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I suspect that the domestic al-Qaeda network is built in two parts: the supporters and the actual operatives. Both are kept separate from the other for reasons of operational security and I suspect that the domestic sleeper network may well have whole cells that are entirely unaware of the others' existence to prevent the whole network from being taken down in the event of a terrorist attack. Al-Qaeda is also decentralized enough to the point that I doubt that even the senior leadership is aware of what goes on - most of the actual planning and execution of the attacks is left to the American cell leaders and their controllers, people like Mohammed Atta and Ramzi Binalshibh.

On one side, there appear to be domestic support networks for al-Qaeda that either covertly (CAIR, AMC) or overtly (al-Muhajiroun, al-Fuqra, various Islamist charities) support their goals. These act to a various degree to help finance, recruit, and provide logistics for the global jihad, and I suspect that there are several procurement cells similar to what the Ujaama brothers ran out of Seattle and northern Oregon. I don't know why law enforcement hasn't at least disrupted the recruiting funnels since 9/11, but in my opinion there reaches a certain point where all of the intelligence you can gain out of these organizations has been obtained. I think that there is a very real concern on the part of law enforcement that acting against these cells will lead their members and people who sympathize with them to carry out acts of violence against them, as this appears to be a major fear over in the UK.

As to the actual sleepers, everything I've seen about al-Qaeda networks here in the States (and to a lesser extent in Western Europe) is that they exist within close filial or social circles that are extremely difficult for law enforcement to penetrate. The sheer number of terror suspects who have been arrested in Europe post-9/11 as opposed to the relative handful here in the US is too much of a disparity to ignore. In a way, I expect that US sleepers operate much the same way that November 17 did in Greece for much of its existence - staying underground and under the radar thanks to tight familial connections, not to mention a great deal of tacit sympathy from their ideological fellow travelers. Whereas November 17 had a lot of tacit backing within the Greek leftist community, al-Qaeda has somewhere around 80% of the sympathies among the American Muslim community according to Sheikh Kabbani, a man who is by far the most qualified to answer that question. Breaking filial and social networks is tough work, which is one of the idea of mosque surveillance is an apt one under the circumstances.

they exist within close filial or social circles that are extremely difficult for law enforcement to penetrate. The sheer number of terror suspects who have been arrested in Europe post-9/11 as opposed to the relative handful here in the US is too much of a disparity to ignore.

I feel both enlightened and startled awake by that statement. I cannot help but agree with it. We are looking at a situation where we about have to rely on a foolish mistake, loose lips or a family squabble to clue us in when their next plan gets rolling. May God provide just what we need, when we need it. Thanks for the insight. You are obviously well informed.