The American strategic revolution

The American strategic revolution
By Stephen Blank

In Afghanistan and now more visibly in Iraq, we are witnessing the latest stages of a strategic revolution. This revolution is not merely the strategic effects gained by using precision-guided munitions. Rather, in both cases, the unparalleled ability of the United States to project and sustain joint military power has been graphically displayed to a degree that is unprecedented in military history.

Never before has anyone successfully projected naval and air power into Afghanistan or Central Asia. Indeed, many of the foreign commentaries directly after September 11, 2001 could not even begin to conceive of such an operation being successful or being mounted at all.

Therefore, we must acknowledge that the revolution in military affairs, at least in its current incarnation, is as much about maneuver as it is about firepower and precision strike. This conclusion will undoubtedly shape future decisions about weapons acquisitions and force structures. This conclusion also cannot be taken to mean that the Iraqi war or other wars that may come will be cakewalks.

But it does mean that the synergistic effects of combining precision strikes with what the armed forces call dominant maneuver have greatly transformed the nature of contemporary warfare, and that this transformation is apparently beyond both the cognitive and material capabilities of most other major militaries or potential threats to our security.

It must also be remembered here that this achievement is possible only through the synchronization first of all of joint forces: naval, air, land, space, and computer, and second through the level of interoperability that we have been able to create with our allies. Although those levels of interoperability vary with the war and the ally, the Northern Alliance being obviously a very different ally than the British military, in both cases the coalitions' achievement in maneuver have been revolutionary.

Our joint forces remain capable of providing both logistical and aerial support to our ground forces in Afghanistan. And in Iraq the ground forces covered unprecedented amounts of ground since operations began. Although in neither case have we surmounted the "fog of war" nor should such an outcome be reasonably expected, prophecies to the contrary notwithstanding; unexpected events and "fog" are inherent in all warfare because all war is about the strategic interaction of two thinking and willing enemies. Therefore all strategy is not only interactive, it is inherently dynamic, fluid, and subject to unforeseen or unexpected decisions by commanders and leaders. Therefore, the unexpected must be expected and we should not become excessively disoriented should that occur.

Even if we take the unforeseen into account, these two wars open a window on future wars and demonstrate that joint operations, performed at an unprecedented level of proficiency, are leading to ever higher levels of achievement with respect to both precision strikes and the ability of forces to maneuver. These revolutionary achievements, in turn, will trigger, or perhaps raise the existing debate within the US armed forces to a higher level.

Undoubtedly, a major postwar debate within the US armed forces will take place over the capabilities, structure and missions of all of the services. The army must prepare for this debate and learn to make a better case for its strategic utility. Arguments over force structure and end strength cannot remain confined to the need for boots on the ground to hold ground, but must now relate to the unprecedented capability of maneuver forces supported by precision-strikes from all the services.

Consequently the role of armor on the battlefield must be reexamined. It is clear that the need for heavy armor and for land-based artillery remain essential, perhaps even more in austere and rough terrain than was previously thought to be the case. Likewise critical arguments about the role of helicopters and the appropriate tactics for using them should undergo searching examination. Evidently the only "retreat" or abortive operation was one in which sustained and coordinated ground fire drove away Apache helicopters. In other wars, too, helicopters have failed to realize their potential. Thus in Chechnya since 1999 Moscow has lost 50 helicopters, a fact that goes to the heart of the debate over the need to devise appropriate tactics for effective maximization of their capabilities.

Equally, if not more importantly, those arguments must also relate to the need for sufficient forces to fight urban battles and to maintain order in transitional situations as the US moves to peace operations after the end of hostilities. Indeed, there are already congressional calls that we are under-manned in Iraq with regard to current stability operations, and these calls are occurring even as the Pentagon is sending forces home. Therefore the post-conflict situation in Iraq, which alone provides the strategic justification to the world for what we have done, must also be carefully examined regarding lessons for future force packages and service missions.

But the need to rethink the role of heavy armor and organic artillery, helicopters and post-conflict structures and missions must also take place within a context that also assimilates the most basic strategic lesson of Iraq, ie the importance of joint synchronization of firepower and maneuver which alone offers maximum operational gains.

