the other agency with respect to observing the space shuttle Columbia on orbit. He explained that NASA would have to request that support on an emergency or high priority basis.

"I explained that the ET debris and possible implications to the left wing thermal protection system had been analyzed and reported to the Mission Management Team and documented in MER (mission evaluation report) daily report FD (flight day) 12 dated 1/28/03 1245 GMT.

"My understanding was that the space shuttle program was well aware of those capabilities that could be provided by the other agency and it had concluded that the offer would not contribute to the analysis. I related that as well as the conclusion reached by the MMT that there was no 'safety of flight' issue, and for those reasons there was no rationale for requesting emergency or high priority support.

"He reiterated that the other agency desired to support on a 'not-to- interfere' basis. I acknowledged this information, told him again that this was not viewed as a 'safety of flight' issue, but told him to accept the offer of support on a 'not-to-interfere' basis."

Ted Molczan, a respected satellite observer, has calculated that Columbia could have been imaged on multiple occasions by classified optical imaging satellites. Resolution would have varied from six to 16 centimeters, or 2.3 to about six inches.

"As of this writing, the precise cause of the Columbia accident is unknown, so it is impossible to know whether or not high-resolution imagery would have been useful," Molczan writes on a web page devoted to the topic. "There may not have been any outwardly visible signs. Even if there was something portentous to be seen, the outcome might have been the same. At this point in the investigation, having clear imagery of the left wing probably would be valuable, but that is easy to say in hindsight."

In other developments, Readdy sent a letter Wednesday to Michael Kostelnik, deputy associate administrator for the space shuttle and the international space station programs, asking him to "begin to identify those critical actions now that we believe need to be completed before a safe return to flight can be assumed. We will adjust this preliminary planning as necessary as we receive recommendations from the CAlB."

"The Deputy Associate Administrator for International Space Station and Space Shuttle Programs will establish a formal "Return to Flight" team, and provide direction for the team to address these actions and other actions determined necessary to comply with the formal recommendations of the CAIB," Readdy wrote.

The team "will plan for a safe return to flight as soon as practicable. As a goal, the SSP shall plan for corrective actions and reviews which support a launch opportunity as early as the Fall of 2003. The team will work closely with the leadership of the International Space Station (ISS) program to ensure that return to flight plans support an optimal return to the tasks of ISS assembly and continued logistics support."

Readdy said the team should consider:

• A thorough review of key shuttle systems, including the insulation currently used on the external tank;
• Development of in-flight tile inspection and repair kits;
• A review of radar and photographic coverage policies for launch and entry;
• A review of failure modes and effects analyses, critical items lists, waivers and hazards;
• Operational concepts for on-orbit inspection and repair of TPS;
• How in-flight safety issues are resolved, "including the appropriate level of management visibility and decision in that process."

"I am asking you to initiate these Return to Flight activities as soon as possible, establish this team, and provide a preliminary action plan no later than 1 April 2003," Readdy concluded. "You will be responsible for providing the team charter and day-to-day direction."

Readdy plans to establish and chair a Spaceflight Leadership Council to oversee return-to-flight activities. Michael Greenfield, associate deputy administrator for technical programs, will co-chair the panel.

"Much needs to be done as we move forward to fly again," Readdy concluded. "I anticipate that our processes will be strengthened and that the safety of flight enhanced as we return to flight."

Readers should keep in mind that setting this Fall as a goal for return to flight is little more than motivational talk at this point. Until the CAIB completes its report and NASA assesses what corrective actions might be necessary, talk of launch dates seems more than a bit premature.

[brityank]

More info on in-flight imaging, or rather the lack of it.

[If you want off or on my Columbia ping list, let me know. FReegards.]

[brityank]

You rang?

:^)

[Jael]

Thank you so much for pinging me!!!

[NormsRevenge]

former shuttle commander .. wow.. IMO , He was too much of a fighter pilot when he needed to be the most cautious decision-maker.

