Replies

You are right, other academics are also beginning to ring the alarm bells in line with your assessment, but the State Dept./CIA and Condoleeze are apparently asleep at their posts. E.g.,

Insight on the News - Fair Comment
Issue: 07/22/03

Fair Comment
U.S. Must Stand Its Ground on the Korea Peninsula
By Alexandr Nemets and John L. Scherer

Is there a new Sino/Russian/North-Korean alliance that is reshaping the politics of Asia? Despite growing evidence of trilateral teamwork, the U.S. State Department has not yet acknowledged it. Though some observers consider North Korean dictator Kim Jong Il's recent behavior irrational and unpredictable, his actions in fact are bold and efficacious when viewed in the context of this burgeoning alliance.

Foreign-policy experts on Asia in general and North Korea in particular are asking: "Why has everything became so bad after everything seemed to be so good?" In 1994, Kim Il Sung, the leader of the Democratic People's Republic of North Korea, agreed to end his program of research and development of nuclear weapons in return for fuel oil and two light-water nuclear reactors to generate electricity. Pyongyang fulfilled the agreement until last year, when its reactors began to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons.

By April, North Korea had at least two nuclear warheads. By the end of this year, the number could total eight to 10. North Korean Taepo Dong-2 intercontinental ballistic missiles could deliver nuclear warheads to targets in Alaska and the continental United States.

Specialists have proposed combinations of carrot and stick to resolve this threat, tempering toughness with concessions. That always sounds good at least. This would involve economic sanctions and assistance to North Korea, especially sizable deliveries of food and fuel. Such a policy is both contradictory and conciliatory.

The Bush administration has solicited help from the People's Republic of China and Russia, which have closer relations with North Korea than does the United States. The United States has urged them to apply diplomatic and economic pressure on Pyongyang to end its nuclear program. China, for example, provides half of North Korea's food and fuel imports. North Korean leaders have said they would regard economic sanctions as an act of war, and neither Moscow nor Beijing has responded positively.

Russia has suggested instead that Washington recognize the North Korean regime and provide economic assistance. In return for termination of its nuclear-, chemical- and biological-weapons programs, Pyongyang would sign a nonaggression pact that would guarantee no U.S. invasion of North Korea. Pyongyang then also would stop exporting missiles. If Washington accepted these proposals, North Korea would have gained diplomatic recognition by nuclear blackmail, an ugly precedent.

After the 1994 agreement, Washington ignored and virtually forgot North Korea. U.S. policy toward the country did not alter between January 2001 and September 2002, even under new Secretary of State Colin Powell. In October 2002, Pyongyang announced its program to build weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) was back on track.

U.S./Chinese/North-Korean talks in Beijing collapsed at the end of April. In June, Washington stated it would pull back U.S. troops from the 150-mile border with North Korea and offered economic aid. All of this suggested confusion about events in the Pacific, or policy in disarray.

Chinese/North Korean ties have been enhanced since Kim Jong Il's unofficial visit to Beijing in May 2000. Beijing helped organize the unprecedented summit between South Korean President Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong Il in Pyongyang in June 2000. This allowed Kim Dae-jung to launch his "Sunshine Policy" that seeks to avoid confrontation with the North. Many East Asia hands consider the policy - offering economic subsidies, political concessions and, possibly, bribes to North Korean leaders - appeasement. To hold the summit, Kim Dae-jung may have paid Kim Jong Il $1.7 billion, which North Korea used to purchase components for nuclear weapons and 40 fighter aircraft.

Beijing increased its economic support of Pyongyang following the May 2000 meeting. Exports from China to North Korea - primarily crude oil, oil products, grain and food items - jumped from around $330 million in 1999 to a little more than $450 million in 2000. Chinese imports from North Korea decreased from nearly $42 million to $37 million. Exports minus imports amount to subsidies from Beijing to Pyongyang, and these grew from $288 million to $413 million.

Military relations also warmed. In April 2001, a delegation of commanders from the North Korean People's Army signed an agreement in Moscow to resume deliveries of Russian weapons after a 10-year interruption. The Russian media trumpeted the agreement without providing details.

In July 2001, China and Russia signed a 20-year treaty of friendship and cooperation that codified the existing alliance between the two countries. That August, Kim Jong Il made a "triumphal visit" to Moscow, traveling by special train. Security was so tight that traffic on the Russian Trans-Siberian Railroad was paralyzed for three weeks. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Il initialed a series of cooperation agreements, then issued a joint statement demanding the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea. Similar appeals appeared in the Beijing media.

