Posted on 04/04/2003 9:22:59 AM PST by Petronski
April 5 2003
The neat files of a library in Baghdad reveal just how the city will meet the army now at its gates, writes Scott Ritter.
There is a complex of buildings in downtown Baghdad - if it still exists after coalition bombing - that contains a dark secret unknown to, or ignored by, the US military when it developed the "Operation Iraqi Freedom" battle plans. Called the Al Bakr Institute for Higher Military Studies, it is the Iraqi version of the American War College and Army General Staff College rolled into one.
As a chief weapons inspector for the UN, I studied this institute for seven years, inspecting it twice. My interest stemmed from a concern that if Saddam Hussein's regime was to continue to maintain chemical and biological weapons (CBW), it would need a corresponding doctrine of employment. The Al Bakr Institute was the place in Iraq where doctrine was developed. I found no evidence of a CBW doctrine, but I did find something that should be of greater concern.
When I first visited in 1992, the library and archives of the institute were filled with binders containing interviews with every Iraqi military commander, down to the battalion level, who had engaged in combat with US forces during Operation Desert Storm. I reviewed these files, looking for any mention of CBW, but found probing investigations into the tactics and equipment of the US military, the deficiencies of Iraqi equipment and tactics, and plans for reorganising, re-equipping and retraining the Iraqi military to overcome those deficiencies.
A second inspection in 1997 showed this program had matured, and a new doctrine had been formulated and disseminated. Furthermore, the institute had formalised a sophisticated program of ongoing study of the US military that updated Iraqi military thinking on a regular basis to compensate for developments in technology and tactics.
The Iraqis had learnt not to engage in a stand-up fight where Americans could bring to bear their superiority in firepower, target-acquisition capabilities and manoeuvrability. The Iraqis reconfigured their military to emphasise small-unit tactics, as opposed to the plodding division- and corps-level operations of the Iran-Iraq and Gulf Wars.
The Al Bakr Institute developed concepts of active defence, constantly moving assets with an eye towards the US ability to collect, process and respond to intelligence data, so the US would bomb what had happened, not what was happening. Deception was integrated throughout, including tactics that had the Iraqis place derelict vehicles in freshly evacuated battle positions, drawing US air attacks away from the real combat power.
Command-and-control was decentralised, with Iraq divided into four autonomous defence regions each broken into combat sectors. The success of the ongoing resistance in southern Iraq attests to the efficacy of this strategy. Radio communications were de-emphasised - couriers and face-to-face briefings became the standard.
The Al Bakr Institute found that special care had to be taken to maintain and retain the loyalty and reliability of the Iraqi population. So the Baath Party was instructed to engage in formal Islamic training and to integrate its functionaries with religious and tribal leaders, especially in the south. Tribal relations were moved away from the party and turned over to the Special Security Organisation, responsible for regime security, including the President's. The Baath Party Militia was melded with tribal militias to form rural defence forces with a shared identity.
Further troubles await the coalition forces as they close on Baghdad. The Special Republican Guard, Saddam's elite security force, has been given an expanded role in responding to emergency situations beyond the basic physical security of Saddam. While certain battalions are responsible for the security of Baghdad and Tikrit, others, broken into companies and platoons, serve as "stiffener" forces for Republican Guard units.
In the aftermath of the failed CIA coup d'etat in June 1996, the Special Republican Guard dissolved its 5th Brigade and merged that brigade's four battalions with the paramilitary Fedayeen Saddam, creating an elite and fanatically loyal organisation under the control of the Special Security Organisation.
Those who predicted that the Iraqi army would surrender, that the Iraqi population would welcome the coalition with open arms and that the Iraqi leadership would collapse were wrong. Unfortunately, the "effects-based" strategy embraced by the Pentagon was based on these conditions. What has transpired is a case of arrogance resulting from ignorance of the enemy.
The Iraqis, thanks to the Al Bakr Institute, have not made that mistake. And today we are paying the price.
Scott Ritter served as a UN chief weapons inspector for Iraq for seven years, from 1991-1998.
"I especially enjoyed the underage girlie mags. I inspected them sometimes four or five times an hour."
Well put, Mr. Ritter.
The Iraqis reconfigured their military to emphasise small-unit tactics, as opposed to the plodding division- and corps-level operations of the Iran-Iraq and Gulf Wars.
Yeah, Scott, that’s working our real well for them.
They’re dying by the thousands and every once in a while they manage to sneak an exploding pregnant women into the midst of our soldiers and kill two.
I wonder if the Al Bakr Institute for Higher Military Studies had a children’s section in the basement. Not only would that explain Ritter's grasp of the issues and it would also explain why he spent seven years “studying” the place.
What's this "we" stuff? Scott, do you have a turd in your pocket? Besides, what's the price? 1:1000 KIA's? No matter how you try and spin this thing, our military is kickin' ass and taking names.
Iraq is a losing army for several reason. Foremost is that Saddam is the leader and no one does anything on their own initiative because they do not want to suffer the consequences of his disapproval.
The same thing happened to Germany when an egomaniac was the be all end all for every military decision. The morning of D-Day no one wanted to wake up Hitler to tell him the Allies were invading at a different place than he said they would.
Neither proved to be any sort of military leader. Just paranoid, vindictive madmen.
Sounds like a pretty damn big "if" to me..... :)
The Iraqis, thanks to the Al Bakr Institute, have not made that mistake. And today we are paying the price.
Wouldn't you think that as a former US Marine, that Ritter would feel a moral resposibility to communicate this info to the military in advance of an invasion?
I think he's demonstrated his level of personal integrity.
Accompanied by Hans Blix on the skin flute.
Knowing how the U.S. is going to hit you only helps if you can hit back.
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