Post-Columbia NASA Hunkers Down - Officials’ view of shortcomings is a bad omen for future clash

If Hamm had any balls, she would resign.........oooops!

nevermind.....................

He was having trouble, because most of them didn't even know what an 'iso' (isometric drawing) was, or how to make one.

Say it ain't so XBob, but, This is (unfortunately) all too true. Fortunately, I am now retired disabled (but not badly :-), and don't have to face that idiocy every day. Nobody, today even has the slightest exposure to drafting instruments, and most have never set pencil to paper (or vellum). I do believe that the young Engineering types feel that ideas come right out of a computer, because I have never met one of the "new generation" who has the slightest idea of "brainstorming", or any other useful design tools.

This being said, HAM seems to describe his act precisely, and the "faulty analysis" seems to be the norm, rather than the exception, these days. Although not mentioned in the article, remember the "semi-destructive testing" which was done on an RCC seal, then simply reinstalled as flight hardware, blindly forgetting that people's lives depend on this stuff. Working with "man-rated" components used to be serious and heady stuff indeed, as one knew that one was holding lives in your hands, and did the requisite amount of over-design to darn well make sure the component worked, every time, but all that seems to have gone by the wayside today.

Keep the Faith For Freedom

Greg

22 - HAMM - "If Hamm had any balls, she would resign.........oooops!"

I think SHE 'feels' if she doesn't know what problems are, she won't have any. I think her boss, SHE probalby 'feels' the same.

Keep these women away from any airplane I fly or bridge I cross.

Keep these women away from any airplane I fly or bridge I cross.

Her comments were definitely nuts.

Anyone with a conscience would have resigned in disgrace instead of denying the obvious. She blew it!

Instead she claims no one was at fault and they did the best they could. (I see no evidence of that.)

They assumed that since the foam had not brought the shuttle down before, it would survive and that there was nothing that could have been done anyway so they did not even try.

What a bunch of crap.

They blew the call and should take the fall.

Darn, I missed the obvious (LOL)...

SHE said...Ok, so I'm from a "previous generation" of engineers...(removing foot from mouth). Conclusion faulty based on preconcieved datapoints.

OK, the above being said, I wouldn't climb into the left seat of anything that SHE had anything remotely associated with, I don't care if it was a Piper Cub (rear seat in this case LOL) that she ordered recovered with new Ceconite fabric. And that's for me, a big deal, because at this point, I would give about anything to get my medical back, and be able to climb into the left (actually, any seat, as long as there were controls there) seat of ANYTHING capable of flight ;-)

I am, as I always have been, ready to accept risk, such as occurs with flight in any high performance aircraft, as is any motivated pilot, as long as the risks are understood, and I have a chance to evaluate my options prior to any given flight. NASA, however, seems to be holding cards that those who will command/pilot the shuttle can't see, and are making decisions based on ?????. Since the Shuttle Commander is limited in what inspections they can make prior to launch, simply by the vehicle configuration and position, and the value of such inspections limited because some faults one just can't see, they have to go on reports of others, who allegedly perform good inspections and tests. Whooops, allegedy simply isn't good enough.

If one buys into the failure mode, then one buys into the huge negligence of putting questionable items back into flight hardware. If I bent a seal almost a thousand times, I wouldn't reinstall it on a Cessna 150, let alone the Shuttle. If I saw video/film of multiple ET foam failures, I would have shut down there and then, the first time it happened, and find out WHY.

Sorry, people, but standard Aerospace Practice and Inspection/Qualification requires requalification of the entire system if a component of mission critical status is changed in any way, shape, or form, from the original, accepted design. The foam was changed, big time, thus, demanding requalification of the whole system. These yahoos just sat there, watched multiple launches where the darn foam came off the tank and impacted the shuttle wing. Since I am not "in the loop" as to the postflight inspections of these previous "foam impact" flights, I can't speculate on what damage was found. We, on another thread, have discussed the almost burnthrough of the elevon actuator shaft. Man, If that had been my area, and I the engineer responsible, would have sent up red flares/flags, and hectored anyone I could, and If I had to, would have issued a grounding order myself.

Ok, NASA management would probably have fired me on the spot, but at least I would have done what was both professionally and morally responsible, and what would have been expected of any designer in any other aerospace project. One just doesn't deliberately put aircrew at risk of a known failure mode, without fixing the defect which would cause said failure mode. I was always taught from day one, that I should always put myself in the position of saying "YES, I would personally fly that, I have no reservations", and be willing to back that statement up, if necessary, by strapping on whatever flight hardware is in question. A very powerful guarantee, indeed.

Maybe if some of the staff (HAM) were handed LES and told to "get aboard NOW" (boot up posterior optional) , their reactions (how much blood drained from their faces, magnitude of shaking, and percent "pucker factor") would be some extremely good datapoints in regards safety of flight issues. If nothing else, it would be worth a few feet of videotape, showing the panic reaction setting in.

One then scrubs the flight, and looks for the problem they are covering up. Simple, forceful, and instantly doable.

Greg

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But when it came time to assess the hazard of foam impact on the special high-temperature leading-edge panels — the reinforced carbon-carbon, or RCC — they had no test data, no analysis tools, no database of flight experience. So they just guessed. They assumed it would be OK. And NASA officials — particularly Linda Ham, who was in charge of that meeting — let them get away with it.

I had thought the "they" and "them" meant NASA officials, then the text says that "...NASA officials...let them (who them?) get away with it."

MSNBC wrote this mess?!!

Sorry I never got back to comment on this. It seems that others have pretty much covered what I would have said, anyway. With one exception:

You sound like a pilot. If so, you understand that most "accidents" are the result of a number of cumulative factors, none of which - by themselves - would have caused it.

We know that a chunk of foam (possibly ice) hit somewhere near the underside of the leading edge.

This sort of thing has happened many times previously, and has not been a problem. This time it was. So I say there has to be another factor involved.

Was this chunk of foam bigger? Maybe

Did it have ice in it? Maybe

Did it hit in just the right place and at the right angle? Probably

But before I sign off on the "they just ran out of luck" scenario, I would like to investigate other possible contributing factors. Hopefully, the CAIB is doing this, but I am beginning to have my doubts.

I have been saying for a while now that the mod work which was performed on Columbia's leading edge support system in 1999 needs to be looked at. Why was it done? Was it done properly? We just don't know, and neither the CAIB or the press seem to be interested.

The nitrogen-gun tests that NASA performed on the leading edge did not test the support system at all. You could see in the pictures that the RCC section was externally supported. Why did NASA not do a realistic test? Why did they assume that the L.E.S.S could not have been a problem? I understand that the RCC sections are attached to the orbiter by only four bolts - what if the impact did not breach the RCC but broke the attachment? What if a bolt was missing? We just don't know. The closeout photos taken at Palmdale have never been released, or maybe they just don't exist. Who knows...

We know that the same people who did the mod work on Columbia did sub-standard work on Atlantis, causing a minor burn through in the same area as the larger problem on Columbia. This should set off alarm bells, but so far it hasn't.

Oh well. We can only hope the truth comes out - for the sake of the astronauts and the space workers of America.

NASA officials put off chance for spy agency photo of Columbia