In both Afghanistan and Iraq, the Marines and the army demonstrated a revolutionary capability for maneuver, provided that they were closely integrated in joint operations with the navy and air forces. This new capability should become the basis for military planning because both these operations have demonstrated that precision strike capability, notwithstanding the revolutionary and enormous progress they have made, cannot by themselves deliver strategic outcomes.

As we wage these wars we must continue to remember that it is the synergies of synchronized joint operations combining firepower with maneuverability that invariably produce the most beneficial outcomes. The revolutionary achievements of our land forces confirm this, and those facts must not be lost sight of as we move forward.

Stephen Blank is an analyst of international security affairs residing in Harrisburg, PA.

I think Mr. Blank has made some interesting observations, but he fails to bring these observations to a useful summary. Part of what has happened with our successes in Afghanistan and now Iraq is that the US has demonstrated that force can be projected to take down regimes without the huge collateral damage to the country, the civilian population or to our own troops.

This is the opposite message from the Clinton experience in Mogadishu where the US would "cut and run" when the collateral damage got ugly. That was the great hope of Usama bin Laden and Saddam: the US doesn't have the will to stay the course... Public opinion will prevent America from projecting its power. The Arab-street will rise up... blah - blah - blah...

This inspired war-plan must send shivers down the spine of Iran, Syria, many of the other Arab kingdoms, and North Korea. While the terrorists may still feel empowered to do their terrible acts, they may start to find that the regimes that gave them aid and comfort are a bit more reluctant to continue that aid and comfort.

This war on terror will go on for decades, but the battle has been joined and our leaders have gotten us off to a good start.

Not to pick nits, but what he is talking about here is really tactics, not strategy. There is a revolution in strategy going on as well, and it involves (among a number of other things) defusing organized terrorism by striking at host states who have taken the trouble to publicly disavow any connection with the groups they covertly support. Another important element is to break the monopoly the backers of such groups have on popular communications technologies by subsidizing their oppositions - this is Radio Free Europe writ large. A third is to break up the ability of a coalition of non-democratic states to threaten the world economy through manipulation of oil prices. Real strategy tends to involve control of ground, natural resources, and lines of communication - political alignments and military operations tend to support these objectives, not supplant them.

The Army is in danger of being decimated by Sec. Rumsfeld because Rumsfeld believes it can be smaller and lighter GIVEN the precision strike capability of our air power arms in the Air Force and Navy.

Rather than argue over the force level being anything from zero to millions, the real issue is tailoring the size to fit the missions they envision the Army doing.

First, someone must come to grips with the fact that they will break the Guard & Reserve if they activate them too often. They are citizen-soldiers. If someone wants to make them soldier-citizens, then they'd better just make and announce that decision, pay them accordingly, and have them inform their civilian employers that their military career is primary and not the other way around.

Force level will be determined by missions. If the mission is to fight 2 simultaneous wars while peacekeeping in X number of locations and doing disaster relief in X number of other locations and doing border patrol from Texas to California, then they need enough people so that soldiers with families can be present with those families a reasonable amount of time each year. If you want them home at least 9 months out of the year, that will determine how many bodies you will need to man the critical missions you've identified.

I'm looking forward to the lessons learned from the battles in Iraq and Afghanistan. To my uneducated eyes, it seems that helicopters are not appropriate for close in support of ground troops. This leads me to conclude we must accellerate the implementation of the Marines' Osprey aircraft and possibly design a replacement for the A-10. Ideally, I'd like to see a VTOL version of the A-10. That would give it more flexibility, while still retaining the tough, AA resistant airframe.

To my uneducated eyes, it seems that helicopters are not appropriate for close in support of ground troops.

Part of the problem is the division of aviation capabilities between the Air Force and Army. The Air Force flys all fixed wing land based fighters and bombers, while the Army flys rotary wing aircraft. The problem is that the Air Force fighter jocks want to fly the hottest performing fighters not low altitude ground support attack aircraft. Prior to the Gulf War, the Air Force wanted to replace A-10's with F-16's. Either the close support role either fixed or rotary winged needs to be part of the Army, or the Air Force must be required to cooperate with the Army and maintatain the fixed wing capability.

I like the idea of a VTOL A-10 replacement. I also think such a design would be useful for the Marines if modified for carrier operations. I'm not sure that stealth is all that important for the role of close support, but if possible an A-10 replacement could be made more stealthy.

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