[ConservativeMan55]

What kind of worms?

http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/977054/posts

[Poohbah]

When the box goes unpatched for six months, the IT shop needs a collective b****-slap.

[xrp]

The NRC also said that plant IT staff were not aware that there was a vulnerability in SQL Server, or that there was an exploit on the loose, despite the fact that Microsoft and the CERT Coordination Center had issued advisories on both.

If my IT staff said that to me, they'd be out of jobs. SQL Slammer was a nearly 100% preventable attack through Microsoft alone. 100% preventable if you had the proper software in place as a safeguard. Being vulnerable to SQL Slammer was almost inexcuseable as admins had over 6 months to patch. MS Blaster was a different story due to the exploit being released only 4 weeks after the vulnerability was released.

[sigSEGV]

[ampat]

Why nuclear power plant controls are connected to any network escapes me. The only thing I saw in the article was for corporate bureaucracy. The actual controls don't need to be connected. The plant should be a stand alone system. Another (network) system could be put in place to display/transmit information.

[Orion78]

PING!

[First_Salute]

Bump.

[DianaN]

A firewall is NOT good enough. I am on my third computer because the other ones crashed due to infectious intrusions. Nuclear power plant computer systems should be totally isolated from ANY outside interference.