The many recommendations are not new. At one time, all those things may have existed in one form or other at one time. Space programs are not proposed or built by dummies, after all.

The disjointedness in the communications flow from top to bottom and vice versa is very worrisome.

It may be symptomatic of an organization imploding. Too bad.

NASA used to run a great space exploration program. Now, China will get a crack at colonizing the moon while we will be schlepping low earth orbit vehicles to launch pads, crossing our fingers.

[brityank]

Your welcome.

There is so much coming out on this accident, especially compared to Challenger, that I have to believe it is because of folks like bonesmccoy and his colleagues on his master thread Observation on TPS damage on Orbiter; it is an outstanding compilation hitting all of the suspect areas with input from some very knowledgeable folks. I got onto the CBS News mail-list just to keep abreast of the CAIB and NASA, and found them trailing what bones and his crew had developed.

Hopefully, the PTB in DC and the various other govt. agencies are learning not to discount the vast pool of intelligence scattered across the web and the world; that truth is always better than fictitious misdirection; and that 'Hey -- lets fix it and move on!' is the watchword for America. Never having been higher than 33,000 feet in a flying coffin, this discussion has been an education. Cheers.

[bonesmccoy]

Thanks for the kind words. When I started that thread, it was not with the intent of road mapping the investigation. The fact that it did road map the CAIB's work is just a reflection of ... shall we say ... "aerodynamic truths" (heh heh...that's what the Russians said when we noticed that the TPS tile pattern on Buran matched the orbiter's forward fuselage almost exactly).

I used to laugh that the AWST photos of Buran on the runway showed scorched burn marks on the aft fuselage near the elevons.

But, I suppose that I shouldn't be so arrogant.

(USA! USA! USA! heh heh... )

[brityank]

The disjointedness in the communications flow from top to bottom and vice versa is very worrisome.

That same attitude is also in play out in the real world; I'm fighting a battle in my own technology company where decisions are made upstairs without considering either the feet-on-the-street or the customers future planning. Needless to say, it's damn frustrating, and my dogs are tired of dancing.

Thanks for the pings and the info, I appreciate it. Cheers.

[FreeLibertarian]

Please put me on your list.

[CyberAnt]

They guessed - and guessed wrong - how on earth could you sleep at night knowing you guessed wrong with all those lives. How horrible!

[brityank]

... "aerodynamic truths" ...

What are you saying? That there's a lot of hot air being blown around? ;^)

There's no such thing as stupid questions, only stupid answers from stupid people; I haven't seen too much of that with you and your colleagues. Seriously, thank you for the education on just how difficult space travel is. Cheers.

[brityank]

OK, done.

[bonesmccoy]

What are you saying? That there's a lot of hot air being blown around? ;^)

Lift-off is not the only venue for massive venting of plasma from displaced engineering team (due to Clinton-era budget cuts).

RETURN TO FLIGHT????

Hell, NASA doesn't even know what CAUSED the accident in the first-place! What the heck are they talking about RTF for?

The country needs a real space program and not the spam-can on wings that we created forty-years ago.

Get us a Heavy-Lift Booster to shut the PLA-Chinese up. When the Chinese get to the moon, we should have Neil Armstrong back at Tranquility and saying "welcome".

Welcome to the moon on behalf of the people of the free world

[bonesmccoy]

MESSAGE TO CHINESE: This planet is not for sale!

[freepersup]

It's painful to have to read the reasoning and defensive explanations behind the decision not to press forward with any ground or space based imagery inspections.

Yes it's hindsight now- but it wasn't then.

As a former parachute rigger and freefall parachutist, the rigger motto has served me well. I WILL BE SURE ALWAYS. Hard to beat that one.

Using this axiom, if someone on the team needs to tap into the spy satelite network in order to see the shuttle "to be sure", then that's what the agency needs to make happen.

