No, but I shall pick them up. I've heard of Day of Deceit, of course. I fairly certain that Richard Sorge of the NKVD had picked up intel about the attack and had cabled Stalin in advance when he was stationed in Tokyo. I am also aware that monitoring stations on the West Coast picked up the First Mobile Fleet as it moved on its due south leg towards Oahu. I am disposed to put such things down to the f*%&er factor in history, but I shall pick up Stinnett's volume, just the same.
Have not heard of Wilford's book, however. Can you tell me his thesis, in brief?
Thanks for the reply. I appreciate your suggestion.
Be Seeing You,
Chris
Stinnett's paperback edition is the text I would recommend to you. It has an Afterword Section which has a copy of a TESTM (viz., RDF - Radio Direction Finding) report from August 1941. Stinnett includes that to demonstrate the level of sophistication the US Navy RDF network had at the time.
Wilford's text (also a paperback) is from his award-winning MA thesis in History from the University of Ottawa. His thesis advisor was Professor Brian Loring Villa. They have jointly published an article in the Northern Mariner on the Striking Force's run up to Pearl Harbor. Wilford discusses the SS LURLINE and the report that Radiomen Grogan and Asplund generated, which was countersigned by the SS LURLINE's captain and delivered to the US Navy a week before the Pearl Harbor attack. That report should have caused CinCPAC to be informed and a search North of Hawaii to be initiated - Admiral Kimmel was not told of the SS LURLINE report. FYI - that original report is grown legs and is now missing.
I would also suggest Howeth's tome on US Navy communications and its history - especially RDF and intra-fleet, simulataneous reception/re-broadcast [on separate frequencies], and high-speed equipment.
And Farago's paperback edition of the The Broken Seal - in particular its Postscript. There you will find the method the Striking Force used for bi-directional communication to/from Japan. Nothing magical there - the navies of the world had long used the same techniques.
Also, SRH-406 has an appendix of some pre-Pearl Harbor messages, note in those the distinction made between long-wave and short-wave transmissions, and the important communication responsibility of the Hiei [high superstructure for antenna height] had - to/from Japan and within the Striking Force itself.
Then find Prados Combined Fleet Decoded and the story of the recovery from the CA Nachi of the Striking Force's Operational Order No. 1 (from November 17, 1941). A copy of this document is in the MacArthur Archive in Norfolk, VA. Section F of that report - Communications - confirms that the Striking Force sailed under orders that mandated radio transmissions to acknowledge receipt of orders. [Simple command and control even then.]
Of course, there is the famous AKAGI message " ... heard on tactical circuits ..." - See Layton on her "ham-fisted" radio operator - who would have been left in home water if radio deception was being attempted.
In the Hewitt Inquiry you will find that the so-called "bi-lateral" RDF problem (even recited by Gannon recently) did not exist; also Rochefort's comment on radio deception or lack thereof.
So, strict or absolute radio silence (i.e., all frequencies at all times) is a myth. The US Navy knew it then and knows it now. Of course, those RDF reports, circa Pearl Harbor remain classified - very interesting that.
But, then when FDR got those Japanese messages and says "This means war." - and does not send a FLASH IMMEDIATE message to all commands ... bespeaks volumes itself.
Stay curious.