In September 2001, President Jiang Zemin arrived in Pyongyang, the first visit of a principal Chinese leader to North Korea since 1992 when China and South Korea established diplomatic relations. The Jiang-Kim encounters resulted in strengthened economic and political cooperation and increased Chinese subsidies to North Korea.

The events of July-September 2001 have resulted in a de facto trilateral Moscow/Beijing/Pyongyang alliance. Although not yet codified, relations today are based on the bilateral agreements and treaties concluded during 2000-01. Official treaties have been supplemented by secret bilateral agreements concerning technological and strategic military cooperation.

The nature of these secret agreements remains unknown in the West. An attack on one party might bring the other two into the fray. If this is the case, plans to eliminate the North Korean nuclear potential by a pre-emptive strike could result in unforeseen complications.

By autumn 2001, Kim Jong Il, the leader of one of the world's most impoverished countries, felt powerful enough to risk a military confrontation with one of his neighbors. In December 2001, Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF) fired on a North Korean spy vessel that had entered Japanese territory. The North Korean ship fled to Chinese waters.

Was it doing Chinese bidding? During November-December 2001, the Chinese Foreign Ministry and Beijing media vehemently opposed Japanese SDF logistical support of U.S. operations in the Arabian Sea.

At the end of June 2002, North Korean forces attacked South Korean naval vessels in the Yellow Sea in their bloodiest clash in years. As if nothing had happened, Pyongyang earned several billion dollars in trade with the South, welcomed South Korean tourists and obtained investment and direct contributions from companies close to the Seoul administration. Most of this money ended up in the hands of Kim Jong Il who, according to the South Korean media and intelligence community, had stashed at least $4 billion in Western European banks by the end of 2002.

One may speculate that Kim Jong Il's regime organized the naval clash to increase "tributes" from the South. Obviously, he was not particularly concerned about South Korean or U.S. retaliation. At an earlier summit in St. Petersburg, Jiang and Putin had decided to increase bilateral strategic cooperation and to solidify their positions in key regions, particularly the Korean Peninsula. With such backing, Kim Jong Il felt he could act with impunity.

During Aug. 20-24, 2002, Kim Jong Il made his latest journey to Russia. Visiting the Primorye (Maritime) and Khabarovsk regions - those nearest Korea - he toured workshops at the Komsomolsk-na-Amure Aircraft Co., which produce Su-27 and Su-30 fighters for the Chinese People's Liberation Army and other military enterprises. On Aug. 23, Kim Jong Il held talks with Putin in Vladivostok, focusing on expanding their arms trade and on large-scale, near-term, joint economic projects. Afterward, Kim Jong Il directly challenged the United States and Japan by renouncing curbs on his nation's nuclear-weapons program. Deliveries of Russian tanks, jet fighters and air-defense missiles undoubtedly gave him confidence.

In October 2002, during talks with a delegation from the U.S. State Department, North Korean representative Li Gun announced that his country had resumed the development and production of nuclear weapons. Had Pyongyang consulted with Moscow and Beijing about the announcement? At virtually the same time, vessels of the Russian Pacific fleet held joint maneuvers with the North Korean navy in the Yellow Sea for the first time in decades. Moscow-Pyongyang joint action has reached its highest level since the 1960s.

During October 2002-May 2003, the State Department tried to resolve these outstanding issues without using force. The State Department apparently thinks it is dealing with Pyongyang alone, but it is, in fact, confronting the Moscow-Beijing-Pyongyang triad, and all three countries seek the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea. To relinquish control of the Korean Peninsula to this new alliance in exchange for elimination of Pyongyang's WMD programs surely is too great a price.

We offer five observations: 1) Washington should not expect Moscow or Beijing to help resolve this problem. 2) The crisis is long term and need not be fixed by next Friday. Washington can wait for favorable terms. It is the world's only superpower after all. 3) The United States should not appease Kim Jong Il or succumb to blackmail. Major concessions will lead only to more Korean coercion. 4) Washington must not acquiesce whenever Pyongyang becomes belligerent, even if it is supported by Russia and China. The Bush administration should not offer diplomatic recognition, food aid, economic assistance or nuclear technology until North Korea ends its WMD programs and begins to cooperate in the family of nations. 5) A U.S. national missile defense (NMD) ultimately may blunt the North Korean/Chinese/Russian threat. Work on the NMD must proceed speedily.

Alexandr Nemets, who worked for many years in the Russian Academy of Sciences, is an expert on economic and military issues of East Asia. John L. Scherer has written several articles on foreign policy and is the coauthor, with Nemets, of Sino-Russian Military Relations: The Fate of Taiwan and The New Geopolitics.