When you're hiring thugs I guess you go where you can find them...
Still want more information on the non-Iranian vigilantes; someone has got to know where they come from, how they are organized, and how the police and army are reacting to their presence.
Rafsanjani is a complex figure, and he is as well involved in business. My guess is that he will swing when he see where the wind is blowing.
Below is an Opinion from the Daily Star in Lebanon:
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/opinion/26_06_03_a.asp The 3-way battle for Iran’s uncertain future
The struggle in Iran is frequently described as one between two camps: reformists gathered around President Mohammad Khatami and hard-liners loyal to the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. These two groups are certainly at each other’s throats, but no analysis of the situation is complete without an appreciation of the role being played by a third force: former President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. The latter’s efforts are deployed behind the scenes these days, but whatever happens in the more public contest, he figures to have a huge say in what follows.
At some point, Rafsanjani will have to make a decision. He can profit to some extent by allowing the reformers and the old guard to lose popular support by engaging in never-ending battles, but if the mayhem both political and physical goes on too long, there will be precious few pieces left to pick up.
Khatami’s principal accomplishment has been to articulate the longings of a populace for whom the radical changes of the 1979 Islamic revolution are no longer sufficient. They understand that reform is a process, not a destination, but Khatami has not been able to translate his enormous popularity into implementation of the sweeping changes that are required. Whether he remains in office or not, though, the people who have twice elected him president will not simply forget why they did so.
In some ways Rafsanjani’s power is equal to or even greater than Khatami’s. He heads the powerful Expediency Council, which arbitrates intra-government disputes and so can make or break virtually any initiative. Perhaps even more importantly, he has constituencies within both the state bureaucracy and the influential bazaar merchant community of which Khatami can only dream. Rafsanjani is accused by some of using his unique position to perpetuate government paralysis as a means of undermining the credibility of both the reformists and the hard-liners so that he can return to the presidency. If this is true, he is playing a highly dangerous game that risks, at best, putting him in charge of a sinking ship.
Iranians have paid a heavy price for the inability of their leaders to chart and follow a coherent course. That burden will become unbearable unless Khatami’s opponents accept that his ideas are a natural product of the revolution, not a program for its defeat. The people who followed Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini did so because they wanted a more participatory system than that allowed by the much-despised monarchy. They got precisely that, and the result is that they have twice voted for Khatami because he promises more of the same.
Whether he remains in the background or eventually makes a move for his old job, Rafsanjani is ideally placed to render yeoman service to his country and his people. He could also, however, set them back decades by ignoring the manifest will of a people who, granted a few timid liberties, will not give them up without a fight. How he decides depends on the extent to which he understands the inimitable attraction of freedom. Iran cannot go back to the pre-Khatami days, and it can only go down if anyone is foolish enough to try.