Let's suppose a satelite camera provided an image to NASA that showed damage which would be of a fatal nature. In this example let's stick with the known debris strike location- RCC's # 5,6,& 7. What's the solution ?

Might the shuttle be positioned upon re-entry in such a way as to shield the left wing's leading edge from the intense re-entry heat ? I don't see a way to do it. Initially, I was thinking about the possibility of a flight configuration where the shuttle is banked in such a way that the left wing is out of the slip stream or relative wind enough to shield it from the plasma at the re-entry interface. To do so would expose other areas of the shuttle, which lack the proper thermal protection, to the re-entry heat.

[brityank]

When the Chinese get to the moon, we should have Neil Armstrong back at Tranquility and saying "welcome".

On that I firmly agree. Unfortunately, we have a real problem in that a lot of the raw materials and little-by-little the knowledge of them is being outsourced, courtesy of the Greening of the Government. I heard that NASA has to get most of it's titanium from outside the country, and most of that is defective. The most prolific lanthimide (sp) mines in the US are now pretty well embargoed by ESA edicts. We're losing the knowledge base for nuclear reactors and the engineers who run them, as the math and science courses needed are being undermined by the environmentalist lobbies in both schools and governments. Most sheeple are content to go home and turn on the latest "Real Survivor" trash programming, instead of learning what their local governing bodies are doing with their tax monies.

Bread and Circuses and (outsourcing) Servants -- the Fall of the Roman Empire, and possibly the closing of the most noble experiment in governance -- the USA.

One good thing about being a pessimist; you're not surprised when things go wrong, and you get delirious when things go well.

[FreeLibertarian]

Thanks

[brityank]

Might the shuttle be positioned upon re-entry in such a way as to shield the left wing's leading edge from the intense re-entry heat ? I don't see a way to do it.

I don't know enough about flying the shuttle, but I don't think that I would have made the decision, knowing there was potential fatal damage, to bring it down without trying everything and anything to rescue the crew. Columbia was sent up as if it were a simple camping trip up in the hills. No thought or provision was made for them all to exit the craft even if a second shuttle had been sent up. The docking collar, EVA suits, cherry-picker arm; none of them on this flight. The two suits they had were umbilical-attached, not self-contained; they were limited to whatever tether length the oxygen supply provided.

A remote controlled camera was designed and built and tested; why isn't that standard on every craft? Guessing that the foam strike didn't cause critical damage, based on poorly visioned distant optical cameras at liftoff is pitiful. Not equipping the MMU and training a couple of the crew to use it is deplorable. Sitting in a nice air-conditioned office deciding that the crew wouldn't be able to effect some type of repair on the tiles is short-sighted neglect. Hell, I can get cheese out of a pressurized can; I'm sure some type of ablative foam could be rigged to cover some tiles.

Still, I do have the reality of knowing, that under all of the circumstances this crew was sent up under, just maybe it is better for them, if not us, that they had no inkling of their impending doom. I tear up each time I read through the time line of their descent and can hear the excitement in the words from McCool, Husband, Clark, and Chawla nattering about the plasma displays through the windows. God rest their souls.

[Budge]

There must be a way to do in-flight photos to check for any damage.

[brityank]

I know there is, but the layers of bureaucracy and security will have to be knocked down first. I found the following shot at GRIN; someone else had a better one with an explanation of how it works. It should be standard on every manned flight and improved as technology indicates.

12/03/1997 -- Looking like he's playing with a high tech "soccerball" STS-87 Mission Specialists Winston Scott reaches out and retrieves the free-flying AERCam/Sprint (Autonomous EVA Robotic Camera).

I believe NASA also has a SR-71 that they have previously used to image a shuttle; I don't know if the image could be sharp enough to discern individual tiles and any damage, and obviously the lighting would be a big consideration. There are lots of military sats that have imaging capability that can resolve features to about six inches at ground level; but we'll never know if they could have detected misaligned RCC or small tile damage. Just my uninformed opinion.