Exposing the “Strongman” Fantasy: Pluralism is Iraq’s only realistic option

Experts who claim to be realists say it is hopeless for the U.S. to try to create a democracy in Iraq. But it is those who think that the U.S. can meet its needs by installing a strongman who will restore Sunni military control of Iraq who are in the grip of an illusion.

What is referred to as the "democratic" program building a pluralist government of law which protects Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds is the only realistic goal for the U.S.

The U.S. is committed to creating a reasonably stable government in Iraq that can hold the country together despite the division of Iraq among Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds, as well as other minorities.

The only possibilities are either a pluralist regime designed to protect the interests and needs of all the major groups, or a regime in which one group suppresses the others. The first alternative is what is being called "democracy" because it requires agreement between competing groups.

All forms of the second alternative dominance by one group are impossible or unacceptable. Neither the Kurds nor the Shiites will accept another Sunni dictatorship (and many Sunnis would also object). The Kurds are not united or effective enough to rule. Neither Kurds nor Sunnis will accept an Islamist Shiite state ruled by ayatollahs (and many Shiites would also fight against it). It is the "nondemocratic" alternative which is unrealistic.

So the question is not, "Should there be democracy?" It is, "Should there be a pluralist system in which none of the groups dominate the others?"

The U.S. administration doesn't yet have a unified position about which alternative to favor. What appears to be U.S. reluctance to be seen as telling the Iraqis what to do about their future government, or fear of damaging some Iraqi with the "made in the USA" label, is really internal conflict among Americans about what kind of Iraqi government the U.S. should seek.

Ahmad Chalabi and the Iraqi National Congress (INC) have been committed for ten years to the pluralist, rule-of-law, alternative. Those in the State Department and the CIA who have worked so hard against Chalabi argue partly against his personal qualities and the fact that Chalabi and the INC are exiles rather than "internals."

But they reject evidence of local support for Chalabi and for the INC and its ideas because they have a deep-seated conviction that the goal of democracy is unrealistic in the short term. They, and the governments of the neighboring states, don't believe Iraq can be kept together except by the army, led by a Sunni-dominated officer corps. The Saudis, Syrians, and Egyptians are less afraid of Iraq falling apart than they are of Iraq being kept together by a democrat like Chalabi.

One key factor usually not taken into account is that none of the basic groups in Iraq is unified. For example, one million of the four million Kurds live in Baghdad, and there is a big difference between the urban Kurds and the village Kurds of the north.

Similarly, while Baghdad is in the Sunni center of Iraq, more than half of Baghdad's six million people are Shiites. Some of the major tribes which are important units in the political structure of Iraq are partly Shiite and partly Sunni.

The distinctions between urban and rural parts of the population, or between primarily secular and primarily religious parts, are as politically significant as the distinctions between Sunni, Shiite, and Kurd, that receive all the attention. Even for primarily secular Muslims Islam is a central part of their identity, and many modern urbanites retain significant tribal attachments.

Among religious Iraqis whether Sunni or Shiite there are important differences between those who might be called extremists, followers of either Wahhabi/Muslim Brotherhood influences or the Islamism of Khomeini from Iran, and more moderate Muslims not committed to using force to make everyone follow their beliefs.

The multiple, overlapping identities found in Iraq as in most places provide the basis for building a united Iraq. If all Iraqis were simply Sunni, Shiite or Kurd, there would be no solution except division or domination. Fortunately the situation is more complicated than that, and the real possibilities come from the complications.

Generally people assume that each of the three major groups wants to control the country. But in fact most leaders are much more focused on making sure that another group isn't able to dominate them; their main concern is defensive.

Groups of community leaders are always risk-avoiders. And the Iraqi leaders have all had a terrible experience. They are keenly aware of the risks of anarchy and of division within the country, as well as the risk of domination by another group.

The group of leaders of each community would happily give up the goal of their group dominating the country if they could find a way to make sure that no other group dominated. Now the leadership of Iraq is the few thousand men and women, but mostly men, who are the accepted leaders and senior members of Iraq's traditional groupings, tribes, clans, families, plus religious leaders, local notables, and some of those who achieved positions in the exile political process and in the Iraqi National Congress (INC) regime that operated in northern Iraq from 1992 to 1996.

While much of this leadership may not have any commitment to Jeffersonian values, it is ready to try something different in Iraq, wants to keep Iraq together, and is prepared to believe that law and democracy may be the keys to success in the modern world.

They don't think that the fact that no Arab country is democratic means that Iraq can't be; they think Iraq can do things other Arab countries are unable

The primary question they will ask about proposals for the new Iraq is: "Will such a system enable our group to continue to control and protect our community?"

Of course they will be interested in competing for a bigger share of disputed benefits. But there is reason to hope that competition about marginal advantage and personal rivalries will not be enough to overcome the leaders' desperate need to put together a system that protects their basic position and preserves the country.

The solution to the problem of Iraq's future worked out by the Iraqi National Congress (INC), representing all groups, while scorned as unrealistic democracy, is based on the fundamental idea that each community should control itself, as in the days of the Ottoman Empire and to some extent during British rule.

