A "Mafia in uniform"
Russian criminal organizations are heavily involved in the arms market, as is the Russian military. In Russia, two separate but overlapping processes seem to have fused in ways that have greatly stimulated the illegal arms trade. The first is the massive growth of organized crime, fueled by hyperinflation and unemployment and facilitated by the long-standing link between criminals and corrupt officials and politicians.
The second process is the criminalization of millions of members of the armed forces, who have suffered a severe decline in status. The members of the Russian military receive their wages months late and work under appalling conditions. As a result, the military has become what Graham Turbiville calls a "Mafia in uniform."2
For self-preservation on the one hand or unmitigated greed on the other, all ranks of the armed services are engaged in their own entrepreneurial activities. Privates have sold their rifles to local criminals; high-ranking officers have sold much more significant equipment to foreign governments.
Extensive corruption-combined with a partial transition to a capitalist economy-has resulted in the de facto privatization of Russia's military equipment. And the growth of organized crime and the criminalization of the Russian military have merged in ways that make combating the flow of stolen arms extremely difficult.
The outflow of Russian weapons seems to be increasing. Itar-Tass reported last May that in the first three months of 1998, 465 illegal arms dealers were arrested, and approximately 1,500 weapons, 170,000 cartridges, 30 kilograms of explosives, and 147 bombs were confiscated. One operation not only prevented the selling of Grad rockets to Abkhazia, but also resulted in the confiscation of 180 rockets with 18 tons of explosives.
Arrests are the exception rather than the rule. In the summer and fall of 1998, the Russian economic crisis precipitated a further hemorrhaging of Russian military weapons. According to one report, between September 22 and 28 more than 17,000 rounds of ammunition, several thousand stun grenades, six grenade launcher rounds, and 10 grenades were stolen from a Pacific Fleet ammunition dump.3 In October it was reported that customs officials in the far eastern city of Khasan had blocked an attempt to sell five assault/transport helicopters to North Korea.4
Movement toward the formal commercialization of the Russian military-something along the lines of China's People's Liberation Army-is taking place. But whether the process is formalized and legitimized or continues clandestinely, the exodus of arms is likely to continue. Consider the weapons that Russian gangs deploy: Four criminals arrested in Tambov had 17 assault rifles, an assault rifle with an under-the-barrel grenade launcher, 11 other grenade launchers, five grenades, 13 pistols, an industrial explosive device, and more than 800 cartridges of ammunition.
Illegal guns are also being shipped into Russia. One of the most bizarre incidents involved several officials of the Russian embassy in Finland. Acting on information received in August 1996, the Moscow Regional Directorate for Combating Organized Crime identified eight former and current embassy employees, including the first secretary, who had bought more than 200 firearms and more than 5,000 rounds of ammunition in Helsinki and smuggled them into Russia using diplomatic immunity to proceed unhindered through customs controls.