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Letter to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from Secretary of Defense Brown, 15 May 1978.

The first two weeks of May witnessed the culmination of the efforts by the Carter administration to win Congressional approval for the package deal involving the sale of advanced aircraft to Israel, Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

In the following letter, Secretary Brown sought to alleviate fears of some Senators that the F-15 that would be sold to Saudi Arabia would be used against Israel. He explained the capabilities of this aircraft and also specified the assurances received from the government of Saudi Arabia. The next day, the Senate approved the proposed package deal.

Dear Mr. Chairman,
During recent conversations with you and other members of your committee, a number of questions have been raised regarding the characteristics of the F-15 aircraft we propose to sell to Saudi Arabia and reassurances as to the purpose for which Saudi Arabia will use the aircraft. I would like to respond to these questions and attempt to resolve any uncertainties that members may have felt regarding the proposed sale.

In sum, it is clear that the F-15 will help Saudi Arabia deter and defend against those nations that are hostile to its role as a leading moderate Arab state.

II. Assurances
The Government of Saudi Arabia has assured us that it has no aggressive intentions against any state, that it will use the F-15 aircraft only in furtherance of its legitimate self-defense, and that it will not employ the aircraft offensively. The Saudi Arabian Government has similarly assured us that it will not transfer the F-15 aircraft to any third country or permit the nationals of such country to train on the F-15 aircraft, serve as pilots, or otherwise to have access to the aircraft without the authorization of the United States.

We have specifically discussed these restrictions on use and prohibitions on transfer with the Government of Saudi Arabia. They have assured us that they intend scrupulously to comply with these prohibitions and restrictions. The record of Saudi Arabia in this respect is excellent.

However, should the assurances be violated, the United States can take appropriate action, including suspension of services and of delivery of spare parts and other military equipment. Without such services the usability of the F-15 would degrade rapidly.

It is also important to note that the sales agreement reserves to the United States the right to suspend or cancel deliveries at any time when the national interest of the United States so requires. Further, under section 21 (C) of the arms export control act, no U.S. person employed under foreign military sales contracts in Saudi Arabia or any other country would be permitted to perform services in support of combat operations.

Questions have been raised concerning the possible basing of the F-15 aircraft at Tabuk air base. I would like to repeat to you the assurance given to me and other United States officials by the Saudi Arabian Government that Saudi Arabia will base the F-15 aircraft, not at Tabuk, but at Dhahran, Taif and possibly at Riyadh or Khamis Mushait. Basing the F-15 at the vulnerable Tabuk base could place in needless jeopardy these vital aircraft which will form the heart of the Saudi Arabian air defense system. In addition, Tabuk is not equipped to serve as an operating base for the F-15's, and could not be so equipped without extensive base for the F-15's, and could not be so equipped without extensive U.S. assistance which would not be provided.

These practical considerations, of which Saudi Arabia is well aware, strengthen the assurances that the F-15's will not be based at Tabuk.