The INC concept and the one developed by Kanan Makiya as part of a U.S. State Department-convened Iraq group is to divide authority both regionally in a federal system, and politically between the national government and the communities who are normally the main influence on the daily life of most Iraqis. This permits the national government to be made up of more modern and democratic Kurds, Shiites, and Sunnis.

In a national setting they can reinforce each other, even though in their own groups each must take a back seat to more traditional and authoritarian figures. A government of law will be built on the Muslim tradition of leaders' obligation to observe the law, plus a practical consideration. Each person realizes that if he himself is not ruling, it would be safer if the ruler is subject to law.

If such a national government threatens the hold of the community leaders in their separate affairs it will be resisted. This "democratic" government will not have a mandate to make Iraqis live as democrats, or to challenge the traditional leaders. If it wants to continue to receive the support or at least tolerance of the fierce community leaders it will have to leave them alone as the Ottoman rulers from Istanbul did for centuries.

Because a pluralist system does not conflict with anyone's basic interests, and is based on Iraq's needs rather than an ideological commitment to democracy, the idea has been accepted by many Iraqi leaders and is not an unrealistic dream although it will be very difficult.

This would be the situation if Iraqis were left alone to build a new system. But Iran has other ideas.

The Iranian regime is afraid that the U.S. will come after them next. They understand that they have a much better chance to defeat the U.S. in Iraq than they have to defend themselves from a U.S. challenge at home, because at home they are weakened by their lack of public support.

Iranian agents are the largest group in Iraq with a clear idea of what they want to do and a united tactical and strategic leadership. Iran has already put large numbers of political organizers and agitators, backed by hundreds of armed men and millions of dollars of political bribes, into Iraq to implement their well-planned program.

They are not trying to win a popularity contest; they are seeking to control through the power to kill their opponents and protect those who do as they are told.

To defeat the U.S. in Iraq Iran doesn't need to establish a Shiite religious state in Iraq; all it has to do is prevent the formation of an Iraqi government because that would put the U.S. in an impossible situation when Iraqis then use terrorism to kill large numbers of Americans. If the government in Iraq continues to be an American government Iran will be able to organize Iraqi groups to protest against the U.S. "occupation," and such protests will provide the political cover under which Iraqi terrorists, with covert help and encouragement from Iranian agents, can kill Americans and destroy American offices and headquarters.

American security measures to protect its personnel and root out terrorist organizations will inevitably cause conflict with Iraqis and increase animosity against American government. Terrorism by Iraqis against Americans (and Iraqis) is almost impossible to defeat without an Iraqi government. And the conflict would produce great anti-U.S. reactions in both the Arab world and in Western Europe.

But the increased urgency of creating an Iraqi government to be able to resist the challenge from Iran hasn't eliminated the division in the U.S. administration about which of the two Iraqi alternatives a pluralist government or domination by one of the Iraqi groups the U.S. should support.

The pressure from Iran may make the U.S. more eager to leave, and more willing to accept a less than democratic government, but it won't make it easier to create a government based on domination by one of the Iraqi groups. The other Iraqis would resist and the conflict would provide further cover for terrorism against the U.S.

Therefore the Iranian challenge only increases the U.S. need to work to establish a pluralist Iraqi government that is, a "democratic" solution, because only a pluralist regime can achieve the Iraqi unity needed to repel the Iranian interference and overcome the terrorists.

— Max Singer is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies of Bar-Ilan University. This piece was originally published by the Jerusalem Post and is reprinted with permission.

Personally, I think that we should get out of Iraq as quickly as possible.

The Iraqi's owe us a few bucks (and more), and they certainly do have the means to pay.

We send them the bill for our services, we force them to pay, and then we should get out.

We are not going to convert these troglidytes to anything.

I say that we collect from them what they owe us and we pull out. What sane person would want to be involved in trying to administer a Democracy or any sort of Government to these backward people?

I say that we just get out. Let them eat their young.

Bring our Troops home, ASAP!

Iran will fall apart all by itself.

Likely there are some operatives there who have American interests at heart, but that matters not. The Troops need to be brought home.

I do not think that we are likely to have much success in any attempts at Nation building among Muslims. It is simply not in their breeding.

There is this document that was designed for a political system to absorb the baneful effects of factionalism. In fact, the more factions you have, the better the document works. George Will has called it "a system of institutionalized gridlock." It was written 216 years ago by a gentleman from Virginia named Madison.

How about something for Iraq modeled on the US Constitution?

I stated this on another one of your posts and I'll say it again here.

Unite them as Iraqi's with a common goal of Iraqi Prosperity. Do it based on Individual Citizen Rights not Group Rights. They need to be Iraqi's not etc..etc..etc..

How about something for Iraq modeled on the US Constitution

Could work if 1) Iraq's oil resources are nationalized and 2)states are defined carefully based the British formula wherein a plurality must rely on the cooperation of its minorities to conduct business. A reverse of the US gerrymandering process.

Iran can keep fooling around until the US decides to do something that will take all their attention right there in Iran. These mullahs are hanging on by a thread with 70% of the people wanting to get rid of them. They keep stirring the pot in Iraq, all their "mujahadeens" will be in Iraq and unable to protect them. It would be the perfect opportunity for the Iranians to rise up and overthrow the mullahs.

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